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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DEBRA JEAN COANDO, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 950573-CA 
vs. 
Priority No. 
PATRICK DEAN COANDO, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant-Appellant Patrick Dean Coando appeals the termination of his parental rights in 
his three children. The termination was entered by the Eighth District Juvenile Court, the 
Honorable Jeril Wilson presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Annotated 78-38-51(1), whereby an appeal to the Court of Appeals may be taken from any order, 
decree or judgment of the Juvenile Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. That the Juvenile Court erred in refusing to transfer the petition for termination of 
the parental rights of an Indian parent, pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act, U.S.C. Chapter 
21, Section 1911(b), to Tribal Court in that there was not a sufficient showing of good cause made 
by Plaintiff for the Juvenile Court to maintain jurisdiction. 
2. That the Juvenile Court erred in reversing its prior decision, that had been 
stipulated to by all parties involved, that the Indian Child Welfare Act applied to the proceedings 
and governed the issue of jurisdiction, thus overturning the previous rule of the case.. 
3. That the Trial Court erred in finding that the termination of the Defendant's 
parental rights did not affect an "Indian family" that the specific facts of this case were not with 
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the scope of Congress' intent in establishing the Indian Child Welfare Act pursuant to the Indian 
Child Welfare Act. 
4. That the Juvenile Court erred in not dismissing the case after close of Petitioners' 
case for Petitioner's failure to satisfy her burden of proof for termination imposed upon her by the 
Indian Child Welfare Act; namely, 
a) failure to provide remedial and rehabilitative programs and preventative 
measures designed to prevent the break up of the Indian family that must be undertaken and 
proven unsuccessful prior to the termination of the parental rights of an Indian parent as required 
by § 1912(d) of the Indian Child Welfare Act; 
b) that a determination must be made, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that continued custody of the child is likely to result in emotional or physical damage to the 
child prior to termination of the parental rights of an Indian parent as required by § 1912(f) of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act; and 
c) the burden of proof imposed by either ICWA of "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
or by Utah Code Annotated 73-3a-402 (et. seq) of "clear and convincing evidence," especially 78-
3a-409, which sets forth specific considerations for the court when the child is not in the physical 
custody of the parent whose rights are to be terminated. 
5. That the actions of the Guardian ad Litem in the conducting of the case created 
prejudice and unfair bias in the Court proceedings and causing the Appellant to feel insulted and 
more isolated from the State Court proceeding. 
PERTINENT STATUTORY AND RULE PROVISIONS 
The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. Chapter 21, §1901 et seq., is the dispositive 
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statute regarding the interest of the Indian tribes in maintaining control over the children of its 
members and their subsequent jurisdiction over issues involving the termination of the parental 
rights of an Indian parent and the breakup of Indian families. The Act, in its entirety is copied in 
the appendix. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-3f-101 et seq., the former statute governing the termination of 
parental rights, has been renumbered to Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-3a-401 to 414. The 
renumbered statute is reproduced in the appendix. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(b), regarding motions to dismiss, is reproduced in 
the appendix. 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The standard for appellate review is that of "correctness" since the trial court's 
determination of the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act is a matter of law rather than of 
fact. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). "Correctness" means the appellate court decides 
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judges' determination of law. 
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 1, 1993 a petition for adoption was filed in the Eighth District Court by Debra 
Jean Coando, aka Debra Jean Robertson ("Petitioner") and Dee Ray Robertson to adopt Ms. 
Coando's three children. Petitioner then filed a Petition to Terminate the parental rights of the 
children's father and her former husband, Patrick Dean Coando. The case was transferred to 
Eighth District Juvenile Court. Mr. Coando is a registered member of the Eastern Shoshone 
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Tribe. All three children are also enrolled members of the Tribe. Appellant filed Motion to Stay 
the proceedings and to transfer to Tribal Court pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) Indian Child 
Welfare Act (Hereinafter "ICWA"). The Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation 
(hereinafter "Tribe") moved the Court pro hoc vice to be allowed to intervene in the case as an 
interested party. Petitioners objected to the transfer. The court appointed a guardian-ad-litem to 
represent the best interest of the children. Before oral argument on the Motion, Judge Kay 
Lindsay found and the parties had stipulated that: 
1. That the minors are Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA. 
2. That the minors were not domiciled on the reservation, therefore § 1911 of the 
ICWA applied to the proceeding. 
3. That the Tribe had the right to intervene. 
4. That the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation had adequate 
notice of the proceeding. 
5. That should this matter be heard in the State Court that the substantial standards set 
forth in ICWA would apply to this proceeding and would be the grounds as defined 
in that Act. The burden of proof, which would be beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
the requirement that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and 
rehabilitative programs to Mr. Coando has been unsuccessful. (Transcript of 
Hearing March 3,1994, Page 2 line 21 to Page 3 line 20) 
6. That the tribe wished the matter be transferred to Tribal Court. 
After oral argument and briefing of several key points, the Court ruled in a Memorandum 
Decision that the Appellee had made a sufficient showing of good cause to prevent the transfer to 
Tribal Court under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and that "it does not run counter to the 
intent of ICWA to retain jurisdiction in the State Court." Memorandum Decision 7/7/94, p.4-5, 
paragraph 13. The Court reaffirmed the previous stipulations of the parties.) Appellant filed an 
Objection to the Memorandum Decision and reserved the right to appeal the issue of jurisdiction at 
the conclusion of the proceedings. 
The case proceeded to trial on November 30,1994. Since the Eighth District Court has no 
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permanent sitting judge, Judge Jeril Wilson of the Fourth District Juvenile Court heard the 
proceedings. 
On May 25, 1995, the Court ruled in favor of Petitioner and granted the Motion to 
Terminated Mr. Coando's parental rights in his three children, holding that the ICWA did not 
apply to these proceedings in that it did not result in the break up of an Indian family. The Court 
also denied the Tribe's Motion to Dismiss. 
Counsel for Mr. Coando filed a Notice of Appeal within the statutory time limits. A 
Motion to Stay Adoption Proceeding was also filed and argued August 23, 1995. The Court 
granted the Stay of Adoption on February 29,1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are drawn from the transcripts and pleadings prepared of the hearing held in the 
Eighth District Juvenile Court. Previous hearings held in the Eighth Judicial District Court 
regarding this matter were not transcribed into the record on appeal. These records contained the 
divorce of Patrick and Debra Jean Coando, the original filing of the Petition to Adopt and to 
Terminate Parental Rights and the Motion to Transfer to Juvenile Court. 
At trial, Plaintiff put on evidence to show why she believed that the parental rights of Mr. 
Coando in his children should be terminated. Upon the conclusion of the case, the Tribe and Mr. 
Coando joined in Motion to Dismiss under Rule 41(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for failure 
of the Plaintiff to meet her burden of proof for termination, namely "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
The Court asked all parties to brief the issue overnight. The next morning, Petitioner was 
allowed to reopen her case. She called as a witness a Counselor/Social Worker to testify as to the 
possible detrimental impact on the children from continued contact with their father. Said witness 
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was never qualified as an expert and it was shown that the witness had no basis for his testimony 
and that he had no qualification's or knowledge of ICWA, except counseling some Indian children. 
It was testified to that the witness had only met with the children at the request of the Guardian ad 
Litem and Plaintiff for approximately forty minutes together the night previous to his testimony. 
Further, that he had never visited with Mr. Coando nor had he done any psychological testing. It 
was clear from his testimony that the Guardian-ad-Litem had been the driving force in finding this 
witness. Transcript of Hearing 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, Page 207-209. 
The Appellant and the Tribe next presented their evidence. During the cross-examination 
of Mr. Coando, the Guardian ad Litem asked him questions showing definite racial slurs and bias. 
These actions created an atmosphere where Mr. Coando felt even more insecure and threatened 
by the Court. See Cross Examination of Mr. Coando by Mr. Austin, Transcript, Page 292-293. 
At the end of argument, the Court took the matter under advisement. Mr. Coando 
requested visitation with his children, asserting that he had been prevented from seeing his children 
for nearly five years by the actions of their mother. The Court granted his motion, after talking to 
the children. The visits were to be with the consent of the Guardian ad Litem and supervised at 
the Department of Family Services. The Guardian ad Litem, who had already upset Mr. Coando 
in Court, authorized the Department of Family Services to video tape the sessions of the visits 
without any Court order or the permission of Mr. Coando. This was a further invasion of his 
privacy. This was especially upsetting to him since he had not been allowed to visit his children 
in years. The Guardian ad Litem filed a Motion to Terminate Visitation and brought another 
mental health care professional to the hearing in March. Counsel objected to the introduction of 
Dr. Bell as a back door attempt to fulfill the requirements of ICWA. The Court did not enter Dr. 
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Bell's testimony as an expert, but discontinued the visits. 
On May 25,1995 the Court issued its ruling on the motion to terminate. The Court ruled 
that since the three Indian children had had minimal contact with Mr. Coando or the Tribe and had 
resided with their white mother and her family, that this was not an Indian family. Therefore, the 
Court reasoned that termination of the parental rights of Mr. Coando would not result in the break-
up of an Indian family. The Court overturned the prior ruling of Judge Lindsay that the ICWA 
applied and ruled that it did not apply. The Court ruled that Mr. Coando was an unfit parent, that 
it was in the best interest of the children that his rights be terminated, that he had made only token 
efforts to avoid being an unfit parent and that the children were bonded to Dee Ray Robertson, 
their step-father. The Court also denied the Tribe's Motion to Dismiss. The Court stated that it 
terminated Mr. Coando's parental rights pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-3a-402 et. seq. 
(typographical error of the Court corrected). 
ARGUMENT 
1. That the Juvenile Court erred in refusing to transfer the petition for 
termination of the parental rights of an Indian parent, pursuant to the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, U.S.C. Chapter 21, Section 1911(b), to Tribal Court in 
that there was not a sufficient showing of good cause made by Plaintiff for the 
Juvenile Court to maintain jurisdiction. 
A. The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted in order to protect 
the interests of the Native American tribes in the children of their 
members and to prevent the further loss of Indian culture and 
values. 
The ICWA, 25 USC §§1901-1922 (1993), was enacted to protect the best interest of 
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by 
establishing for the placement of Indian children in adoptive homes which would reflect the unique 
values of Indian culture. To implement this policy, Congress decided that "in any State Court 
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proceeding for the termination of parental rights of an Indian child not residing on the reservation, 
the State Court, in absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the 
jurisdiction of the tribe, upon petition of the Indian child's tribe." 25 USC §1911 (1993)(emphasis 
added). 
In § 1901 of ICWA, in the section labeled Congressional Findings, the legislature stated: 
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the Indian 
Tribes and their members and the federal responsibility to Indian people, the 
Congress finds -
(1) That Clause 3, Section 8, Article 1 of the United States Constitution 
provides that "the Congress shall have power... to regulate commerce... 
with Indian tribes" and, through this and other constitutional authority, 
Congress has pleniary powers over Indian affairs; 
(2) That Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing 
with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and 
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources; 
(3) That there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and 
integrity of Indian Tribes than their children and that the United States has 
a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members 
of or are eligible for membership in Indian tribe; 
(4) That an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the 
removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by non tribal 
public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such 
children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and 
institutions; and 
(5) That the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian custody 
proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and 
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families. 
Idat 637-38. 
Congress declared in the statute its policy in §1902 as follows: 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to 
protect the best interest of Indian children and to promote the 
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the 
establishment of minimum federal standards for removal of Indian 
children from their families and the placement of such children in 
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foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of 
Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the 
operation of child and family service programs. 
Id at 638. 
To implement the above referenced goals, the first thing the Legislature put in place under §1911 
was the Indian Tribe's jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. If an Indian child is 
domiciled within a reservation, then the Tribal Court retains exclusive jurisdiction over that child. 
When an Indian child is not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, 
a State Court proceeding for the foster care placement of or termination of parental rights, "the 
Court, in the absence of good cause the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction 
of the tribe, absence objection by either parent, upon the Petition of either parent or the Indian 
custodian of the Indian child's tribe, provided, that such transfer shall be subject to declination by 
the Tribal Court or such Tribe." Id at page 641, paragraph (b) 
The legislature went on in §1911(c) to allow the Indian child's tribe the right to intervene 
in any State Court further to protect the tribes interest in the children of its members above and 
beyond that of the parents interest. The Legislature also specifically called for "full faith and credit 
the public acts records and judicial proceeding of the Indian Tribal Courts." The United States 
Congress had therefore declared its preference that any proceeding to terminate the parental rights 
to Indian children be before the Tribal Court. 
It is undisputed in this case that the natural father of the children is an Indian, being an 
enrolled member of the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, which is a 
federally recognized Indian Tribe. It is also undisputed that the three minor children are also 
enrolled members of the same tribe, making them Indian children pursuant to 25 USC § 1903(4). 
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The mother of the children is non-Indian. 
B. The Indian Child Welfare Act specifies that jurisdiction over 
Indian children be transferred to the Tribal Court unless there is 
good cause to the contrary for the State Court to maintain 
jurisdiction. 
The only exceptions to transfer to Tribal Court specified in the ICWA is when there is 
"good cause to the contrary... [and] absent objection by either parent". ICWA at § 1911(b). The 
language of 1911(b) creates a clear mandate to transfer jurisdiction to the Tribal Court with only 
limited exceptions. See In the Matter of Adoption of Hallowav. 732 P.2d 962, 965 (Utah 1986). 
Any analysis of § 1911(b) must therefore start with the presumption that jurisdiction be 
transferred to Tribal Court with the statutory exceptions to be interpreted consistently with the 
purposed of the statute. See In the Matter of Dependency and Neglect of A.L.. 442 N.W. 2d 233 
(S.D. 1989), In the words of the House Report accompanying ICWA, the Act "seeks to protect 
the rights of the Indian child as an Indian child and the rights of the Indian community and Tribe in 
retaining its children and its society." H.R. REP. #1386, 95th Congress, 2nd Session 1978 at 23. 
In the limited circumstances allowed for a State Court to maintain jurisdiction and not 
transfer to Tribal Court, a denial of transfer is not mandated, but is left up to the Court's 
discretion. A determination of whether "good cause" exists clearly involves discretion by the State 
Court. Consequently, in reading the section consistently, it is reasonable to conclude that 
Congress intended that the State Court exercise discretion when there is an objection by a parent to 
transfer, but does not mandate that the State Court maintains jurisdiction. The statute does not 
allow the State to keep jurisdiction over an Indian child without a showing of good cause why the 
transfer should not occur. 
Discretionary review when interpreting § 1911(b) is consistent with the legislative history 
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of ICWA. The House Report in sub-section (b) directs the State Court, having jurisdiction over an 
Indian child custody proceeding to transfer such proceeding, absent good cause to the contrary, to 
the appropriate Tribal Court upon the petition of the parents of the Indian Tribe." H.R. REP. 
1386 at Section by Section analysis for Section 101. The House Report then states that "either 
parent is given the right to veto such transfer." Id. However, a veto can be either absolute or 
qualified See Blacks Law Dictionary 1403 (5th edition 1979). If Congress had intended that 
parents have an absolute right of veto that could be destructive to the tribal interests, then the 
purposes of the statute to protect the rights of the Tribe to their children would be frustrated. But 
by interpreting the parental veto as a qualified veto, allows the purposes of the statute to remain in 
place. 
C. The doctrine offorum non conveniens is insufficient to 
overrule the jurisdictional requirements set forth in the Indian 
Child Welfare Act 
Further evidence of the Congressional intent that jurisdiction should be transferred to the 
Tribal Court under ICWA is the fact that both the parental objection and the modified doctrine of 
forum non conveniens are described in the same places. See House Report 1386 at Section by 
Section analysis for Section 101. The relationship of the discussion of a modified forum non 
conveniens standard to the statement on good cause and parental objection, plus the citation to the 
entire subsection when discussingyfrn/m non conveniens make it clear that Congress intended the 
modified forum non conveniens analysis to apply to situation where good cause not to transfer is 
alleged and where the parent objects. Otherwise, Congress would have placed the discussion of 
forum non conveniens immediately following the discussion of good cause and limited such 
statement to the good cause provision. 
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Congress clearly intended that the goals of ICWA should not be defeated by individual 
parents. Congress determined to subject Indian child custody proceedings to the ICWA!s 
jurisdictional and other provisions, even in cases where the parents consented to the adoption, 
because of concerns going beyond the wishes of the individual parents. Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holvfield ,490 U.S. 30, 50, 104 L. Ed 2d 29,109 S. Ct. 1597 (1989). 
Congress took this action in response to the 1977 Final Report of the American Policy Review 
Commission, which stated "the removal of Indian children from their cultural settings seriously 
impacts a long term tribal survival and has damaging social and psychological impact on many 
individual Indian children." See Senate Report No. 95-597,95th Congress, 2nd session (1978) at 
52. The United States Supreme Court in Holvfield recognized the balancing approach when it 
cited with approval the "scholarly and sensitive opinion" in the Halloway which states "the 
protection of this tribal interest is the core of the ICWA, which recognizes that the tribe has an 
interest in the child which is distinct but on parity with the interest of the parents." Holvfield 490 
U.S. at 52 (citing In Re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P 2d 962,969-70 (Utah 1986). This position 
has also been acknowledged by other State Courts. In Moore v. Seer. 405 N. W.2d 650,652 (S.C. 
1987), the South Carolina Court stated that the parent's objection to transfer under 25 U.S.C. 
Section 1911(b) would allow other States to modified doctrine of forum non conveniens. The 
Federal District Court of Utah has also recognized that "principals of equity require that the 
interest of the individual must also be protected, not at the derogation of the act but in compliance 
with its provisions." Navaho Nations v. District Court of Utah County, 624 F. Supp. 130,133 (D. 
Utah 1985). 
The Congressional intent to provide a "qualified veto" by a parent is the practical result, 
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given that at no place in the statue does Congress provide that the two parents should be placed on 
unequal footing with each other. To find that a parental objection is an absolute veto would foster 
the same type of forum shopping rejected in Holyfield. The parental objection is not an absolute 
veto, but a special right preserved by parents of Indian children to trigger a balancing by the Court 
of the tribes interest with those of the parent. 
The traditional doctrine of forum non conveniens gives a court discretion to overcome the 
presumption to transfer. See Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In such cases, the 
Court considers "the relative ease of access to source of proof, availability of compulsory 
process,... all other practical problems that make trial of the case easy, expeditious and 
inexpensive." Id. at 508. In many cases prior to ICWA where the child was located of the 
reservation, it was extremely simple for the State Courts to decline to transfer the case based on 
principals of forum non conveniens. "States and their Courts are partly responsible for the 
problem [ICWA] was intended to correct." Holyfield 490 U.S. at 45. See also 25 USC, 
§1901(5) ("judicial bodies... have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian 
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families"). 
Because of the sad state of affairs respecting Indian children so emphatically described in the 
legislative reports, Congress clearly intended to permit a State Court to apply a modified doctrine 
of forum non conveniens to protect the rights of Indian children, Indian parents, and Indian tribes, 
rather that to create a loop hole to be used to defeat those rights as so regularly occurred prior to 
ICWA. H.R. report 1386. "Liberal expansion of the forum non conveniens doctrine would 
preclude transferring jurisdiction to tribal Courts except in cases where the child resides on or 
near a reservation. Acceptance of [such argument]... would be contrary to the Congressional 
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findings and the goals incorporated in the ICWA." In the Interest of Armelh 550 N.E.2d 1060, 
1067 (111. App. IstDist. 1990). 
The traditional forum non conveniens should be modified in its application to allow the 
unique interests of the child, the Indian parents, and the tribe to overcome what would be a 
traditional decision to reject transfer to the tribe on the basis oi forum non conveniens. Congress 
has made sure the views of the parents will be addressed, but they must be balanced with the 
interest of the tribe. "The modification of the traditional concept of'the forum non conveniens 
should be limited to meeting the objective of ICWA namely: (1) to protect the best interest of the 
Indian children, (2) to promote the stability and security of the Indian tribes." In the Matter of 
Dependency and Neglect of A.L.. 442 N.W. 2d 233 (S.D. 1989); 25 USC, Section 1902. "That a 
State Court may take jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that it should do so, as the Court 
should consider the rights of the child, the rights of the tribe and the rights of the parents and 
should balance the interest of the State and the tribe." In the Interest of C.W.. 479 N.W.2d 105 
(Neb. 1992). 
At a hearing to determine whether good cause exists, the party opposing transfer has the 
burden of establishing that good cause not to transfer the matter exists. In the Interest of C.W., 
479 N.W. 2d 105 (Neb. 1992)( citing 25 USC, Section 1911(b)) and Holvfield supra. The 
presumption is that jurisdiction should be transferred to the tribe. At the hearing of the 
jurisdictional question, in this case the moving party was the mother who objected to the transfer 
on the grounds that the two fourteen year old children objected to the transfer and forum non 
conveniens. 
The Court ruled that the combination of these things constituted good cause and refused to 
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transfer the case to Tribal Court. The forum non conveniens argument was based on the fact that 
the witnesses necessary for the mother to bring her case would have to travel from Vernal Utah, to 
Fort Washakie, Wyoming, for the trial, which is a five hour trip and would therefore be 
inconvenient. Interesting enough, the Court failed to analyze whether it was any less of a burden 
for the Tribe, the father of the children and the other tribal witnesses to come from Fort Washakie 
to Vernal, Utah. Even if such witnesses as the Tribal Elders were required to travel at great 
burden is not unduly burdensome and does not justify the application of tht forum non conveniens 
standard when balanced against the higher Congressional requirement of transferring jurisdiction 
to the Tribal Court. 
Petitioner also claimed that the children objected to being transferred to Tribal Court since 
they had no experience with the reservation and no experience with the culture. That is not a 
justification for keeping jurisdiction of the case in State Court. In fact, the lack of exposure of the 
children to Indian culture points to the importance of transferring jurisdiction to Tribal Court, 
where the interest of the tribe in those children could be best protected. In Tribal Court, the 
witnesses on tribal issues would be the Elders of the Tribe, who could explain the need to maintain 
tribal culture and traditions, the impact of terminating the parental rights of Appellant, and 
the implications for the termination of the tribe and the children. The isolation of Indian children 
from the tribes culture is precisely one of the evils that ICWA was intended to prevent. See 
Holvfield. 490 U.S. 30 (1989); 25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq.; HR REP 1386; (hearing on Section 
1214 before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Congress 5th session, (1977)). 
The record leading up to the enactment of ICWA indicates that many Indian children have 
had serious adjustment problems upon reaching adolescence because of their isolation from the 
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Indian culture. See Holvfield. 490 U.S. at 33 and note 1. One of the most serious failings of the 
system ICWA was designed to remedy was that Indian children are discriminated from their 
heritage by non tribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently evaluating the 
cultural and social premisses underlying Indian life. Id at 34. Tribal Court is best suited to ensure 
that interests of all parties are properly considered. "Judicial bodies... have often failed to 
recognize the tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in 
Indian communities and families." 25 U.S.C., § 1901(5). The Utah Supreme Court recognized in 
Hallowav that "receptivity of the non Indian forum to non Indian placement of an Indian child is 
precisely one of the evils at which ICWA was aimed." Hallowav, 732 P.2d at 969. 
The State Court should have transferred jurisdiction of this case to Tribal Court because 
that is the preference designed by ICWA and the burden on the party objecting to the transfer was 
insufficient to tip the scales against the presumption. The good cause argued by the mother only 
met the traditional non forum conveniens standard, which would not be sufficient to override the 
Congressionally mandated purposes of ICWA. Transfer should have been made to the Eastern 
Shoshone Tribe Tribal Court. 
2. That the Juvenile Court erred in reversing its prior decision, that had 
been stipulated to by all parties involved, that the Indian Child Welfare Act 
applied to the proceedings and governed the issue of jurisdiction, thus 
overturning the previous rule of the case. 
After motion from Appellant, Patrick Coando, and the Tribe to remove these proceedings 
to Tribal Court, Judge Kay Lindsay specifically ruled that the minors involved in this case are 
Indian children within the meaning of the ICWA 25 U.S.C. §1901 et seq.; and that the above 
named minors are not domiciled on the reservation so therefore § 1911(b) of the Act applied to 
the proceeding. The Court went on to order "that the legal and procedural standard to the ICWA 
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apply herein whether this matter is transferred pursuant to the Act or whether the matter is heard 
by this Court". Transcript of Hearing held on May 3, 1994, page 3, line 13-20. 
After briefing and argument following the order, the Honorable Kay Lindsay offered the 
following memorandum decision which is quoted in part: 
1. That counsel for the parties have made the following stipulation: 
A. That the above named minors are Indian children within the meaning 
of the ICWA, 25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq. (1978.) 
B. That the above named minors are not domiciled on the reservation and 
thereby Section 1911(b) of the act applies to this proceeding... 
2. That the State Court pursuant to Section 1911(b) of the ICWA (25 USCS) is 
required to transfer the proceeding for the termination of parental rights to an 
Indian child not domiciled within the reservation to the Indian child's tribe in the 
absents of good cause to the contrary and absent objection by either parent. 
Record at Memorandum Decision page 1-2. 
Nearly a year later, when the Honorable Jeril Wilson entered a final ruling in this case, he stated: 
1. The Court has reconsidered the March 23,1994 order of Judge Lindsey and 
finds that the children have spent their entire lives with their custodial Non-Indian 
mother with frequent from relatives and have had minimal contact with 
their Indian father. 
2. There is no existing Indian family unit or environment from which 
the children are being removed. 
3. The Indian father has not maintained custody of the children and the mother is not 
Indian. 
4. Even though the children are certified with the Eastern Shoshone Tribe as enrolled 
members, this action is not for the removal of Indian child from an existing Indian 
family unit, and the termination of Mr. Coando's parental rights will not result in 
the break up of an Indian family. 
5. The specified facts of this case are not within the scope of Congress intent in 
establishing the ICWA. Therefore, the Court concludes that the legal and 
procedural standards of the ICWA do not apply in this case. 
6. That these findings are convincing grounds to reconsider the previous order of 
Judge Lindsay dated March 23,1994 to correct clear error and prevent manifest 
injustice.... 
Transcript of Hearing held May 25,1995, page 2, lines 17-25 and page 3 lines 1-10. 
In deciding suisponte to overturn Judge Lindsay's ruling that the ICWA applied in this case in spite 
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of the stipulation of the parties, the Court violated the legal doctrine of the "law of the case". 
The Appeals Courts of Utah have "repeatedly indicated that one District Court Judge can 
not overrule another District Court Judge of equal authority". Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 
(Utah 1987). "The purpose of the doctrine of 'the law of the case' is that in the interest of 
economy of time and efficiency and procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and the 
difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same proposition in the same 
case. But it is also that generally preliminary or interim rulings do not rise to the dignity of race 
judicata or stari decisis. It is further true that ordinarily one Judge of the same Court cannot 
properly overrule the decision of another Judge of that Court. Notwithstanding these propositions, 
the ruling of one Judge as to the sufficiency or effects of pleadings, does not prevent another 
division of the Court from considering the same question of law if it is properly involved on a 
subsequent motion which presents the case in a different light." Richardson v. Grand Central 
Corporation. 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). See also Thurston v. Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 
1034 (Utah 1995). 
In Thurston, the Court delineated two aspects of the law of the case doctrine, one 
concerning issues decided by an Appeal Court for re-hearing and the second concerning when a 
Court reconsiders its own prior decision. In evaluating the second aspect of the legal doctrine, the 
Appeals Court found that "a Court is justified in refusing to reconsider matters it resolved in a 
prior ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and consistency." The doctrine is not a limit 
on power but, "as applied to the effect of previous orders on the later action of the Court rendering 
them in the same case, mainly expresses the practice of Courts generally to refuse to reopen what 
has been decided...." Id at 1036. The exceptional circumstances under which Courts have 
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reopened issues previously decided are narrowly defined: 
1. When there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; 
2. When new evidence has become available; or 
3. When the Court in convinced that a prior decision was clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice. 
Id at 1037. 
In the case at bar, the trial court did not claim that there had been an intervening change of 
controlling authority or that new evidence had become available. It did allude, however, to the 
manifest injustice principle. The Court of Appeals in Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 
1306 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994), listed six factors that could be used for a Court to reconsider a prior 
ruling: 
[A] Court can consider several factors in determining the propriety of reconsidering 
a ruling. These may include, but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is 
presented in a "different light" or under "different circumstances;" (2) there has 
been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest 
injustice" will result if the Court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a Court 
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) the issue was not adequately briefed when 
first contemplated by the Court. 
Id at 1309. 
In this particular case, the parties, by stipulation, had agreed that the ICWA applied and 
Judge Lindsay had concurred and ordered that the ICWA did apply. No party filed a motion to 
request Judge Wilson to reconsider this position. The parties in this matter continued upon the 
assumption that the ICWA applied, relied in fact to their detriment as shown by Mr. Coando 
preserving his right to appeal the decision that the matter should not be transferred to the Tribal 
Court, but agreeing to continue the proceedings in State Court since the ICWA applied. It is Mr. 
Coando's assertion that, based on the rules set down in the ICWA, it does govern this case and that 
it created a manifest injustice when Judge Wilson ruled that it was not applicable at the 
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proceedings before the bar. 
3. That the Trial Court erred in finding that the termination of the 
Defendant's parental rights did not affect an "Indian family" that the specific 
facts of this case were not with the scope of Congress* intent in establishing 
the Indian Child Welfare Act pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act 
Congress in the ICWA § 1903 gives definitions for terms used in this action it states and 
includes: 
1. "Child custody proceeding" shall mean and include -
(I) "foster care placement" which shall mean any action removing an 
Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary 
placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a guardian 
or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian can not have 
the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not 
been terminated; 
(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any action 
resulting in the termination of the parent child relationship; 
(iii) "pre-adoptive placement" which shall mean the temporary 
placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the 
termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoption 
placement; and 
(iv) "adoptive placement" which shall mean the permanent 
placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action 
resulting a final decree of adoption;... (emphasis added) 
3. "Indian" means any person who is a member of an Indian Tribe, or who is an 
Alaskan native and a member of a regional corporation as defined in Section 1606 
of title 43; 
4. "Indian Child" means any unmarried person who is under the age of eighteen and 
either; (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an 
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe;... 
9. "Parent" means any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian 
person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under Indian 
Tribal law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where paternity has not 
been acknowledge or established. 
Id. at 639-40. 
Under the subchapter dealing with child custody proceedings, Section 1911(b) discussing 
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transfer of proceedings and the declination by Tribal Court, the Congress stated: 
In any State Court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of 
parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of 
the Indian child's tribe, the Court, in the absent of good cause to the contrary, 
shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent the objection 
by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian of the 
Indian child's tribe; provided, that such transfer shall be subject to declination by 
the Tribal Court of such tribe or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child. 
Id. at 641. 
In section 1912, Congress went on to delineate: 
In any involuntary proceeding in a State Court, where the Court knows or has 
reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care 
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the 
parent or Indian custodian of the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return 
receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and their right of intervention.... 
Id at 643-44. 
In part (d) of that same section the Congress went to state: 
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental 
rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the Court that active efforts 
have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed 
to prevent the break up of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved 
unsuccessful.... 
(f) No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceedings in the absence of 
a determination, supported by evidence upon a reasonable doubt, including testimony of 
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian 
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 
Id at 643. 
Paragraph (d) is the only place where the term "Indian family" is used. The term Indian 
family is not defined in the definitions but the language in Section 1912 is clear in that any 
involuntary proceeding in a State Court seeking the termination of parental rights to an Indian child 
involves the involvement of ICWA. 
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It seems incredible to rule that the termination of Mr. Coando's parental rights does not 
lead to the break up on an Indian family since an Indian father and three Indian children are 
involved. The non-Indian mother certainly has notice that her ex-husband and children are Indian. 
The taking of Mr. Coando's parental rights definitely results in the break-up of an Indian family. It 
is very clear that the situation Mr. Coando faced in State Courts is exactly the kind of case that 
ICWA was designed to prevent. That being, when the State Court finds itself in a position of 
supporting and ruling that the Indian child should be raised and controlled by the dominant culture. 
This denies the Indian child any right to know or experience the other culture. It denies Indian 
parents, in married to a non-Indian any input into the cultural background of their children and 
cultural traditions being continued. 
4. That the Juvenile Court erred in not dismissing the case 
after close of Petitioners1 case for Petitioner's failure to satisfy 
the burden of proof for termination imposed upon her by the 
Indian Child Welfare Act 
A. Petitioner failed to provide remedial and 
rehabilitative programs and preventative measures 
designed to prevent the break up of the Indian family 
that must be undertaken and proven unsuccessful 
prior to the termination of the parental rights of an 
Indian parent as required by § 1912(d) of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act 
ICWA § 1912(d) requires that" remedial and rehabilitative programs and preventative 
measures designed to prevent the break up on the Indian family must be undertaken and these 
efforts proven unsuccessful". Id at 643-44. No evidence whatsoever was presented on this issue, 
in spite of the fact that all paraties had notice and had stipulated to the applicability of ICWA. 
Transcript of hearing held March 3,1994, p. 3, lines 17-20. The Petitioner failed to even address 
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such issue of any rehabilitative or preventative measures. In fact, the testimony showed otherwise 
in that Petitioner had actively sought to interfere with any relationship between Mr. Coando and 
his children. 
The parties, Debra Jean Coando and Patrick Coando were divorced August 13, 1989 by 
default of the Defendant not appearing. The Court ordered, based on the testimony of the then 
Mrs. Coando, that "the care, custody and control of the minor children, David Allen Coando, born 
December 2, 1979, Paul Dean Coando, born December 2, 1979 and Sky Deonna Coando, born 
April 15,1987, is awarded to Plaintiff subject to the reasonable rights of visitation in Defendant at 
all reasonable times, reasonable places and under reasonable circumstances." See Decree of 
Divorce attached herein. 
At the time of this Decree of Divorce, Mr. Coando was incarcerated. All of the "bad acts" 
that Petitioner alleged in her testimony had occurred prior to August 1989 and yet in her 
Complaint for Divorce, she asked and was granted by default that Mr. Coando have reasonable 
rights of visitation. These were rights that she did not, in reality, grant to Mr. Coando. Mr. 
Coando's testimony during the proceeding was that he had been denied visitation repeatedly. Mr. 
Coando testified that neither he nor his siblings or his parents had been allowed to see the children 
since 1990. Transcript of Hearing dated November 30,1994 and 12/1/94, Page 280, lines 3-15. 
Mr. Coando delineated other times when he had attempted to obtain visitation but had been 
denied. Transcript of Hearing dated 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, Page 281-82. Even during the trial 
time itself, every time Mr. Coando attempted visitation he was met with strong resistance from 
Petitioner, aided in this by the Guardian ad Litem. It is clear that at no time was Petitioner 
interested in any amount of reconciliation or rehabilitative help to enable Mr. Coando to have 
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contact with his children. Her Petition should have been denied pursuant to § 1912(d). Failure of 
the Court to do so is plain error. 
B. Petitioner failed to show that a determination had 
been made, supported by evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that continued custody of the child 
is likely to result in emotional or physical damage to 
the child prior to termination of the parental rights of 
an Indian parent as required by § 1912(f) of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act. 
The ICWA § 1912(f) states "no termination of parental rights may be ordered in such 
proceedings in absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the 
parent or by the Indian custodian it is likely to result in serous emotional or physical damage to the 
child." When Petitioner rested, she had not presented any evidence concerning whether the 
continued custody (in this case parental rights of Mr. Coando) of the children by the parent or 
Indian custodian was likely to result in any emotional or physical damage. Instead, the testimony 
was that Mr. Coando had never hit his children and the only testimony concerning emotional 
damage was of the effects of seeing their parents fight. Petitioner supplied no expert witnesses as 
to any emotional or physical damage to the children that would result from continued contact with 
Mr. Coando. 
The next day, the Court allowed Petitioner to reoen her case. Petitioner and the Guardian 
ad Litem tried to introduce the testimony of Mr. Augustus, a social worker, but failed to qualify 
him as an expert witness. Mr. Augustus testified that he was a "Licensed Clinical Social Worker 
and Certified Addiction Counselor." Transcript of Hearing dated 11/30/94, Page 203, lines 10-11. 
He also testified that he had no experience of expertise with the ICWA. Transcript of Hearing, 
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dated 11/30/94, Page 208, lines 24-25 and Page 209, lines 1-18. Further, by his own testimony, 
the examination of the children itself was far from adequate to do any determination. He said that 
he spoke collectively with the children for forty minutes and with Petitioner for twenty minutes. 
He never, at any time, interviewed Mr. Coando or was able to do any psychological evaluations 
on the children. This was far from an adequate amount of time or examination for the formation 
of a reasonable expert opinion, especially for someone who was not qualified as an expert. 
Further, Petitioner did not move that he be qualified as an expert. 
In the Matter of M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981), the Montana Supreme Court 
stated with regards to § 1912(f): 
The Act does not define "qualified expert witness."... In deciding in whether there 
is proper foundation for an expert opinion, the Trial Court should consider the 
Department of Interior Guidelines which provide: 
B. Persons with the following characteristics are most likely to 
meet the requirements for a qualified expert witness for purposes of 
an Indian child custody proceeding: 
(i) A member of the Indian child's Tribe, who is 
recognized by the Tribal Community as 
knowledgeable in Tribal customs as they pertain to 
family organization and child rearing practices. 
(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial 
experience in the delivery of child and family 
services to Indians, an extensive knowledge of 
prevailing social and cultural standards and child 
rearing practices within the Indian child's Tribe. 
(iii) A professional person having substantial 
education and experience in the area of his or her 
specialty. 
We are aware that these guidelines add a dimension to expert testimony not 
normally required. However, we feel these guide lines comport with the spirit of 
the ICWA and therefore deem the to be applicable. 
Id. at 131. 
Mr. Augustus was never qualified as an expert in this case nor do his qualifications 
25 
constitute an expert under the ICWA. The Court was not asked to rule that Mr. Augustus 
qualified as an expert witness; therefore, Defense Counsel was not given the opportunity to Voir 
Dire him concerning his qualifications as an expert under ICWA, nor were they required to object 
to his testimony being admitted as that of an expert. "Admission of expert testimony requires 
proper foundation to qualify the witness." Antwon v. Thomas, 806 P.2d, 744,746 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1981). No foundation was laid by Plaintiff concerning Mr. Augustus' ability or qualifications to 
testify as an expert under ICWA. Instead, Mr. Augustus1 testimony was that he was not familiar 
with ICWA and had not worked with the termination of parental rights under ICWA. The Utah 
Supreme Court has been consistent in ruling that an adequate foundation must be laid before a 
finding can be made that the expert can testify. See Burton v. Youngblood. 711 P.2d 245,248 
(Utah 1985)(expert testimony excluded because counsel failed to obtain necessary foundation). 
See also Schindler v. Schindlen 776 P.2d 84, 89 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989)(psychologist's proffered 
testimony was inadmissible due to foundation); State v. Pendergas, 803 P.2d 1261,1265 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1990). Petitioner failed to meet the burden imposed by ICWA concerning an expert 
testimony and therefore her case should have been dismissed pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) for failure to meet the burden of proof. 
C. Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof 
imposed by either ICWA of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt or by Utah Code Annotated 73-3a-402 (et. 
seq) of "clear and convincing evidence," especially 
78-3a-409, which sets forth specific considerations 
for the court when the child is not in the physical 
custody of the parent whose rights are to be 
terminated. 
As has been stated before, ICWA § 1912(f) states "no termination of parental rights may 
be ordered in such proceeding in the absence on a determination, supported by evidence beyond a 
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reasonable doubt, including the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody 
of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical 
damage to the child". The Court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Coando was an 
unfit or incompetent parent to the children. Transcript of hearing held May 25, 1995, Page 3, line 
11 through Page 5 line 22. Several jurisdiction have ruled that the clear and convincing evidence 
standard is not sufficient for termination of parental rights of an American Indian pursuant to 
ICWA. See In the Matter of J.L.H.. 299 N.W. 2d. 812 (S.D. 1980); In the Matter of R.M.NL 
316 N.W. 2d, 538 (Minn. 1982). 
"The parent child relationship is constituted and protected." In Re. K.S., 737 P.2d, 171, 
172 (Utah 1987). Therefore, "[although the child's best interest is a principal of consideration in 
parental termination proceedings, under the due process cause, a finding of unfitness of the parent 
or substantial neglect must be supported by clearest supporting evidence... to terminate parental 
rights for unfitness, the parents conduct must substantially depart from the norm; the unfit parent 
is one who substantially and repeatedly refuses and fails to render proper parental care and 
protection." State In the Interest of L.D.S. v. Stevens. 797 P.2d, 1133,1139 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
Although this burden is substantial and important, it is not as stringent as the standard imposed by 
the ICWA. The proof required for the clear and convincing standard falls far short of the standard 
of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A termination based on State law standards rather that the federal standards creates 
reversible error. In the Matter of Adoption of Hallowav. 732 P.2d, 962,966-68 (Utah 1986). "In 
the absence of plain indication to the contrary... Congress when it enacts a statute is not making an 
application of the Federal Act dependant on State law." Holvfield 490 U.S. at 43 (1989). 
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Because federal law is supreme, the standards of proof and other legal requirements for 
termination of parental rights under the ICWA are controlling. See the United States Constitution, 
Article 6, Clause 2; McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. 316, 326-27 (1819 ); Hallowav. 732 P.2d at 
966-68. 
If this Court should decide that ICWA does not apply to the case at hand, Petitioner still 
failed to meet the burden of proof imposed by Utah Code Annotated § 78-3a-402 et seq. Even 
under Utah's lower standard of clear and convincing, the facts as testified do not warrant 
termination of parental rights. In the Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d, 131 l(Utah 1976), a mother 
was determined to be "immature, self- centered, hostile, dependent, a lack of self control, a low 
frustration tolerance, and it was expressed that she might harm the child." Id at 316. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that "the personality characteristics described to the mother, although not 
ideal, do not represent such a substantial departure from the norm as to constitute a condition 
seriously detrimental to the child." The Court went on to reverse the lower Court's termination of 
parental rights. In reaching this decision, the Utah Supreme Court relied on State v. McMasten 
486 P.2d 567 (Utah 1971). In McMaster, the evidence indicated that the parents frequently 
quarrelled, the father never held a job for more than a month, and he frequently left home with the 
welfare check, leaving the family destitute. The Court in McMaster found that these facts did not 
raise to the level of actions considered "seriously detrimental to the child." Winger. 558 P.2d at 
1315 (citing McMaster). Clearly the actions testified to by Petitioner and her witnesses cannot 
meet this standard. 
The testimony was that earlier in the relationship Mr. Coando had frequently used alcohol 
and that he had had several incidences of violence with Petitioner. He had also been incarcerated 
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several times. However, the testimony of everyone including the children was that he had never 
harmed them. The worst thing Petitioner could accuse him of to the children, was taking the boyfs 
to the Sundance in Wyoming without her permission. Transcript of Hearing held 11/30/94, Page 
84, lines 15-24 and Page 276, lines 12-22. There was testimony that the domestic violence caused 
the children to be fearful, but there was agreement that the acts were not directed at the children. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-407, provides that the Court may terminate all parental rights 
with respect to one or both parents if it finds any one of the following: 
1. That the parent or parents have abandoned the child; 
2. That the parent or parents have neglected or abused the child; 
3. That the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent; 
4. That the child is being cared for in an out of home placement... 
5. Failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this chapter; 
6. That only token efforts have been made by the parent or parents: 
a. To support or communicate with the child; 
b. To prevent neglect of the child; 
c. To eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional 
abuse of the child; or 
d. To avoid being an unfit parent; 
7. That the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to 
the child and the Court finds that termination is in the child's best interest; or 
8. The parent or parents, after a period of trial during which the child has been 
returned to live in his own home, substantially and continuously or repeatedly 
refused or failed to give the child proper care and protection. 
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Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-408 gives specific considerations where a child is not in the physical 
custody of the parent. It states: 
1. If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or parents, the 
Court, in determining whether parental rights should be terminated, 
shall consider, but is not limited to, the following: 
a. The services provided or offered to the parent or parents to 
facilitate a reunion with the child; 
b. The physical, mental or emotional condition and needs of 
the child and his desires concerning the termination, if the Court 
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determines he is of sufficient capacity to express his desires; and 
c. The effort the parent or parents have made to adjust their 
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best 
interest to return him to his home after a reasonable length of time, 
including, but not limited to: 
(i) Payment of a reasonable portion of substitute 
physical care and maintenance, if physically able; 
(ii) Maintenance of regular visitation or other 
contact with the child that is designed and carried out 
a plan to reunite the child with the parent or parents; 
and 
(iii) Maintenance of regular contact and 
communication with the custodian of the child. 
In this case, when the parties divorced in 1989, Mr. Coando was granted reasonable 
visitation rights. At that time, he was in the custody of the Uintah County Jail and shortly 
thereafter, was sent to the Utah State Prison. During the time he was at the Utah State Prison, any 
contact with the custodial mother was denied by her conduct. Mr. Coando testified that he was 
incarcerated at the time of the divorce. Transcript of Hearing dated 11/3/94, Page 87, lines 1-4. 
The testimony was that Mr. Coando had gone to prison for burglary, that he and Petitioner had 
had an altercation, and that during the time he was in prison, she had not allowed him to have 
visitation. The testimony of Petitioner is clear that she did not allow visitation after July 10,1990 
and that she violently opposed visitation at any time in the five years from then to the termination 
proceedings. Mr. Coando testified that he had not even been allowed to see his children in five 
years and that the denial of visitation had been without his consent and over his objection. It is 
obvious from the proceedings that at no time was any effort to satisfy the Utah requirements that 
efforts be made to reunite the family, as required in Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-49(l)(a). 
Instead, the only actions taken by Petitioner, the Guardian ad Litem and the Division of Family 
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Services were aimed at preventing such reunification. Petitioner's claim under State law must also 
fail. 
5. That the actions of the Guardian ad Litem in the 
conducting of the case created prejudice and unfair bias in the 
Court proceedings and causing the Appellant to feel insulted 
and more isolated from the State Court proceeding. 
The record is not clear upon whose motion the Guardian ad Litem was requested. 
However, an Order appointing Guardian-ad-Litem was stamped with Judge Lindsey's signature on 
February 16, 1994. The Order states: "Pursuant to 55-16-7, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, wherein it 
is provided that in every case involving abused or neglected children resulting injudicial 
proceeding, the Court shall appoint a Guardian-ad-Litem; and whereas a Petition has been filed in 
the above entitled matter alleging neglect and/or abuse...". The Court appointed a Guardian-ad-
Litem, who was then Larry Steele, who filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the removal of the 
proceeding to Tribal Court. Mr. Steele's brief outlines the children's negative memories of their 
father and states for the record that it is his feeling that the children would not be best served by 
removing the proceeding to Tribal Court. There is no reference in any matter that these have been 
abused or neglected children, authorizing the appointment of a guardian ad litem. 
By the time the case was tried in November, 1994 Mr. Steele has been replaced by a full 
time Guardian ad Litem, Mr. Eugene Austin. Mr. Austin was the Guardian ad Litem in the trial 
proceedings. Although he repeatedly said in the proceedings that he was not taking a position he 
did just the opposite. In the hearing of the Motion to Terminate the Parental Rights of Mr. 
Coando, it was apparent from Mr. Austin's demeanor, behavior and questions that he was not in 
favor of the children maintaining contact with Mr. Coando, as has already been mentioned in this 
brief. At the close of Petitioner's case, the attorney for the Eastern Shoshone Tribe and Mr. 
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Coando joined in a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
because Petitioner had failed to meet her burden. The Judge asked that the issue be briefed 
overnight. Mr. Austin took the children to meet with a social worker that evening and presented 
that social worker to the Court along with the Petitioner in his presentation of his case the next 
morning. This was done in a belated and insufficient attempt to bolster Petitioner's case under the 
ICWA. It had the effect of giving the Guardian-ad-Litem's stamp of approval on the "too little, too 
late" effort's to get sufficient testimony. 
During the direct questioning of Mr. Coando, Mr. Austin was verbally combative and went 
so far as to ask Mr. Coando, "Now, you've stated that you live the Indian culture, is it part of the 
Indian culture to drink and assault your wife?" Transcript of Hearing on 11/30/94 and 12/1/94 
Page 292, lines 23 thru 25. After that question was objected to and the objection sustained, Mr. 
Austin went on to ask Mr. Coando, "Does the Indian culture prescribe that the wife support the 
children and not the husband?" Transcript of Hearing dated 11/30/94 and 12/1/94 Page 293, line 
14-15. Mr. Austin continued to be verbally combative with Mr. Coando until it got to the point 
that in the closing arguments, when Mr. Coando objected to things Mr. Austin was saying, Mr. 
Austin asked that Mr. Coando be barred from the Court for the rest of the proceedings. 
Transcript of Hearing dated 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, Page 309, lines 4-6. In these closing 
arguments, Mr. Austin went on to state "It seems to me that the idea that the children are Indian 
and not white is ludicrous There is - There may be an argument they may be both, but that they 
should be forced into an Indian culture which they do not know against their wishes is, I think 
contrary to good sense". Transcript of Hearing dated 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, Page 309, lines 16-
21. 
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He went on later to say, "I would like to mention the thing about race. We've discussed 
blood ties and frankly, scientifically speaking, there is no such thing as race, your Honor. If you 
lined up everyone from white skin to the darkest skin we wouldn't be able to tell where one race 
left off and the other began. There is no scientific basis for it. We use it because it's convenient to 
keep records. What is important is culture identity. In this case, the culture identity of the children 
is the non-Indian culture." Transcript of Hearing dated 11/30/94 and 12/1/94, Page 312, lines 13-
21. This was all from the person that ICWA and the Court had entrusted with protecting the 
Indian children's rights as an Indian child. 
After the trial, this type of prejudice against Mr. Coando continued. Previous to the 
proceeding, Mr. Coando had filed a Motion for Visitation and an Order for Supervised Visitation 
had been granted by the Court ordering Mr. Austin to arrange such visits. After the extremely 
negative experiences that Mr. Coando had experienced with Mr. Austin during the trial, Mr. 
Coando asked that Mr. Austin not be present at the visits themselves. Mr. Austin arranged for a 
several DFS workers and an officer to be present at the supervised visitations at DFS and also 
arranged that these visits be video recorded. All of this continued to create a somewhat negative 
environment for the visits of Mr. Coando. 
After a couple visits, the Guardian ad Litem filed a Motion to Discontinue the visits and 
filed a request for a psychological examination. It was the Court's instruction that the Guardian ad 
Litem draft questions for the psychological examination, that all the parties could go over to make 
sure that they were content neutral, to determine the condition of these children. Instead, the 
Guardian ad Litem took these children to an independent psychiatrist and had the psychiatrist talk 
with the children's mother and the children without the content neutral questions, which resulted in 
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a psychological evaluation that slanted towards the mother's view of the situation. Mr. Coando 
was never given an opportunity to visit with any of the mental health care professional involved 
with the children. 
In May of 1995, partly because of the problems that had been experienced this case and 
other cases, Mr. Austin was fired by his supervisors and was replaced by Mr. Cleve Hatch as the 
Guardian ad Litem. After Mr. Hatch took over as the Guardian ad Litem, there were no more 
negative smears made in the Guardian ad Litem's office towards Mr. Coando. The actions of Mr. 
Austin's were extremely prejudicial. It was his apposition to the 41(b) motion that urged the Judge 
to not consider this as an "Indian family." The fact that it took from December 1, 1994 to May 
24,1995 for the Judge to make a ruling allowed all the controversy created by the guardian to 
contribute and prejudice the judge's opinion. 
The ICWA provides in §1912 (b) that the "Court may, in its' discretion, appoint counsel 
for the child upon a finding that such appointment is in the best interest of the child." Mr. 
Coando's position is that since the Guardian ad Litem was appointed to represent the best interest 
of these children that his job should have been to represent the best interest of the complete 
children, children that are part white part Indian and enrolled members of the Eastern Shoshone 
Tribe. By deciding that the children had no interest in being Indian and negating that entire part of 
the children, he did not operate in their best interest. Further, when he made his personal attacks 
on Mr. Coando, he went beyond the Code of Ethics for an attorney and created a situation where 
Mr. Coando was so uncomfortable and felt under so much bias in the State Court proceeding that 
he felt it necessary to remove himself from the courtroom on several different occasions. "The 
right to the integrity of the family is among the most fundamental right under the Fourteenth 
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Amendment of The United States Constitution." United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida in Davis v. Page. 442 F. Supp 258,260 (S D. Fla. \911){quoted in H.R. REP 
#1386, 95th Congress, Second Section, 1978 §102.) 
Mr. Austin was appointed by the State and in his position became an advocate against Mr. 
Coando rather than an advocate for the rights of the children. This created undue bias and 
prejudice against Mr. Coando in the mind of the Court as well as in the proceedings themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons and based on the arguments set forth above, the Court Order terminating 
Mr. Coando's parental rights should be overturned, and any further action concerning these issues 
be remanded to Tribal Court for the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j / _ day of May, 1996. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be 
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a 
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of 
an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in 
the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or 
stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice 
of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by 
a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the 
plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms 
and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been 
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed 
against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain 
pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without 
prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the 
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim 
against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event 
the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. 
The court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render 
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment 
until the close of all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on 
the merits against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an 
indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the 
claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this 
rule shall be made before a responsive pleading is served or, if there 
is none, before the introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or 
including the same claim against the same defendant, the court may 
make such order for the payment of costs of the action previously 
dismissed as it may deem proper and may stay the proceedings in the 
action until the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a 
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party 
claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional 
remedy has been allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in 
support of such provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the 
court to the adverse party against whom such provisional remedy was 
obtained. 
§ 1 8 1 5 . Rules and regulations 
(a) Consultation with national Indian organizations 
Within four months from October 17, 1978, the Secretary shall, to the 
extent practicable, consult with national Indian organizations to consider 
and formulate appropriate rules and regulations for the conduct of the grant 
program established by this chapter. 
(b) Publication 
Within six months from October 17, 1978. the Secretary shall publish 
proposed rules and regulations in the Federal Register for the purpose of 
receiving comments from interested parties. 
(c) Promulgation 
Within ten months from October 17, 1978, the Secretary shall promulgate 
rules and regulations for the conduct of the grant program established by 
this chapter. 
(d) Source of appropriations 
Funds to carry out the purposes of this section may be drawn from gener-
al administrative appropriations to the Secretary made after October 17. 
1978. 
(Pub.L. 95-471, Title I, § 114, Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1329.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-471, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.Ncws, p 2987. 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Grant policies and procedures pertaining to tnbally controlled community colleges and Navajo 
Community College, see 25 CFR 41.1 et seq. 
CHAPTER 21—INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
Sec. 
1901. Congressional findings. 
1902. Congressional declaration of policy. 
1903. Definitions. 
SUBCHAPTER I—CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 
1911. Indian tribe jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings. 
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction. 
(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court. 
(c) State court proceedings; intervention. 
(d) Full faith and credit to public acts, records, and judicial pro-
ceedings of Indian tribes. 
1912. Pending court proceedings. 
(a) Notice; time for commencement of proceedings; additional 
time for preparation. 
(b) Appointment of counsel. 
(c) Examination of reports or other documents. 
(d) Remedial services and rehabilitative programs; preventive 
measures. 
(e) Foster care placement orders; evidence; determination of 
damage to child. 
(0 Parental rights termination orders; evidence; determination 
of damage to child. 
1913. Parental rights; voluntary termination. 
(a) Consent; record; certification matters; invalid consents. 
(b) Foster care placement; withdrawal of consent. 
(c) Voluntary termination of parental rights or adoptive place-
ment; withdrawal of consent; return of custody. 
(d) Collateral attack; vacation of decree and return of custody; 
limitations. 
1914. Petition to court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate action upon 
showing of certain violations. 
1915. Placement of Indian children. 
(a) Adoptive placements; preferences. 
(b) Foster care or preadoptive placements; criteria; preferences. 
(c) Tribal resolution for different order of preference; personal 
preference considered; anonymity in application of prefer-
ences. 
(d) Social and cultural standards applicable. 
(e) Record of placement; availability. 
1916. Return of custody. 
(a) Petition; best interests of child. 
INDIANS 
Sec. 
1917 Tnbal affiliation information and other information for protection of 
rights from tnbal relationship, application of subject of adoptive 
placement, disclosure by court 
1918. Reassumption jurisdiction over child custody proceedings 
(a) Petition, suitable plan, approval by Secretary 
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary, partial ret-
rocession 
(c) Approval of petition, publication in Federal Register, notice, 
reassumption period, correction of causes for disapproval 
(d) Pending actions or proceedings unaffected 
1919 Agreements between States and Indian tribes 
(a) Subject coverage 
(b) Revocation, notice, actions or proceedings unaffected 
1920 Improper removal of child from custody, declination of jurisdiction, 
forthwith return of child, danger exception 
1921 Higher State or Federal standard applicable to protect rights of par-
ent or Indian custodian of Indian child 
1922 Emergency removal or placement of child, termination, appropriate 
action 
1923 Effective date 
SUBCHAPTER I I—INDIAN C H I L D 
A N D FAMILY P R O G R A M S 
1931 Grants for on or near reservation programs and child welfare codes 
(a) Statement of purpose, scope of programs 
(b) Non-Federal matching fundb for related Social Security or 
other Federal financial assistance programs, assistance for 
such programs unaffected State licensing or approval for 
qualification for assist i ite under federally assisted program 
1932 Grants for off reservation programs for additional services 
1933 Funds for on and off reservation programs 
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of 
Health and Human Services, appropriation in advance for 
payments 
(b) Appropriation authorization under section 13 of this title 
1934 "Indian" defined for certain purposes 
SUBCHAPTER I I I—RECORDKEEPING, I N F O R M A T I O N 
AVAILABILITY, A N D TIMETABLES 
1951 Information availability to and disclosure by Secretary 
(a) Copv of final decree or order, other information, anonvmity 
CH 21 CHILD Wl II \KI 25 § 1901 
Sec 
1951 Information availability to and disclosure by Secretary—Continued 
(b) Disclosure of information ' >r enrollment of Indian child in 
tribe or for determination of member rights or benefits, certi-
fication of entitlement to enrollment 
1952 Rules and regulations 
SUBCHAPTER IV—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
1961 Locally convenient day schools 
1962 Omitted 
1963 Severability of provisions 
Cross References 
Jurisdiction of Passamaquoddy Tribe or Penobscot Nation over Indian child custody proceed-
ings pursuant to this chapter see section 1727 of this title 
§ 1 9 0 1 . Congressional findings 
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and the 
Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian 
people, the Congress finds— 
(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution 
provides that "The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate 
Commerce * * * with Indian tribes" and, through this and other 
constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian af-
fairs, 
(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course 
of dealing with Indian tubes, has assumed the responsibility for the 
protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources, 
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued exis-
tence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the 
United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian chil-
dren who are members ot or are eligible for membership »n an Indian 
tribe, 
(4) that an alarmmglv high percentage of Indian families are broken 
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by 
nontnbal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high per-
centage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive 
homes and institutions, and 
f (5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indi-
\ an child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bod-
) les, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian 
/ people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian com-
( munities and families 
Historical Note 
Short Title. Section I of Pub.L. 95-608 
provided: "That this Act [which enacted this 
chapter] may be cited as the 'Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978V 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608. see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Indians Q=>6. 
Library References 
CJ.S. Indians § 20 et seq. 
§ 1 9 0 2 . Congressional declaration of policy 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to pro-
tect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and 
securit\ of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Fed-
eral standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the 
placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect 
the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indi-
an tribes in the operation of child and family service programs. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, § 3, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.) 
Historical Note 
Legislatire History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608. see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Notes of Decisions 
Administrative opinions and guidelines 2 
Adoption proceedings 5 
Custody disputes 3 
Incompetence and brutality of parent:, 4 
State regulation or control 1 
1. State regulation or control 
This chapter does not violate compact with 
the United States provision of the South Da-
kota Constitution. Matter of Guardianship 
of D. L. L., S.D.1980. 291 N.W.2d 278. 
2. Administrative opinions and guidelines 
Guidelines published by Department of the 
Interior for state courts to follow in Indian 
child custody proceedings do not have same 
legislative effect as regulations, but they do 
represent the Department's interpretation of 
this chapter. Matter of J. L. H., S.D.1980, 
299 N.W.2d 812. 
3. Custody disputes 
Child custody dispute involving non-Indian 
mother and Indian paternal grandparents did 
not fall within ambit of this chapter, which 
was n6t directed at disputes between Indian 
families regarding custody of Indian children 
but which was to preserve Indian culture val-
ues under circumstances in which Indian 
child is placed in foster home or other pro-
tected institution. Application of Bertelson, 
Mont.1980, 617 P 2d 121. 
4. Incompetence or brutality of parents 
This chapter principally applies to cases 
where a state court or agency attempts to re-
move an Indian child from his or her Indian 
home on grounds of alleged incompetence or 
brutality of parents. Matter of Adoption of 
Baby Boy L., Kan. 1982, 643 P.2d 168. 
5. Adoption proceedings 
This chapter, by its own terms, did not ap-
ply to adoption proceeding involving non-In-
dian mother's illegitimate child, who had nev-
er been in care or custody of putative father, 
a five-eighths Kiowa Indian, in that issue of 
preservation of Indian family was not in-
volved as child had never been a part of any 
Indian family relationship. Matter of Adop-
tion of Baby Boy L.. Kan. 1982, 643 P.2d 168. 
§ 1 9 0 3 . Definitions 
For the purposes of this chapter, except as may be specifically provided 
otherwise, the term— 
(1) "child custody proceeding" shall mean and include— 
(i) "foster care placement" which shall mean any action remov-
ing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for tempo-
rary placement in a foster home or institution or the home of a 
guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian can-
not have the child returned upon demand, but where parental 
rights have not been terminated; 
(ii) "termination of parental rights" which shall mean any ac-
tion resulting in the termination of the parent-child relationship; 
(iii) "preadoptive placement" which shall mean the temporary 
placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after 
the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adop-
tive placement; and 
(iv) "adoptive placement" which shall mean the permanent 
placement of an Indian child for adoption, including any action 
resulting in a final decree of adoption. 
Such term or terms shall not include a placement based upon an act 
which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime or upon an 
award, in a divorce proceeding, of custody to one of the parents. 
(2) "extended family member" shall be as defined by the law or cus-
tom of the Indian child's tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, 
shall be a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the 
Indian child's grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or steppar-
ent; 
(3) "Indian" means any person who is a member of an Indian tribe, 
or who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation as 
defined in section 1606 of Title 43; 
(4) "Indian child" means any unmarried person who is under age 
eighteen aruTis either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible 
for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a mem-
ber of an Indian tribe; 
(5) "Indian child's tribe" means (a) the Indian tribe in which an In-
dian child is a member or eligible for membership or (b), in the case of 
an Indian child who is a member of or eligible for membership in more 
than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the 
more significant contacts; 
(6) "Indian custodian" means any Indian person who has legal cus-
tody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law 
or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been 
transferred by the parent of such child; 
25 § 1903 INDIANS 
(7) "Indian organization" means any group, association, partnership, 
corporation, or other legal entity owned or controlled by Indians, or ja 
majority of whose members are Indians; 
(8) "Indian tribe" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other or-
ganized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the 
services provided o Indians by the Secretary because of their status as 
Indians, including any Alaska Native village as defined in section 
1602(c) of Title 43; 
(9) "parent" means any biological parent or parents of an Indian 
child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, 
including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include 
the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or estab-
lished; 
(10) "reservation" means Indian country as defined in section 1151 
of Title 18 and any lands, not covered under such section, title to which 
is either held by the United States in trust for the benefit of any Indian 
tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to a 
restriction by the United States against alienation; 
(11) "Secretary" means the Secretary of the Interior; and 
(12) "tribal court" means a court with jurisdiction over child custo-
dy proceedings and which is either a Court of Indian Offenses, a court 
established and operated under the code or custom of an Indian tribe, 
or any other administrative body of a tribe which is vested with author-
ity over child custody proceedings. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, § 4, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3069.), 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608, see 1978 US 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Cross References 
Indian tribe defined to include Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, see section 1727 of this title. 
Reservation defined to include Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Indian Reservations, see section 
1727 of this title. 
Library References 
Indians <©=D1. C.J.S. Indians §§ 1, 2. 
Notes of Decisions 
Child custody proceeding 1 placement based upon an award, in a divorce 
Indian custodian 2 proceeding, of custody to one of the parents, 
does not apply to award of custody of a child 
or children to one or the other parent as a 
1. Child custody proceeding r " f o f a * ™ J V™?*™*' ™*}™n " 
,.L. , Malaterre, N.D.1980, 293 N.W.2d 139. This chapter, enacted to establish standards 
to be used in child custody proceedings for 2. Indian custodian 
placement of Indian children in foster or Indian child's maternal aunt, who did not 
adoptive homes, but providing that term have legal custody of child but who assumed 
CH. 21 CHILD WELFARE Z? § IVII 
for such purpose, was not an 'Indian custodi tion of foster care placement. Matter of 
an" within meaning of par. (6) of this section. Charloe, Or. 1982. 640 P.2d 608. 
so as to be entitled to notice prior to termina-
SUBCHAPTER I—CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 
§ 1 9 1 1 . Indian tribe jurisdiction over Indian child custody 
proceedings 
(a) Exclusive Jurisdiction 
An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any 
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domi-
ciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is 
otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian 
child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive juris-
diction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child. 
(b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court 
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termina-
tion of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within 
the reservation of the Indian child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good 
cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of 
the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either par-
ent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such 
transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe. 
(c) State court proceedings; Intervention 
In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termina-
tion of parental rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child 
and the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point in 
the proceeding. 
(d) Full faith and credit to public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of Indian tribes 
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United 
States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indi-
an child custody proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full 
faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any 
other entity. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 101, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3071.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
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Library References 
Indians <£=>27(2. 7) 
Parent and Child ©=32(7) 
Constitutionality 1 
Domicile or residence 2 
Forum non conveniens 5 
Intervention 6 
Jurisdiction of state court 3 
Transfer of proceedings 4 
CJS Indians §§ 8. 16 et scq . 17 cl scq 
CJS Parent and Child §§ 34, 35 
Notes of Decisions 
1. Constitutionality 
Denial of access to Male court under this 
section was based solely upon political status 
of parent and child and quasi-sovereign na-
ture of tribe, and thus was discriminatory 
classification not prohibited by U S C A 
Const Amends 5 and 14 Matter of Appeal 
in Pima County Juvenile Action No S-903, 
1981, 635 P2d 187, 130 Ariz App 202 
2. Domicile or residence 
Unemancipatcd Indian minor was domi-
ciled within reservation that was domicile of 
her father for purpose of subsec (a) of this 
section giving Indian tnbe exclusive jurisdic-
tion over any child custody proceeding in-
volving Indian child domiciled within reser-
vation of tnbe Matter of Appeal in Pima 
County Juvenile Action No S-903. 1981. 635 
P2d 187, 130 Anz App 202 
Illegitimate child of unemancipated Indian 
minor took domicile of its mother for purpose 
of subsec (a) of this section giving Indian 
tnbe exclusive junsdiction over ans child cus-
tody proceeding involving Indian child domi-
ciled within reservation of such tribe, not-
withstanding that child was living in Anzona 
with prospective adoptive parents pursuant to 
temporary custody order Id 
3. Jurisdiction of state court 
Where this chapter applies, the state court 
has a duty to exercise its junsdiction over ac-
tions brought thereunder, since to decline ju-
nsdiction in such a case would violate U S 
C A Const Art 6, cl 2 E A v State, Alas-
ka 1981, 623 P2d 1210 
4. Transfer of proceedings 
Where non-Indian mother of illegitimate 
child objected to transfer of proceeding for 
adoption of child to court of Indian offenses 
and, as specifically provided by subsec (b) of 
this section, such a transfer could not be 
made over her objection, petition to transfer 
junsdiction to court of Indian offenses was 
properly denied Matter of Adoption of Ba-
by Boy L , Kan 1982. 643 P 2d 168 
Where child of mother who was enrolled 
member of Indian tribe was domiciled outside 
tribe's reservation at time of commencement 
of child dependency and neglect action, moth-
er was not entitled to order immediately 
transferring jurisdiction to tribal court, how-
ever, extratcrntonal junsdiction of tribe cre-
ated by this chapter was required to be adju-
dicated before merits of action Matter of M 
E M. Mont 1981, 635 P 2d 1313 
5. Forum non conveniens 
Provision of subsec (b) of this section for 
state court to transfer parental rights termina-
tion proceeding with respect to Indian child 
not domiciled within reservation of child's 
tribe, to jurisdiction of tribe was intended to 
permit state court to apply a modified doc-
tnnc of forum non conveniens Matter of 
Appeal in Pima Count) Juvenile Action No 
S-903, 1981. 635 P 2d 187. 130 Ariz App 
202 
Although Indian child was living in Anzo-
na with prospective adoptive parents pursuant 
to temporary custody order, Arizona court 
should hav»e deferred to tribal jurisdiction in 
parental rights termination proceeding where 
evidence concerning mother's fitness as a par-
ent would be more readil) accessible in Mon-
tana, in which reservation of mother's tnbe 
was located, and qualified expert witnesses as 
to whether custody in mother would likely re 
suit in serious emotional or physical damage 
to child would also be more accessible there 
since expert witnesses lacking knowledge of 
tnbal culture and values might not be "quali-
fied" to give an opinion Id 
6. Intervention 
Any error which might have occurred by 
refusal of Kiowa Tribe's petition to intervene 
in adoption proceeding was harmless in view 
of non-Indian mother's clear intention to re-
voke her consent to adoption and again take 
custody of her illegitimate child if adoption 
for benefit of adoptive couple was denied for 
any reason or if an attempt was made to place 
child for adoption under terms of this chap-
ter, since any attempt to effect preferential 
placement contemplated by the provisions of 
this chapter would necessarily result in re-
moval of child from custody of adoptive cou-
pie and thereupon there being no consent by turned to her Mailer • Adoption of Babv 
mother to .my such action child would be re Boy L . Kan 1982. 643 P 2d 168 
§ 1 9 1 2 . Pending court proceedings 
V W ' (a) Notice; time for commencement of proceedings; 
, V additional time for preparation 
,«' In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or 
has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the 
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian 
child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, 
by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings 
and of their right of intervention If the identity or location of the parent 
or Indian custodian and the tnbe cannot be determined, such notice shall be 
given to the Secretary in like manner, who shall have fifteen days after re-
ceipt to provide the requisite notice to the parent or Indian custodian and 
the tribe. No foster care placement or termination of parental rights pro-
ceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the 
parent or Indian custodian and the tribe or the Secretary: Provided, That 
the parent or Indian custodian or the tribe shall, upon request, be granted 
up to twenty additional days to prepare for such proceeding 
(b) Appointment of counsel 
In any case in which the court determines indigene), the parent or Indian 
custodian shall have the right to court-appointed counsel in any removal, 
placement, or termination proceeding The court may, in its discretion, ap-
point counsel for the child upon a finding that such appointment is in the 
best interest of the child Where State law makes no provision for appoint-
ment of counsel in such proceedings, the court shall promptly notify the 
Secretary upon appointment of counsel, and the Secretary, upon certifica-
tion of the presiding judge, shall pay reasonable fees and expenses out of 
funds which may be appropriated pursuant to section 13 of this title. 
(c) Examination of reports or other documents 
Each party to a foster care placement or termination of parental rights 
proceeding under State law involving an Indian child shall have the right to 
examine all reports or other documents filed with the court upon which any 
decision with respect to such action may be based 
(d) Remedial services and rehabilitative programs; preventive measures 
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of 
parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court 
that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabili-
tative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and 
that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. 
(e) Foster care placement orders; evidence; 
determination of damage to child 
No foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the ab-
sence of a determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, in-
cluding testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody 
of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child 
(f) Parental rights termination orders; evidence; 
determination of damage to child 
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in 
the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child 
(PubL 95-608, Title I, § 102, Nov 8, 1978, 92 Stat 3071 ) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 US 
Code Cong and Adm News p 7530 
Indians <3=>27(6, 7) 
Library References 
CJ S Indians §§ 8, 17 et seq 
Notes of Decisions 
Admissibility of evidence 8 
Appointment of counsel 6 
Burden of proof 7 
Damage to child 5 
Expert witnesses 9 
Instructions 10 
Preventive measures 4 
Retroactive effect 1 
Revocation of relinquishment of parental 
rights 3 
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1. Retroactive effect 
Petition filed by state for permanent custo-
dy of children of member of Chippewa Cree 
Tribe, filed on Mar 1, 1979, was not gov 
erned by this chapter, in that this chapter did 
not go into effect until May 7, 1979 Matter 
of T J D , Mont 1980. 615 P 2d 212 
2. State regulation or control 
Indian child's maternal aunt, whose foster 
care of child was terminated without giving 
aunt notice of the hearing, was not entitled to 
relief on theory that federal standards in this 
chapter, which required that "Indian Custo-
dian ' was to be given notice of proceeding to 
terminate foster care placement, preempted 
state law defining legal custody, in li«*ht of 
fact that Congress expresbly left detcrmma 
tion of "legal custody" up to state law Mat-
ter of Charloe, Or 1982, 640 P 2d 608 
3 Revocation of relinquishment of parental 
rights 
Even assuming that Arizona court had ju 
nsdiction in proceeding for termination of In 
dian mother's parental rights and properly 
declined to refer proceeding to tribal court, 
where there was no evidence as to mother's 
fitness as a parent or any attempt to preserve 
parent child relationship, Indian mother wa> 
entitled to return of her child when she re-
voked her relinquishment of parental rights 
Matter of Appeal in Pima County Juvenile 
Action No S-903, 1981, 635 P 2d 187, 130 
Anz App 202 
4. Preventive measures 
Evidence, vhich showed that while child 
was placed with foster parent and later with 
father, mother made no effort to exercise con-
sistent visitation, which indicated that moth-
er's paint huffing addiction was cause of her 
inability to function as parent, and which in 
dicated that she spurned help and chose to 
deny addiction, was sufficient to support find 
ing that active efforts were made to prevent 
breakup of Indian family before termination 
of mother's parental rights was sought as re-
quired by this chapter Indian Child Welfare 
Act of 1978, § 102(d), 25 U S C A 
§ 1912(d) People in Interest of S R , 323 
N W 2d 885 
5. Damage to child 
Proof that mother's continued custody of 
Indian child was likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to child was 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for 
termination of her parental rights under this 
chapter, where mother had rarely seen child 
in two years since her birth, where child had 
special needs, and where mother showed no 
sense of responsibility or significant degree of 
interest in child Indian Child Welfare Act, 
§ 102(0, 25 U S C A § 1912(0 People in 
Interest of S R , 323 N W 2d 885 
Where Indian mother was unresponsive to 
efforts to assist her and where child would be 
irreparably damaged by further contact with 
mother in partntal relationship, trial court, 
which gave child's father, also an Indian, sole 
custody, care and control of child based on 
finding that father was providing child with 
appropriate environment, had no reasonable 
alternative other than termination of mother's 
parental rights Indian Child Welfare Act of 
1978, §§ 3, 102(0, 25 U S C A §§ 1902, 
1912(0 Id 
In proceeding for termination of mother's 
parental rights evidence of conduct of moth-
er and other persons in and about children's 
residence supported trial court's finding that 
children were neglected and dependent 
Matter of J L H S D 1982, 316 N W 2d 
650 
Under this chapter, no termination of pa-
rental rights to an Indian child may be or-
dered in the absence of a determination sup-
ported beyond a reasonable doubt, including 
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that 
the continued custody of the child by the par-
ent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the 
child Matter of R M M . Minn 1982, 316 
N W 2d 538 
Testimony of social worker and psychiatrist 
that mother's condition was a serious threat 
to child's emotional and physical health ful-
filled requirement of both this chapter and 
MSA § 260 221(b)(4) stating that parental 
rights may be terminated if parents are unfit 
by reason of intoxication or habitual use of 
narcotic drugs Id 
Note 9 
6 Appointment of counsel 
Where mother, who was enrolled member 
of Indian tnbe, was entitled to appointment 
of counsel in child dependency and neglect 
action, trial court committed reversible error 
in failing to appoint counsel even though 
mother never requested counsel be appointed 
Matter of M E M, Mont 1981, 635 P 2d 
1313 
7. Burden of proof 
Under this chapter, dependency and ne-
glect must be proved by cleat and convincing 
evidence in order to best protect interest of 
child, which is of paramount importance at 
adjudicatory hearing People in Interest of S 
R , 323 N W 2d 885 
Clear and convincing evidence standard of 
proof for termination of parental rights of 
American Indian mother was inadequate as 
subsec (0 of this section required determina-
tion, supported by "evidence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, ' that continued custody of 
child was likely to result in serious emotional 
or physical damage to the child Matter of J 
L H, S D 1980, 299 N W 2d 812 
8. Admissibility of evidence 
In proceedings alleging neglect of children 
and seeking termination of parental rights, 
neither doctrine of res judicata nor collateral 
estoppel precluded introduction of evidence 
originating prior to original adjudication of 
children as neglected or dependent children 
whereunder mother had signed probationary 
agreement in which she agreed among other 
things, to maintiin suitable home for her chil-
dren furthermore, court could take judicial 
notice of prior adjudication Matter of J L 
H SD 1980. 299 N W 2d 812 
9. Expert witnesses 
In proceeding for permanent depnvation of 
legal father's parental nghts, trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that 
witnesses, one of whom had been employed as 
caseworker supervisor of foster care program 
in Indian center and other who had been 
mental health counselor and foster care 
caseworker for tnbe and Indian center, were 
qualified expert witnesses for purposes of this 
chapter In re Welfare of Fisher, Wash App 
1982, 643 P 2d 887 
In child dependency and neglect proceed-
ing in olving child of mother who was en-
rolled member of Indian tnbe, tnal court was 
required to determine proper foundation for 
qualified expert witness Matter of M E M , 
Mont 1981. 635 P 2d 1313 
4 C 
25 § 1912 INDMNS 
Note 10 
10. Instructions pnvcd child action was raised prior to trial, 
Where it was impossible to determine, un- an<* transcript did not establish natural moth-
der record as presented, whether i.sue of ap- *r's status as an Indian sufficient to bring her 
phcabihty of provisions of this chapter which * , t h , n a m b , t o f s u c h provisions, tnal court 
would entitle natural mother, an Indian, to d , d n o t c r r l n instructing jury to use standard 
protection of a jury instruction utilizing Stan- of preponderance of evidence Matter of J 
dards of clear and convincing evidence in de- " • ^•c' 1982, 643 P 2d 306 
§ 1913. Parental rights, voluntary termination 
(a) Consent; record; certification matters; Invalid consents 
Where any parent or Indian custodian voluntarily consents to a foster 
care placement or to termination of parental rights, such consent shall not 
be valid unless executed in writing and recorded before a judge of a court of 
competent jurisdiction and accompanied by the presiding judge's certificate 
that the terms and consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail 
and were fully understood by the parent or Indian custodian. The court 
shall also certify that either the parent or Indian custodian fully understood 
the explanation in English or that it was interpreted into a language that the 
parent or Indian custodian understood Any consent given prior to, or 
within ten days after, birth of the Indian child shall not be valid. 
(b) Foster care placement; withdrawal of consent 
Any parent or Indian custodian may withdraw consent to a foster care 
placement under State law at any time and, upon such withdrawal, the child 
shall be returned to the parent or Indian custodian. 
(c) Voluntary termination of parental rights or adoptive placement; 
withdrawal of consent; return of custody 
In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or 
adoptive placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be 
withdrawn for any reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of 
termination or adoption, as the case may be, and the child shall be returned 
to the parent. 
(d) Collateral attack; vacation of decree and return of custody; limitations 
After the entry of a final decree of adoption of an Indian child in any 
State court, the parent may withdraw consent thereto upon the grounds that 
consent was obtained through fraud or duress and may petition the court to 
vacate such decree. Upon a finding that such consent was obtained through 
fraud or duress, the court shall vacate such decree and return the child to 
the parent. No adoption which has been effective for at least two years may 
be invalidated under the provisions of this subsection unless otherwise per-
mitted under State law. 
fPuh I 95-608. Title I 6 103 Nov 8. 1978. 92 Stat. 3072.> 
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Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L 95-608. see 1978 US 
Code Cong and Adm News, p 7530 
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Library References 
C J S Adoption of Persons §§ 10 to 12, 114 
to 123 
C J S Parent and Child §§ 20, 22. 28, 29, 34, 
35 
Notes of Decisions 
Abandonment of parental control 2 
Revocation of relinquishment of parental 
rights 3 
Standard of protection of parental rights 1 
1. Standard of protection of parental rights 
This chapter provides a higher standard of 
protection to rights of parents in termination 
proceedings Matter of Appeal in Pima 
County 'uvenile Action No S- 03. 1981. 635 
P2d 187, 130 AnzApp 202 
2. Abandonment of parental control 
Where Indian father foresaw lengthy, ex-
pensive hospitalization and agreed, for wel-
fare of his children, to grant foster home tem-
porary custody, and there was no express 
mutual agreement by the parents granting 
emancipation of children, there was no com-
plete abandonment of parental responsibility 
and control, and the personal health problems 
of the parents did not show intent to aban-
don, so that reservation residency and domi-
cile of the children was not lost by an> sup-
posed abandonment or emancipation on the 
part of the parents Matter of Guardianship 
of D L L. S D 1980, 291 N W 2d 278 
3. Revocation of relinquishment of parental 
rights 
When Indian child within purview of this 
chapter is involved, adoption agrncies and 
prospective adoptive parents must be held to 
assume risk that parent might change her 
mind regarding relinquishment of parental 
rights before adoption is finalized Matter of 
Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No 
S-903. 1981. 635 P 2d 187, 130 Ariz App 
202 
Even assuming that Arizona court had ju-
risdiction in proceeding for termination of In-
dian mother's parental rights and properly 
declined to refer proceeding to tribal court, 
where there was no evidence as to mothers 
fitness as a parent or any attempt to preserve 
parent-child relationship. Indian mother was 
entitled to retvn of her child when she re-
voked her rclir {uishment of parental rights 
Id 
§ 1 9 1 4 , Petition to court of competent jut isdiction to invalidate 
action upon showing of certain violations 
Any Indian child who is the subject of any action for foster care place 
ment or termination of parental rights under State law, any parent or Indian 
custodian from whose custody such child was removed, and the Indian 
child's tribe may petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate 
such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of sec-
tions 1911, 1912, and 1913 of this title. 
(Pub L. 95-608, Title I, § 104, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3072 ) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 U S. 
Code Con£ and Adm News, p. 7530. 
IINIJIAiN*» 
Library References 
Infants e=>l94, 155 CJS Adoption of Persons §§ 10 to 12 
Notes of Decisions 
1. Temporary custody not abuse its discretion under this chapter by 
In adoption proceeding involving adoption denying petition of putative father, father's 
of non Indian mother s illegitimate child a parents, and Kiowa Tribe for a change of 
five sixteenths Kiowa Indian by blood, by a temporary custody Matter of Adoption of 
non Indian adoptive couple, tnal court did Baby Boy L, Kan 1982, 643 P 2d 168 
§ 1 9 1 5 . Placement of Indian children 
(a) Adoptive placements; preferences 
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a prefer-
ence shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a place-
ment with (1) a member of the child's extended family, (2) other members 
of the Indian child's tribe, or (3) other Indian families 
(b) Foster care or preadoptive placements; criteria; preferences 
Any child accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement shall be 
placed in the least restrictive setting which most approximates a family and 
in which his special needs, if any, may be met The child shall also be 
placed within reasonable proximity to his or her home, taking into account 
any special needs of the child In any foster care or preadoptive placement, 
a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to 
a placement with— 
(i) a membei of the Indian child's extended family, 
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian 
child's tribe, 
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized 
non-Indian licensing authority, or 
(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operat-
ed by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the 
Indian child's needs 
(c) Tribal resolution for different order of preference; personal preference 
considered; anonymity in application of preferences 
In the case of a placement under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, if 
the Indian child's tribe shall establish a different order of preference by reso-
lution, the agency or court effecting the placement shall follow such order 
so long as the placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate to the 
particular needs of the child, as provided in subsection (b) of this section 
Where appropriate, the preference of the Indian child or parent shall be 
considered Provided, That where a consenting parent evidences a desire for 
anonymity, the court or agency shall give weight to such desire in applying 
the preferences 
CI I. 21 C I I I I D W l l I A R L &%/ >f 4.^ » W 
(d) Social and cultural standards applicable 
The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this 
section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian 
community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which 
the parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties 
(e) Record of placement; availability 
A record of each such placement, under State law, of an Indian child 
shall be maintained by the State in which the placement was made, evidenc-
ing the efiorts to comply with the order of preference specified in this sec-
tion Such record shall be made available at any time upon the request of 
the Secretary or the Im an child's tribe 
(PubL 95-608, Title I, § 105, Nov 8, 1978, 92 Stat 3073) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 US 
Code Cong and Adm News, p 7530 
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et seq 
C J S Infants § 293 
Notes of Decisions 
based on health problems of parents which 
were allegedly adversely affc.'ing welfare of 
the children, the proper forum for relief was 
the tribal court Matter of Guardianship of 
D L L . S D 1980, 291 N W 2d 278 
1. Primary cultural heritage 
In adopting this chapter, it was not intent 
of Congress to dictate that illegitimate child 
who has never been a member of an Indian 
home or culture, and probably never would 
be, should be removed from its primary cul-
tural hentage and placed in an Indian envi-
ronment over express objections of non Indi 
an mother Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy 
L , Kan 1982, 643 P 2d 168 
2. Jurisdiction of tribal court 
On petition by manager of foster home for 
letters of guardianship of Indian children, 
3. Jurisdiction of state court 
Hearing required to be held in superior 
court prior to entering a final decree of adop-
tion would be a 'subsequent proceeding in 
the same matter," following adoptive place 
ment of natural grandparents* grandchildren, 
which would render this chapter applicable 
and give superior court jurisdiction over 
claim by natural grandparents that placement 
of Eskimo children in adoptive home by De-
partment of Health and Social Services de-
prived them of right under this chapter to 
preference in the adoptive placement E A 
v State, Alaska 1981. 623 P 2d 1210 
§ 1 9 1 6 . Return of custody 
(a) Petition; best Interests of child 
Notwithstanding State law to the contrary, whenever a final decree of 
adoption of an Indian child has been vacated or set aside or the adoptive 
parents voluntarily consent to the termination of their parental rights to the 
15 $ 1V10 INDIANS 
child, a biological parent or prior Indian custodian may petition for return 
of custody and the court shall grant such petition unless there is ;i showing, 
in a proceeding subject to the provisions of section 1912 of this title, that 
such return of custody is not in the best interests of the child. 
(b) Removal from foster care home; placement procedure 
Whenever an Indian child is removed from a foster care home or institu-
tion for the purpose of further foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive place-
ment, such placement shall be in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter, except in the case where an Indian child is being returned to the 
parent or Indian custodian from whose custody the child was originally re-
moved. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 106, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3073.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95 608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Library References 
Infants <©=>19.2(2). C.J S. Infants §§ 13 to 18. 
§ 1 9 1 7 . Tribal affiliation information arid other information for 
protection of rights from tribal relationship; applica-
tion of subject of adoptive placement; disclosure by 
court 
Upon application by an Indian individual who has reached the age of 
eighteen and who was the subject of an adoptive placement, the court which 
entered the final decree shall inform such individual of the tribal affiliation, 
if any, of the individual's biological parents and provide such other informa-
tion as may be necessary to protect any rights flowing from the individual's 
tribal relationship. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 107, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3073.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Library References 
Records €=a32. C.J.S. Record* S 1* 
§ 1 9 1 8 . Reassumption of jurisdiction over child custody pro-
ceedings 
(a) Petition; suitable plan; approval by Secretary 
Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction pursuant to 
the provisions of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by 
Title IV of the Act of April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any 
other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction over hild custody proceed-
ings. Before any Indian tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child 
custody proceedings, such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a 
petition to reassume such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exer-
cise such jurisdiction. 
(b) Criteria applicable to consideration by Secretary; partial retrocession 
(1) In considering the petition and feasibility of the plan of a tribe under 
subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary may consider, among other 
things: 
(i) whether or not the tribe maintains a membership roll or alterna-
tive provision for clearly identifying the persons who will be affected by 
the reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe; 
(ii) the size of the reservation or former reservation area which will 
be affected by retrocession and reassumption of jurisdiction by the 
tribe; 
(iii) the population base of the tribe, or distribution of the population 
in homogeneous communities or geographic areas; and 
(iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of multitribal occupation of a 
single reservation or geographic area. 
(2) In those cases where the Secretary determines that the jurisdictional 
provisions of section 1911(a) of this title are not feasible, he is authorized to 
accept partial retrocession which will enable tribes to exercise referral juris-
diction as provided in section 1911(b) of this title, or, where appropriate, 
will allow them to exercise exclusive jurisdiction as provided in section 
1911(a) of this title over limited community or geographic areas without 
regard for the reservation status of the area affected. 
(c) Approval of petition; publication In Federal Register, notice; 
reassumption period; correction of causes for disapproval 
If the Secretary approves any petition under subsection (a) of this section, 
the Secretary shall publish notice of such approval in the Federal Register 
and shall notify the affected State or States of such approval. The Indian 
tribe concerned shall reassume jurisdiction sixty days after publication in the 
Federal Register of notice of approval. If the Secretary disapproves any 
petition under subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary shall provide such 
technical assistance as may be necessary to enable the tribe to correct any 
deficiency which the Secretary identified as a cause for disapproval. 
(d) Pending actions or proceedings unaffected 
Assumption of jurisdiction under this section shall not affect any action 
or proceeding over which a court has already assumed jurisdiction, except as 
may be provided pursuant to any agreement under section 1919 of this title. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I. § 108, Nov 8, 1978, 92 Stat 3074) 
Historical Note 
References in Text. The Act of Aug 15, section 1360 of Title 28 For complete classi-
1953, referred to in subsec (a), is Act Aug flcation of this Act to the Code, see Tables 
15, 1953, c 505, 67 Stat 588, as amended, volume 
which enacted section 1162 of Title 18, 
Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and section Legislative Histor>. For legislative history 
1360 of Title 28. Judiciary and Judicial Pro- and purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 U S. 
cedure, and provisions set out as notes under Code Cong and Adm News, p 7530 
Cross References 
Approval, consideration, or determination of petition for assumption of jurisdiction over child 
custod\ proceedings bv Passamaquoddy Tribe or Penobscot Nation according to this 
section, see section 1727 of this title 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Procedures governing tribal reassumption of jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, 
see 25 CFR 13 I et seq 
Library References 
Indians <£=>27(2) C J S Indians §§ 8, 16 et seq 
Infants <£=>I8 C J S Infants §§ 5 to 7, 10. 12. 17 
§ 1 9 1 9 . Agreements between States and Indian tribes 
(a) Subject coverage 
States and Indian tribes are authorized to enter into agreements with each 
other respecting care and custody of Indian children and jurisdiction over 
child custody proceedings, including agreements which may provide for or-
derly transfer of jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis and agreements which 
provide for concurrent jurisdiction between States and Indian tribes. 
(b) Revocation; notice; actions or proceedings unaffected 
Such agreements may be revoked by either party upon one hundred and 
eighty days' written notice to the other party. Such revocation shall not 
affect any action or proceeding over which a court has already assumed 
jurisdiction, unless the agreement provides otherwise. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 109, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3074) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L. 95-608, see 1978 US 
Code Cong, and Adm News, p 7530 
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Library References 
Indians €=>27(2). CJS Indians §§ 8, 16 et seq 
Infants ®=>I8 CJS Infants §§ 5 to 7, 10, 12, 17 
§ 1 9 2 0 . Improper removal of child from custody; declination 
jurisdiction; forthwith return of child: danger exce 
tion 
Where any petitioner in an Indian child custody proceeding before a Stz 
court has improperly removed the child from custody of the parent or In< 
an custodian or has improperly retained custody after a visit or other tei 
porary relinquishment of custody, the court shall decline jurisdiction ov 
such petition and shall forthwith return the child to his parent or Indi 
custodian unless returning the child to his parent or custodian would subje 
the child to a substantial and immediate danger or threat of such dange 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 110, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3075.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 U.S 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p 7530 
Library References 
Indians <©=>27(2). C J S Indians §§ 8, 16 et seq 
Infants «=>18 C J.S. Infants §§ 5 to 7, 10, 12, 17. 
§ 1 9 2 1 . Higher State or Federal standard applicable to prote 
rights of parent or Indian custodian of Indian child 
In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody pr 
ceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of protects 
to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than t 
rights provided under this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall app 
the State or Federal standard. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 111, Nov 8, 1978, 92 Stat 3075) 
Historical Note 
Legtslatire History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 U S 
Code Cong, and Adm News, p. 7530 
Library References 
Indians c£=>6 C J S Indians § 20 et seq. 
§ 1 9 2 2 . Emergency removal or placement of child; terminatio 
appropriate action 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to prevent the emerge™ 
removal of an Indian child who is a resident of or is domiciled on a reserv 
tion, but temporarily located off the reservation, from his parent or Indi: 
custodian or the emergency placement of such child in a foster home or 
institution, under applicable State law, in order to prevent imminent physi-
cal damage or harm to the child. The State authority, official, or agency 
involved shall insure that the emergency removal or placement terminates 
immediately when such removal or placement is no longer necessary to pre-
vent imminent physical damage or harm to the child and shall expeditiously 
initiate a child custody proceeding subject to the provisions of this sub-
chapter, transfer the child to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian tribe, 
or restore the child to the parent or Indian custodian, as may be appropri-
ate. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 112, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3075.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Library References 
Indians <&=>6. C.J.S. Indians § 20 et seq. 
§ 1 9 2 3 . Effective date 
None of the provisions of this subchapter, except sections 1911(a), 1918, 
and 1919 of this title, shall affect a proceeding under State law for foster 
care placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or 
adoptive placement which was initiated or completed prior to one hundred 
and eighty days after November 8, 1978, but shall apply to any subsequent 
proceeding in the same matter or subsequent proceedings affecting the cus-
*ody or placement of the same child. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title I, § 113, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3075.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 7530. 
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SUBCHAPTER II—INDIAN CHILD 
AND FAMILY PROGRAMS 
§ 1 9 3 1 . Grants for on or near reservation programs and child 
welfare codes 
(a) Statement of purpose; scope of programs 
The Secretary is authorized to make grants to Indian tribes and organiza-
tions in the establishment and operation of Indian child and family service 
programs on or near reservations and in the preparation and implementa-
tion of child welfare codes. The objective of every Indian child and family 
service program shall be to prevent the breakup of Indian families and, in 
particular, to insure that the permanent removal of an Indian child from the 
custody of his parent or Indian custodian shall be a last resort. Such child 
and family service programs may include, but are not limited to— 
(1) a system for licensing or otherwise regulating Indian foster and 
adoptive homes; 
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities for the counseling and 
treatment of Indian families and for the temporary custody of Indian 
children; 
(3) family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, 
day care, afterschool care, and employment, recreational activities, and 
respite care; 
(4) home improvement programs; 
(5) the employment of professional and other trained personnel to 
assist the tribal court in the disposition of domestic relations and child 
welfare matters; 
(6) education and training of Indians, including tribal court judges 
and staff, in skills relating to child and family assistance and service 
programs; 
(7) a subsidy program under which Indian adoptive children may be 
provided support comparable to that for which they would be eligible 
25 § 1931 INDIANS 
as foster children, taking into account the appropriate State standards 
of support for maintenance and medical needs, and 
(8) guidance, legal representation, ind advice to Indian families in-
volved in tribal, State, or Federal child custody proceedings 
(b) Non-Federal matching funds for related Social Security or other Federal 
financial assistance programs; assistance for such programs unaffected; 
State licensing or approval for qualification for assistance 
under federally assisted program 
Funds appropriated for use by the Secretary in accordance with this sec-
tion may be utilized as non-Federal matching share in connection with 
funds provided under Titles IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act [42 
U S C A §§ 620 et seq , 1397 et seq ] or under anv other Federal financial 
assistance programs which contribute to the purpose for which such funds 
are authorized to be appropriated for use under this chapter The provision 
or possibility of assistance under this chapter shall not be a basis for the 
denial or reduction of any assistance otherwise authonzed under Titles 
IV-B and XX of the Social Secunt> Act or any other federally assisted 
program For purposes of qualifying for assistance under a federally assist-
ed program, licensing or approval of foster or adoptive homes or institutions 
by an Indian tnbe shall be deemed equivalent to licensing or approval by a 
State 
(PubL 95-608, Title II, § 201, Nov 8, 1978, 92 Stat 3075) 
Historical Note 
References in Text The Social Security plete Classification of this Act to the Code, 
Act, referred to in subsec (b), is Act Aug 14, see section 1305 ol Title 42 and Tables vol 
1935 c 531, 49 Stat 620 as amended Ti ume ' 
ties IV-B and XX of the Social Security Act Legislative History For legislative history 
are classified generally to part B (section 620
 a n d purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 197" US 
et seq ) of subchapter IV and subchapter XX Code Cong and Adm News p 7530 
(section 1397 et seq ) of chapter 7 of Title 42, 
The Public Health and Welfare For corn-
Library References 
Indians <£=>7 CJS Indians § 22 
United States <£=>40, 82(1) CJS United States §§ 38 to 40, 122 
§ 1 9 3 2 . Grants for off-reservation programs for additional ser-
vices 
The Secretary is also authorized to make grants to Indian organizations to 
establish and operate off-reservation Indian child and family service pro-
grams which may include, but are not limited to— 
(1) a system for regulating, maintaining, and supporting Indian fos-
ter and adoptive homes, including a subsidy program under which Indi-
an adoptive children may be provided support comparable to that for 
which they would be eligible as Indian foster children, taking into ac-
count the appropriate State standards of support for maintenance and 
medical needs 
CH. 21 CMII I) WELFARE 25 § 1VJ4 
(2) the operation and maintenance of facilities and services for coun-
seling and treatment of Indian families and Indian foster and adoptive 
children, 
(3) family assistance, including homemaker and home counselors, 
day care, afterschool care, and employment, recreational activities, and 
respite care, -\nd 
(4) guidance, legal representation, and advice to Indian families in-
volved in child custody proceedings 
(PubL 95-608, Title II, § 202, Nov 8, 1978, 92 Stat 3076) 
Historical Note 
Legislate History For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 US 
Code Cong and Adm News, p 7530 
§ 1933. Funds for on and off reservation programs 
(a) Appropriated funds for similar programs of Department of Health and 
Human Services; appropriation in advance for payments 
In the establishment, operation, and Funding of Indian child and family 
service programs, both on and off reservation, the Secretary may enter into 
agreements with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the latter 
Secretary is hereby authonzed for such purposes to use funds appropriated 
for similar programs of the Department of Health and Human Services 
Provided, That authority to make payments pursuant to such agreements 
shall be effective only to the extent and in such amounts as may be provided 
in advance by appropriation Acts 
(b) Appropriation authorization under section 13 of this title 
Funds for the purposes of this chapter may be appropriated pursuant to 
the provisions of section 13 of this title 
(Pub L 95-608, Title II, § 203, Nov 8, 1978, 92 Stat 3076, Pub L 96-88, Title V, 
§ 509(b), Oct 17, 1979, 93 Stat b95 ) 
Historical Note 
Change of Name. "Secretary of Health which is classified to section 3508(b) of Title 
and Human Services ' and "Department of 20, Education 
Health and Human Services" were substitut Legislative History. For legislative histor\ 
ed for "Secretary of Health, Education, and
 a n d p u r pose of Pub L 95-608, see 1978 U S 
Welfare ' and 'Department of Health, Educa
 C o d c C o n g ? l l d A d m N c w S f p 7530 
tion, and Welfare ', respectively, in subsec (a) 
pursuant to section 509(b) of Pub L 96-88, 
§ 1934. "Indian" defined for certain purposes 
For the purposes of sections 1932 and 1933 of this title, the term "Indi-
an" shall include persons defined in section 1603(c) of this title 
fPub I 95-608 Title II. § 204. Nov 8. 1978, 92 Stat 3077 ) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Tub.L. 95-608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Library References 
Indians <S=>I. C.JS. Indians §§ 1. 2. 
SUBCHAPTER III—RECORDKEEPING, INFORMATION 
AVAILABILITY, AND TIMETABLES 
§ 1 9 5 1 . Information availability to and disclosure by Secretary 
(a) Copy of final decree or order; other information; anonymity affidavit; 
exemption from Freedom of Information Act 
Any State court entering a final decree or order in any Indian child adop-
tive placement after November 8, 1978, shall provide the Secretary with a 
copy of such decree or order together with such other information as may 
be necessary to show— 
(1) the name and tribal affiliation of the child; 
(2) the names and addresses of the biological parents; 
(3) the names and addresses of the adoptive parents; and 
(4) the identity of any agency haying files or information relating to 
such adoptive placement. 
Where the court records contain an affidavit of the biological parent or par-
ents that their identity remain confidential, the court shall include such affi-
davit with the other information. The Secretary shall insure that the confi-
dentiality of such information is maintained and such information shall not 
be subject to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), as amended. 
(b) Disclosure of information for enrollment of Indian child in tribe 
or for determination of member rights or benefits; certification 
of entitlement to enrollment 
Upon the request of the adopted Indian child over the age of eighteen, the 
adoptive or foster parents of an Indian child, or an Indian tribe, the Secre-
tary shall disclose such information as may be necessary for the enrollment 
of an Indian child in the tnbe in which the child may be eligible for enroll-
ment or for determining any rights or benefits associated with that member-
ship. Where the documents relating to such child contain an affidavit from 
the biological parent or parents requesting anonymity, the Secretary shall 
certify to the Indian child's tribe, where the information warrants, that the 
child's parentage and other circumstances of birth entitle the child to enroll-
ment under the criteria established by such tribe. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title III, § 301, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3077.) 
Historical Note 
Legislate History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Library References 
Records c^30 et seq. CJ.S. Records §§ 34, 35. 38. 
§ 1 9 5 2 . Rules and regulations 
Within one hundred and eighty days after November 8, 1978, the Seen 
tary shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary t 
carry out the provisions of this chapter. 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title III, § 302, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3077.) 
Historical Note 
Legislate History. For legislative history 
and purpose of Pub.L. 95-608, see 1978 U.S. 
Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 7530. 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Procedures governing tribal reassumption of jurisdiction over Indian child custody procecdini 
see 25 CFR 13.1 et seq. 
SUBCHAPTER IV-MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
§ 1 9 6 1 . Locally convenient day schools 
(a) It is the sense of Congress that the absence of locally convenient d 
schools may contribute to the breakup of Indian families. 
(b) Omitted 
(Pub.L. 95-608, Title IV, § 401, Nov. 8, 1978, 92 Stat. 3078.) 
Historical Note 
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H.R. REP. 95-1386 
H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1978, 1978 USCC&AN 7530, 
1978 WL 8515 (Leg.Hist.) 
P.L. 95-608, INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978 
SEE PAGE 92 STAT. 3069 
SENATE REPORT (INDIAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE) NO. 95-597, 
NOV. 3, 1977 (TO ACCOMPANY S. 1214) 
HOUSE REPORT (INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS COMMITTEE) 
NO. 95-1386, JULY 24, 1978 (TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 12533) 
CONG. RECORD VOL. 123 (1977) 
CONG. RECORD VOL. 124 (1978) 
DATES OF CONSIDERATION AND PASSAGE 
SENATE NOVEMBER 4, 1977; OCTOBER 15, 1978 
HOUSE OCTOBER 14, 1978 
THE SENATE BILL WAS PASSED IN LIEU OF THE HOUSE BILL AFTER 
AMENDING ITS LANGUAGE TO CONTAIN THE TEXT OF THE HOUSE 
BILL. 
THE HOUSE REPORT IS SET OUT. 
(CONSULT NOTE FOLLOWING TEXT FOR INFORMATION ABOUT OMITTED 
MATERIAL. EACH COMMITTEE REPORT IS A SEPARATE DOCUMENT ON 
WESTLAW.) 
HOUSE REPORT NO. 95-1386 
JULY 24, 1978 
THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, TO WHOM WAS 
REFERRED THE BILL (H.R. 12533) TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS FOR THE 
PLACEMENT OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE HOMES, TO 
PREVENT THE BREAKUP OF INDIAN FAMILIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, 
HAVING CONSIDERED THE SAME, REPORT FAVORABLY THEREON WITH AN 
AMENDMENT AND RECOMMEND THAT THE BILL AS AMENDED DO PASS. 
* * * * 
PURPOSE 
THE PURPOSE OF THE BILL (H.R. 12533), INTRODUCED BY MR. UDALL 
ET AL., [FN1] IS TO PROTECT THE BEST INTERESTS OF INDIAN CHILDREN 
AND TO PROMOTE THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF INDIAN TRIBES AND 
FAMILIES BY ESTABLISHING MINIMUM FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR THE REMOVAL 
OF INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND THE PLACEMENT OF SUCH 
CHILDREN IN FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE HOMES OR INSTITUTIONS WHICH WILL 
REFLECT THE UNIQUE VALUES OF INDIAN CULTURE AND BY PROVIDING FOR 
ASSISTANCE TO INDIAN TRIBES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE OPERATION OF 
CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICE PROGRAMS. 
BACKGROUND 
* * * I CAN REMEMBER (THE WELFARE WORKER) COMING AND TAKING 
SOME OF MY COUSINS AND FRIENDS. I DIDN'T KNOW WHY AND I DIDN'T 
QUESTION IT. IT WAS JUST DONE AND IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN DONE * * * 
[FN2] THE WHOLESALE SEPARATION OF INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THEIR 
FAMILIES IS PERHAPS THE MOST TRAGIC AND DESTRUCTIVE ASPECT OF 
AMERICAN INDIAN LIFE TODAY. SURVEYS OF STATES WITH LARGE INDIAN 
POPULATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN AFFAIRS 
(AAIA) IN 1969 AND AGAIN IN 1974 INDICATE THAT APPROXIMATELY 25-35 
PERCENT OF ALL INDIAN CHILDREN ARE SEPARATED FROM THEIR FAMILIES 
AND PLACED IN FOSTER HOMES, ADOPTIVE HOMES, OR IKSTITUTIONS. IN 
SOME STATES THE PROBLEM IS GETTING WORSE: IN MINNESOTA, ONE IN 
EVERY EIGHT INDIAN CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE IS LIVING IN AN 
ADOPTIVE HOME; AND, IN 1971-72, NEARLY ONE IN EVERY FOUR INDIAN 
CHILDREN UNDER 1 YEAR OF AGE WAS ADOPTED. THE DISPARITY IN 
PLACEMENT RATES FOR INDIANS AND NON-INDIANS IS SHOCKING. IN 
MINNESOTA, INDIAN CHILDREN ARE PLACED IN FOSTER CARE OR IN ADOPTIVE 
HOMES AT A PER CAPITA RATE FIVE TIMES GRATER THAN NON-INDIAN 
CHILDREN. IN MONTANA, THE RATIO OF INDIAN FOSTER-CARE PLACEMENT 
IS AT LEAST 13 TIMES GREATER. IN SOUTH DAKOTA, 40 PERCENT OF ALL 
ADOPTIONS MADE BY THE STATE'S DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE SINCE 
1967-68 ARE OF INDIAN CHILDREN, YET INDIANS MAKE UP ONLY 7 PERCENT 
OF THE JUVENILE POPULATION. THE NUMBER OF SOUTH DAKOTA INDIAN 
CHILDREN LIVING IN FOSTER HOMES IS PER CAPITA, NEARLY 16 TIMES 
GREATER THAN THE NON- INDIAN RATE. IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, THE 
INDIAN ADOPTION RATE IS 19 TIMES GREATER AND THE FOSTER CARE RATE 
10 TIMES GREATER. IN WISCONSIN. THE RISK RUN BY INDIAN CHILDREN 
OF BETNG SEPARATED FROM THEIR PARENTS IS NEART.V 1 ,600 PERCENT 
GREATER THAN IT IS FOR NON-INDIAN _ CHILDREN. JUST AS INDIAN 
CHILDREN ARE EXPOSED TO THESE GREAT HAZARDOUS, THEIR PARENTS ARE 
TOO. THE FEDERAL BOARDING SCHOOL AND DORMITORY PROGRAMS ALSO 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE DESTRUCTION OF INDIAN FAMILY AND COMMUNITY LIFE. 
THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (BIA), IN ITS SCHOOL CENSUS FOR 1971, 
INDICATES THAT 34,538 CHILDREN LIVE IN ITS INSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES 
RATHER THAN AT HOME. THIS REPRESENTS MORE THAN 17 PERCENT OF THE 
INDIAN SCHOOL AGE POPULATION OF FEDERALLY-RECOGNIZED RESERVATIONS 
AND 60 PERCENT OF THE CHILDREN ENROLLED IN BIA SCHOOLS. ON THE 
NAVAJO RESERVATION, ABOUT 20,000 CHILDREN OR 90 PERCENT OF THE BIA 
SCHOOL POPULATION IN GRADES K-12, LIVE AT BOARDING SCHOOLS. A 
NUMBER OF INDIAN CHILDREN ARE ALSO INSTITUTIONALIZED IN MISSION 
SCHOOLS, TRAINING SCHOOLS, ETC. IN ADDITION TO THE TRAUMA OF 
SEPARATION FROM THEIR FAMILIES, MOST INDIAN CHILDREN IN PLACEMENT 
OR IN INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTING TO 
A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT MUCH DIFFERENT THAN THEIR OWN. 
IN 16 STATES SURVEYED IN 1969, APPROXIMATELY 85 PERCENT OF ALL 
INDIAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE WERE LIVING IN NON-INDIAN HOMES. 
IN MINNESOTA TODAY, ACCORDING TO STATE FIGURES, MORE THAN 90 
PERCENT OF NONRELATED ADOPTIONS OF INDIAN CHILDREN ARE MADE BY 
NON-INDIAN COUPLES. FEW STATES KEEP AS AS CAREFUL OR COMPLETE 
CHILD WELFARE STATISTICS AS MINNESOTA DOES, BUT INFORMED ESTIMATES 
BY WELFARE OFFICIALS ELSEWHERE SUGGEST THAT THIS RATE IS THE NORM. 
IN MOST FEDERAL AND MISSION BOARDING SCHOOLS, A MAJORITY OF THE 
PERSONNEL IS NON-INDIAN. IT IS CLEAR THEN THAT THE INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE CRISIS IS OF MASSIVE PROPORTIONS AND THAT INDIAN FAMILIES 
FACE VASTLY GREATER RISKS OF INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION THAN ARE 
TYPICAL OF OUR SOCIETY AS A WHOLE. 
STANDARDS 
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE CRISIS WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE 
STANDARDS FOR DEFINING MISTREATMENT ARE REVISED. VERY FEW INDIAN 
CHILDREN ARE REMOVED FROM THEIR FAMILIES ON THE GROUNDS OF PHYSICAL 
ABUSE. ONE STUDY OF A NORTH DAKOTA RESERVATION SHOWED THAT THESE 
GROUNDS WERE ADVANCED IN ONLY 1 PERCENT OF THE CASES. ANOTHER 
STUDY OF A TRIBE IN THE NORTHWEST SHOWED THE SAME INCIDENCE. THE 
REMAINING 99 PERCENT OF THE CASES WERE ARGUED ON SUCH VAGUE GROUNDS 
AS 'NEGLECT' OR 'SOCIAL DEPRIVATION' AND ON ALLEGATIONS OF THE 
EMOTIONAL DAMAGE THE CHILDREN WERE SUBJECTED TO BY LIVING WITH 
THEIR PARENTS. INDIAN COMMUNITIES ARE OFTEN SHOCKED TO LEARN THAT 
PARENTS THEY REGARD AS EXCELLENT CAREGIVERS HAVE BEEN JUDGED UNFIT 
BY NON-INDIAN SOCIAL WORKERS. IN JUDGING THE FITNESS OF A 
PARTICULAR FAMILY, MANY SOCIAL WORKERS, IGNORANT OF INDIAN CULTURAL 
VALUES AND SOCIAL NORMS, MAKE DECISIONS THAT ARE WHOLLY 
INAPPROPRIATE IN THE CONTEXT OF INDIAN FAMILY LIFE AND SO THEY 
FREQUENTLY DISCOVER NEGLECT OR ABANDONMENT WHERE NONE EXISTS. FOR 
EXAMPLE, TMTDYNAMiCS. OF -INDIAN, EXTENDED FAMILIES-* ARE LARGELY 
MISUNDERSTOOD."'" AN INDIAN CHILD MAY HAVE SCORES OF," PERHAPS MORE 
THAN A HUNDRED, RELATIVES WHO ARE COUNTED AS CLOSE, RESPONSIBLE 
MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY. MANY SOCIAL WORKERS, UNTUTORED IN THE WAYS 
OF INDIAN FAMILY LIFE OR ASSUMING THEM TO BE SOCIALLY 
IRRESPONSIBLE^CONSIDER LEAVING THE CHILD WITH PERSONS OUTSIDE THE 
NUCLEtlKiWSMIiy^S NEGLECT AND -THUS TAS" GROUNDS*'FOR TERMINATING 
PARENTAL RIGHTS^ BECAUSE IN SOME COMMUNITIES ~ THE SOCIAL WORKERS 
HAVE, IN A SENSE, BECOME A PART OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY, PARENTS 
WILL SOMETIMES TURN TO THE WELFARE DEPARTMENT FOR TEMPORARY CARE 
OF THEIR CHILDREN, FAILING TO REALIZE THAT THEIR ACTION IS 
PERCEIVED QUITE DIFFERENTLY BY NON-INDIANS. INDIAN CHILD-REARING 
PRACTICES ARE ALSO MISINTERPRETED IN EVALUATING A CHILD'S BEHAVIOR 
AND PARENTAL CONCERN. IT MAY APPEAR THAT THE CHILD IS RUNNING WILD 
AND THAT THE PARENTS DO NOT CARE. WHAT IS LABELLED 'PERMISSIVENESS' 
MAY OFTEN, IN FACT, SIMPLY BE A DIFFERENT BUT EFFECTIVE WAY OF 
DISCIPLINING CHILDREN. BIA BOARDING SCHOOLS ARE FULL OF CHILDREN 
WITH SUCH SPURIOUS 'BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS.' ONE OF THE GROUNDS MOST 
FRBgtJEmraff ^ VANCED »FOR TAKING INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THEIR PARENTS 
Ife.JTHJB_-ABUSE: OF^MiCOHOIr.^~-~HOWEVER, THIS STANDARD "IS APPLIED 
UNEQUALLY-. •* CEN. AREAS-^WHERE URATES "OF. PROBLEM "DRINKING 3MONG INDIANS 
ANJL -NON- _ INDIAN-:- ARE-^THE^SAME-^IT^^S^RA^IELY--APPLIED---AGAINST 
N«N%NDXAN""PARENT&. ONCE AGAIN CULTURAL BIASES FREQUENTLY AFFECT 
DECISION MAKING. THE LATE DR. EDWARD P. DOZIER OF SANTA CLARA 
PUEBLO AND OTHER OBSERVERS HAVE ARGUED THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT 
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE USE OF ALCOHOL. YET, BY AND LARGE, 
NON- INDIAN SOCIAL WORKERS DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE MEANING OF 
ACTS OR CONDUCT IN IGNORANCE OF THESE DISTINCTIONS. THB*€OURTS -TEND 
SO, RELY ON THE ,„ TESTIMONY OF SOCIAL WORKERS WHO OFTEN LACK THE 
TRAINING AND INSIGHTS NECESSARY TO MEASURE THE..EMOTIONAL RJSK THE 
d&LD, IS "RUNNING 'AT HOME. IN A NUMBER OF CASES, THE AAIA HAS 
OBTAINED EVIDENCE" FROM COMPETENT PSYCHIATRISTS WHO, AFTER EXAMINING 
THE DEFENDANTS, Tj|WffH&Bl^.i^fcE^ TO*~T:gNTRADTCT-• (PHE-rALLEGATIONS; 




FKOlTTHFtKCT5l5F "THE^PTiRElftTS. THE ABUSIVE ACTIONS OF SOCIAL WORKERS 
WHOULD LARGELY BE NULLIFIED IF MORE JUDGES WERE THEMSELVES 
KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT INDIAN LIFE AND REQUIRED A SHARPER DEFINITION 
OF THE STANDARDS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT. DISCRIMINATORY 
STANDARDS HAVE MADE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR MOST INDIAN COUPLES 
TO QUALIFY AS FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE PARENTS, SINCE THEY ARE BASED ON 
MIDDLE-CLASS VALUES. RECOGNIZING THAT IN SOME INSTANCES IT IS 
NECESSARY TO REMOVE CHILDREN FROM THEIR HOMES, COMMUNITY LEADERS 
ARGUE THAT THERE ARE INDIAN FAMILIES WITHIN THE TRIBE WHO COULD 
PROVIDE EXCELLENT CARE, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE OF MODEST MEANS. WHILE 
SOME PROGRESS IS BEING MADE HERE AND THERE, THE FIGURES CITED ABOVE 
INDICATE THAT NON-INDIAN PARENTS CONTINUE TO FURNISH ALMOST ALL THE 
FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE CARE FOR INDIAN CHILDREN. 
DUE PROCESS 
THE DECISION TO TAKE INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THEIR NATURAL HOMES 
IS, IN MOST CASES, CARRIED OUT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. FOR 
EXAMPLE, IT IS RARE FOR EITHER INDIAN CHILDREN OR THEIR PARENTS TO 
BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL TO OR HAVE THE SUPPORTING TESTIMONY OF 
EXPERT WITNESSES. MANY CASES DO NOT GO THROUGH AN ADJUDICATORY 
PROCESS AT ALL, SINCE THE VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IS 
A DEVICE WIDELY EMPLOYED BY SOCIAL WORKERS TO GAIN CUSTODY OF 
CHILDREN. BECAUSE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE WAIVERS AND BECAUSE 
A GREAT NUMBER OF INDIAN PARENTS DEPEND ON WELFARE PAYMENTS FOR 
SURVIVAL, THEY ARE EXPOSED TO THE SOMETIMES COERCIVE ARGUMENTS OF 
WELFARE DEPARTMENTS. IN A RECENT SOUTH DAKOTA ENTRAPMENT CASE, AN 
INDIAN PARENT IN A TIME OF TROUBLE WAS PERSUADED TO SIGN A WAIVER 
GRANTING TEMPORARY CUSTODY TO THE STATE, ONLY TO FIND THAT THIS IS 
NOW BEING ADVANCED AS EVIDENCE OF NEGLECT AND GROUNDS FOR THE 
PERMANENT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS. IT IS AN UNFORTUNATE 
FACT OF LIFE FOR MANY INDIAN PARENTS THAT THE PRIMARY SERVICE 
AGENCY TO WHICH THEY MUST TURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP ALSO EXERCISES 
POLICE POWERS OVER THEIR FAMILY LIFE AND IS, MOST FREQUENTLY, THE 
AGENCY THAT INITIATES CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
INDIAN AND NON-INDIAN SOCIAL SYSTEMS OPERATES TO DEFEAT DUE 
PROCESS. THE EXTENDED FAMILY PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE. BY SHARING THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF CHILD REARING, THE EXTENDING FAMILY TENDS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNITY'S COMMITMENT TO THE CHILD. AT THE SAME 
TIME, HOWEVER, IT DIMINISHES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE NUCLEAR 
FAMILY WILL BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE ITSELF QUICKLY ENOUGH WHEN AN 
OUTSIDE AGENCY ACTS TO ASSUME CUSTODY. BECAUSE IT IS NOT UNUSUAL 
FOR INDIAN CHILDREN TO SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME AWAY WITH OTHER 
RELATIVES, THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE REALIZATION OF WHAT IS HAPPENING— 
POSSIBLY NOT UNTIL THE OPPORTUNITY FOR DUE PROCESS HAS SLIPPED 
AWAY. 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
IN SOME INSTANCES, FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
CRISIS. FOR EXAMPLE, AGENCIES ESTABLISHED TO PLACE CHILDREN HAVE 
AN INCENTIVE TO FIND CHILDREN TO PLACE. INDIAN COMMUNITY LEADERS 
CHARGE THAT FEDERALLY-SUBSIDIZED FOSTER CARE PROGRAMS ENCOURAGE 
SOME NON-INDIAN FAMILIES TO START 'BABY FARMS' IN ORDER TO 
SUPPLEMENT THEIR MEAGER FARM INCOME WITH FOSTER CARE PAYMENTS AND 
TO OBTAIN EXTRA HANDS FOR FARMWORK. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE 
RATIO OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE VERSUS THE NUMBER OF INDIAN 
CHILDREN THAT ARE ADOPTED SEEMS TO BEAR THIS OUT. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 
WYOMING IN 1969, INDIANS ACCOUNTED FOR 70 PERCENT OF FOSTER CARE 
PLACEMENTS BUT ONLY 8 PERCENT OF ADOPTIVE PLACEMENTS. FOSTER CARE 
PAYMENTS USUALLY CEASE WHEN A CHILD IS ADOPTED. IN ADDITION, THERE 
ARE ECONOMIC DISINCENTIVES. IT WILL COST THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
GOVERNMENTS A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO PROVIDE INDIAN COMMUNITIES 
WITH THE MEANS TO REMEDY THEIR SITUATION. BUT OVER THE LONG RUN, 
IT WILL COST A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY NOT TO. AT THE VERY LEAST, AS 
A FIRST STEP, WE SHOULD FIND NEW AND MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS TO SPEND 
PRESENT FUNDS. 
SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
WfeXNQQME, JOBLESSNESS, POOR.HEALTH, SUBSTANDARD HOUSING, AND 
!EOW EDUCATIONAL' ATTAINMENT— THESE ARE THE REASONS-MOST-OFTEN^CITED 
*Mfc=T-HE -DISINTEGRATION -OF- INDIAN—FAMILY—LIFE. IT IS NOT THAT 
CLEAR-CUT. HOT. ALL IMPOVERISHED "SOCIETIES, WHETHER" INDIAN OR 
NO£"«INDIAN,--STJFFER FROM~ tIATASTROPHICALLY ~HIGff* RATES' OF FAMILY 
BREAKDOWN.— CULTURAL " DISORIENTATION,"™ *A" ""PERSON' S~ ~ SENSE OF 
PeWERLESSNESS,'" "HIS "LOSS OF * SELF-ESTEEM-1"- THESE MAY BE THE MOST 
P6TENT FORCES AT WORK. THEY ARISE, IN LARGE MEASURE, FROM OUR 
NATIONAL ATTITUDES AS REFLECTED IN LONG-ESTABLISHED FEDERAL POLICY 
AND FROM ARBITRARY ACTS OF GOVERNMENT. ONE OF THE EFFECTS OF OUR 
NATIONAL PATERNALISM HAS BEEN TO SO ALIENATE SOME INDIAN PATENTS 
FROM THEIR SOCIETY THAT THEY ABANDON THEIR CHILDREN AT HOSPITALS 
OR TO WELFARE DEPARTMENTS RATHER THAN ENTRUST THEM TO THE CARE OF 
RELATIVES IN THE EXTENDED FAMILY. ANOTHER EXPRESSION OF IT IS THE 
INVOLUNTARY, ARBITRARY, AND UNWARRANTED SEPARATION OF FAMILIES. IT 
HAS ALREADY BEEN NOTED THAT THE HARSH LIVING CONDITIONS IN MANY 
INDIAN COMMUNITIES MAY PROMPT A WELFARE DEPARTMENT TO MAKE 
UNWARRANTED PLACEMENTS AND THAT THEY MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR INDIAN 
PEOPLE TO QUALIFY AS FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE PARENTS. ADDITIONALLY, 
BECAUSE THESE CONDITIONS ARE OFTEN VIEWED AS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF 
FAMILY BREAKDOWN AND BECAUSE GENERALLY THERE IS NO END TO INDIAN 
POVERTY IN SIGHT, AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT OFTEN FAIL TO RECOGNIZE 
IMMEDIATE, PRACTICAL MEANS TO REDUCE THE INCIDENCE OF NEGLECT OR 
SEPARATION. AS SURELY AS POVERTY IMPOSES SEVERE STRAINS ON THE 
ABILITY OF FAMILIES TO FUNCTION— SOMETIMES THE EXTRA BURDEN THAT 
IS TOO MUCH TO BEAR— SO TOO FAMILY - BREAKDOWN CONTRIBUTES TO THE 
CYCLE OF POVERTY. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IN ITS REPORTS TO THE COMMITTEE OF 
FEBRUARY 9 AND MAY 23, 1978, RAISES QUESTIONS REGARDING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CERTAIN OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE LEGISLATION. 
WHILE THE COMMITTEE DID NOT AGREE WITH THE DEPARTMENT ON THESE 
ISSUES, CERTAIN CHANGES WERE MADE IN THE LEGISLATION WHICH WILL 
MEET SOME OF THE DEPARTMENT'S CONCERNS. OTHER ISSUES REMAIN, 
HOWEVER. IN VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS OF THE DEPARTMENT, 
THE COMMITTEE FEELS COMPELLED TO RESPOND. 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE 
CLAUSE 2 OF ARTICLE VI OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: THIS 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH SHALL BE MADE 
IN PURSUANCE THEREOF; AND ALL TREATIES MADE, OR WHICH SHALL BE MADE 
UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES, SHALL BE THE SUPREME LAW 
OF THE LAND; AND THE JUDGES IN EVERY STATE SHALL BE FOUND THEREBY; 
ANY THING IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAWS OF ANY STATE TO THE CONTRARY 
NOTWITHSTANDING. WHEN CONGRESS LEGISLATES PURSUANT TO ITS DELEGATED 
POWERS, CONFLICTING STATE LAW AND POLICY MUST YIELD, GIBBONS V. 
OGDEN, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); [FN3] HILL V. FLORIDA EX REL. WATSON, 325 
U.S. 538 (1945); [FN4] NASH V. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMM. , 389 U.S. 
235 (1967); [FN5] LEE V. FLORIDA, 392 U.S. 378 (1968); [FN6] PEREZ 
V. CAMPBELL, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). [FN7] THE CONSTITUTION, LAWS, 
AND TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES ARE AS MUCH A PART OF THE LAW OF 
EVERY STATE AS ITS OWN LOCAL LAWS AND CONSTITUTION. THEIR 
OBLIGATION 'IS IMPERATIVE UPON THE STATE JUDGES, IN THEIR OFFICIAL 
AND NOT MERELY IN THEIR PRIVATE CAPACITIES. FROM THE VERY NATURE 
OF THEIR JUDICIAL DUTIES, THEY WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO PRONOUNCE 
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE CASE IN JUDGEMENT. THEY WERE NOT TO 
DECIDE MERELY ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OR CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE, 
BUT ACCORDING TO THE LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES— 'THE 
SUPREME LAW OF THE LANE." MARTIN V. HUNTER'S LESSEE, 1 WHEAT. 304 
(1816) ; STATE COURTS HAVE BOTH THE POWER AND DUTY TO ENFORCE 
OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER FEDERAL LAW. CLAFLIN V. HOUSEMAN, 93 U.S. 
130 (1876); [FN8] SECOND EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY CASES, 223 U.S. 1 
(1912); TESTA V. KATT, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). [FN9] 
PLENARY POWER OF CONGRESS OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS 
THE QUESTION IS THEN: 'DOES CONGRESS HAVE POWER TO LEGISLATE 
AS PROPOSED IN THE BILL?' CLAUSE 3, SECTION 8, ARTICLE I OF THE 
CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: THE CONGRESS SHALL HAVE POWER * * * TO 
REGULATE COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS, AND AMONG THE SEVERAL 
STATES, AND WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES. IN AN UNBROKEN LINE OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS, BEGINNING WITH CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL'S 
DECISION IN WORCESTER V. GEORGIA, 31 U.S. 515 (1832): [FN10] (THE 
CONSTITUTION) CONFERS ON CONGRESS THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE; OF 
MAKING TREATIES, AND OF REGULATING COMMERCE WITH FOREIGN NATIONS, 
AND AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES, AND WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES. THESE 
POWERS COMPREHEND ALL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGULATION OF OUR 
INTERCOURSE WITH THE INDIANS. THEY (CONGRESS) ARE NOT LIMITED BY 
ANY RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR FREE ACTIONS. AND ENDING WITH UNITED 
STATES V. WHEELER— U.S.— (MARCH 22, 1978): (tHERE-* IS-^N) 
UqgJ^UTED.-^ACT^T!B0£^!lGRES&^^^ 
GtfgBSNMEftT. THE SUPREME COURT HAS, TIME AND AGAIN, UPHELD THE 
SWEEPING POWER OF CONGRESS OVER THE INDIAN MATTERS. THE CASES ARE 
FAR TOO NUMEROUS TO CITE, BUT TWO CASES WILL SERVE TO EXEMPLIFY 
THIS POSITION. IN U.S. V. KAGAMA, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) [FN11] THE 
COURT SAID: THESE INDIANS TRIBES ARE WARDS OF THE NATION. THEY ARE 
COMMUNITIES DEPENDENT ON THE UNITED STATES. DEPENDENT LARGELY FOR 
THEIR DAILY FOOD. DEPENDENT FOR THEIR POLITICAL RIGHTS. THEY OWE 
NO ALLEGIANCE TO THE STATES, AND RECEIVE FROM THEM NO PROTECTION. 
BECAUSE OF THE LOCAL ILL FEELING, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATES WHERE 
THEY ARE FOUND ARE OFTEN THEIR DEADLIEST ENEMIES. FROM THEIR VERY 
WEAKNESS AND HELPLESSNESS, SO LARGELY DUE TO THE COURSE OF DEALING 
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITH THEM, AND THE TREATIES IN WHICH IT 
HAS BEEN PROMISED, THERE ARISES THE DUTY OF PROTECTION, AND WITH 
IT THE POWER. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE EXECUTIVE AND 
BY CONGRESS, AND BY THIS COURT, WHENEVER THE QUESTION HAS ARISEN. 
AND IN THE UNITED STATES V. NICE, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), [FN12] THE 
COURT HELD: THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE OR PROHIBIT TRAFFIC 
WITH TRIBAL INDIANS WITHIN A STATE WHETHER UPON OR OFF AN INDIAN 
RESERVATION IS WELL SETTLED * * * . ITS SOURCE IS TWOFOLD; FIRST, 
THE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION EXPRESSLY INVESTING CONGRESS WITH 
AUTHORITY 'TO REGULATE COMMERCE * * * WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES', AND, 
SECOND, THE DEPENDENT RELATION OF SUCH TRIBES TO THE UNITED STATES. 
IT CANNOT BE QUESTIONED THAT CONGRESS HAS BROAD, UNIQUE POWERS WITH 
RESPECT TO INDIAN TRIBES AND AFFAIRS, THERE IS ONLY ONE CAVEAT: 
WHILE THOSE POWERS MAY BE PLENARY, THE EXERCISE MAY NOT BE 
ARBITRARY. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESS MAY NOT TAKE INDIAN PROPERTY 
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION NOR MAY IT ESTABLISH A RELIGION FOR 
INDIAN TRIBES. 
PLENARY POWER AND CHILD WELFARE 
THE QUESTION THEN IS: 'IS THE REGULATION OF CHILD CUSTODY 
PROCEEDINGS AND THE IMPOSITION OF MINIMUM FEDERAL STANDARDS AN 
APPROPRIATE EXERCISE OF CONGRESS PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN 
AFFAIRS?' WE NEED ONLY CITE THREE CASES TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR 
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE IN THIS AREA. IN U.S. V. 
HOLLIDAY, 70 U.S. 407 (1866), [FN13] IHE-HSOURT-SAlDTTOMMERCE-WITfl 
J*RE£GN.*NATXQNS,_WITHOUT D^ UBjr^ J^ffiEANS-^ eMMERefi^ BETWEEN^ ei^ IZENS^ F^ 
THfiwIINITED-STATES'"AND-TclTXZENS. OR ^ UBJECTS--OR-FOREIGN~«OVERNMENT& 
AS ^DJ^XDUAI*S.^JVND.jSAj:PMMERCE..WITH.XNDIAN^TRIBES~lIEAlTSrCMMERCE 
WJEg^THE. INDIVIDUALS COMPOSINGJTHO§£JE&LBES. IN DICK V. U.S., 340 
(1908), [FN14] THE "COURT'"HELD: AS «fcONG-AS -THESE-INDIANS-.REMAIN A 
aXSTXNCT—PEOPLE, WITH .AN XDCISTING--TRIBAL-ORGANI-Z-ATIONr-RECOGN^ZED 
B^ ^BTHE*"POLITI'CAL *DEPARTMENT~QF~ THE -daDV£RNMENT~r»CONGRBSS-HAS-^OWER 
TQBB£AXJi!irXra_WJ»M^ANJ}«0!l~4^ * * * . 
KNOEPFLER, IN LEGAL STATUS OF AMERICAN INDIAN & HIS PROPERTY 
(1922), 7 IA.L.B. 232, STATED: 'COMMERCE WITH THE INDIAN TRIBES 
HAS BEEN CONSTRUED TO MEAN PRACTICALLY EVERY SORT OF INTERCOURSE 
WITH THE INDIANS EITHER IN THE TRIBES OR AS INDIVIDUALS.' FINALLY, 
THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS, IN A CASE INVOLVING THE ATTEMPTED 
ADOPTION OF AN INDIAN CHILD (WAKEFIELD V. LITTLE LIGHT, 276 MD. 
333, 347 A.2D 228 (1975)), STATED: WE THINK IT PLAIN THAT 
CHILD-REARING IS AN 'ESSENTIAL TRIBAL RELATION ' WITHIN * * * (THE 
TEST OF) WILLIAMS V. LEE (358 U.S. 217 (1959). [FN15] AND AGAIN: 
* * * (QONSIDERING—THAT' -'THERE' *CAU""BE~"NO - GREATER -THREAT TO 
'ESSENTIAL- TRIBAL RELATIONS'-~AND NOJ GREATER ~INFRINGEMENT~~ON"~THE 
R^ GiXX^ JE^ -THE.-*..* * ,TRIBE TO GOVERN'THEMSELVES'THATT T0~INTERFERE 
W^EH^TRIBAL- CONTROL OVER THE CUSTODY OF -THEIR CHILDRlEN^WE" AGREE 
WimJCHE^CONCLUSION EXPRESSED' IN WISCONSIN POTAWATOMIES "(WISCONSIN 
POTAWATOMIES V. HOUSTON, 393 F.SUPP. 719 (1973)) THAT IN 
DE32ERMIiaNG-^UBJ^CT-MATTER-tfURISD^ 
0NLYRAJ3JDNAL~APPRQACH-~IS~TO -DETERMINE*-THE- iJeMX-e^ fcl^ f^ THE-^ NDIA*! 
C W E S V BY USING THE INDIAN CHILD'S DOMICILE AS THE STATE'S 
JURISDICTIONAL BASIF """Mr •""*.T3","""?_>T •"TTDT' T" ? T»T">Tjj\T«n CT.-V'T*—-*•»»•"" 
PROTECTION FROM LOSING ITS ESSENTIAL RIGHTS OF CHILD-REARING AND 
MAINTENANCE OF TRIBAL IDENTITY. EVEN THIS STATE COURT RECOGNIZED 
THAT A TRIBE'S CHILDREN ARE VITAL TO ITS INTEGRITY AND FUTURE. 
SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO rx^JTECT THE 
INTEGRITY OF THE TRIBES, WE CAN SAY WITH THE KAGAMA COURT, ' * * 
* THERE ARISES THE DUTY OF PROTECTION, AND WITH IT THE POWER.' 
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF PLENARY POWER 
IS THE CONGRESS LIMITED TO INDIAN LANDS OR TO THE RESERVATION 
IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS? THE 
ANSWER IS CLEARLY, 'NO'. AGAIN, WE NEED ONLY CITE ONE OR TWO CASES 
TO SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION. IN U.S. V. HOLLIDAY, SUPRA, THE COURT 
SAID: IF COMMERCE, OR TRAFFIC, OR INTERCOURSE IS CARRIED ON WITH 
AN INDIAN TRIBE, OR WITH A MEMBER OF SUCH TRIBE, IT IS SUBJECT TO 
BE REGULATED BY CONGRESS; ALTHOUGH WITHIN THE LIMITS OF A STATE. 
THE LOCALITY OF THE TRAFFIC CAN HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE POWER. 
(EMPHASIS ADDED.) THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE IT IN REFERENCE TO ANY 
INDIAN TRIBE, OR ANY PERSON WHO IS A MEMBER OF SUCH TRIBE, IS 
ABSOLUTE, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE LOCALITY OF THE TRAFFIC, OR THE 
LOCALITY OF THE TRIBE, OR THE MEMBER OF THE TRIBE WITH WHOM IT IS 
CARRIED ON. IN PERRIN V. U.S., 232 U.S. 478 (1914), [FN16] THE 
COURT HELD: WE COME, THEN, TO THE OBJECTION THAT THE PROHIBITION 
IN THE ACT OF 1894 CONFERS AN UNNECESSARILY EXTENSIVE TERRITORY AND 
IS NOT LIMITED IN DURATION, AND SO TRANSCENDS THE POWER OF 
CONGRESS. A§.j,THE *POWER ,-IS ^ INC3B3ENT^ONLY-.TCr THE - PRESENCE*' C-F THE 
INBtJANS-AND -iSEIR .JTATUS ^S^IfARDS^Eili^GOgERNMENJTi^J^asMUS^aBE 
GflKGEDEBf^FHffT-^IT^Dois^NOT^ -ESSENTIAL, 
Ntfl^E-KjRS^iJtftelTRARYT^UT^^ 
* * * ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MUST ALSO BE CONCEDED THAT, IN 
DETERMINING WHAT IS REASONABLY ESSENTIAL TO THE PROTECTION OF THE 
INDIANS CONGRESS IS INVESTED WITH A WIDE DISCRETION AND ITS ACTION, 
UNLESS PURELY ARBITRARY, MUST BE ACCEPTED AND GIVEN FULL EFFECT BY 
THE COURTS. WE CITE AGAIN U.S. V. NICE, SUPRA: 'THE POWER OF 
CONGRESS TO REGULATE OR PROHIBIT TRAFFIC WITH TRIBAL INDIANS WITHIN 
A STATE WHETHER UPON OR OFF AN INDIAN RESERVATION IS WELL SETTLED 
* * * . ' 
MEMBERSHIP AND PLENARY POWER 
THE QUESTION OCCURS, AS RAISED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
IN ITS REPORT: 'IS THE POWER OF CONGRESS LIMITED, CONSTITUTIONALLY, 
TO ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE FORMALLY ENROLLED AS MEMBERS OF 
AN INDIAN TRIBE?' AGAIN, THE ANSWER IS NEGATIVE. IN 1934, CONGRESS 
ENACTED THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT OF JUNE 18, 1934 (48 STAT. 
988). SECTION 19 DEFINED 'INDIANS' AS: * * * ALL PERSONS OF INDIAN 
DESCENT WHO ARE MEMBERS OF ANY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE NOW UNDER 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION, AND ALL PERSONS WHO ARE DESCENDANTS OF SUCH 
MEMBERS WHO WERE, ON JUNE 1, 1934, RESIDING WITHIN THE PRESENT 
BOUNDARIES OF ANY INDIAN RESERVATION, AND SHALL FURTHER INCLUDE ALL 
OTHER PERSONS OF ONE- HALF OR MORE INDIAN BLOOD. CATEGORIES TWO AND 
THREE OF THIS DEFINITION ARE CLEARLY NOT ENROLLED MEMBERS OF A 
TRIBE, BY DEFINITION; YET CONGRESS CONFERRED THE RIGHTS AND 
BENEFITS OF THE ACT UPON THIS CLASS OF INDIANS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT 
TO PREFERENCE IN FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 
AND THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE. WHEN THE SUPREME COURT WAS CALLED 
UPON TO CONSTRUE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INDIAN PREFERENCE 
SECTION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT IN THE CASE OF MORTON V. 
MANCARI, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), [FN17] IT WAS AWARE THAT INDIANS WHO 
WERE NOT ENROLLED MEMBERS OF A TRIBE WERE MADE ELIGIBLE FOR THIS 
PREFERENCE BY ACT OF CONGRESS, BUT DID NOT STRIKE THE LAW DOWN AS 
INVIDIOUSLY DISCRIMINATORY. THE REASON IT DID NOT WAS BECAUSE IT 
WAS AWARE OF ITS OWN PAST DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
POWER OVER INDIANS NOT MEMBERS OF A TRIBE, CONGRESS MAY DISREGARD 
THE EXISTING MEMBERSHIP ROLLS AND DIRECT THAT PER CAPITA 
DISTRIBUTIONS BE MADE UPON THE BASIS OF A NEW ROLL, EVEN THOUGH 
SUCH ACT MAY MODIFY PRIOR LEGISLATION, TREATIES, OR AGREEMENTS WITH 
-HE TRIBE. STEPHENS V. CHEROKEE NATION, 174 U.S. 445 (1899). 
[FN18] THUS, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SIZEMORE V. BRADY, 
235 U.S. 441 (1914), [FN19] SAID: * * * LIKE OTHER TRIBAL INDIANS, 
THE CREEKS WERE WARDS OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH POSSESSED FULL 
POWER, IF IT DEEMED SUCH A COURSE WISE, TO ASSUME FULL CONTROL OVER 
THEM AND THEIR AFFAIRS, TO ASCERTAIN WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE TRIBE 
* * * . IN FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, AT PAGE 45 IN NOTE 10, IT IS SAID: 
IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT CONGRESS IS NOT BOUND BY THE TRIBAL RULE 
REGARDING MEMBERSHIP AND MAY DETERMINE FOR ITSELF WHETHER A PERSON 
IS AN INDIAN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE. 
UNITED STATES V. ROGERS, 4 HOW. 567 (1846) . IN THE VERY RECENT CASE 
OF UNITED STATES V. ANTELOPE, 45 U.S.L.W. 4361 (APRIL 19, 1977), 
THE SUPREME COURT SAID: IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT 
ENROLLMENT IN AN OFFICIAL TRIBE HAS NOT BEEN HELD TO BE AN ABSOLUTE 
REQUIREMENT FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION. * * * FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGE BATTIN, IN DILLON V. MONTANA, (1978), ORDERED: 2. THAT FOR 
PURPOSES OF APPLYING THIS (FEDERAL) EXEMPTION, THE CLASS OF 'INDIAN 
PERSONS' * * * SHALL INCLUDE PERSONS POSSESSING THE FOLLOWING 
QUALIFICATIONS: (A) THAT THE PERSON POSSESS SOME QUANTUM OF INDIAN 
BLOOD; (B) THAT THE PERSON BE RECOGNIZED AS AN INDIAN BY THE 
COMMUNITY IN WHICH HE OR SHE LIVES, AND THAT THE PUTATIVE 
TAXPAYER'S WARDSHIP STATUS HAS NOT BEEN TERMINATED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT; (C) THAT THE PENSION BE AN ENROLLED MEMBER OF A 
FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN TRIBE OR OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE TO BE 
RECOGNIZED AS AN INDIAN WARD BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. IF THE 
COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO ACT WITH RESPECT 
TO NONENROLLED INDIANS IN THE FOREGOING KINDS OF CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW 
MUCH MORE IS ITS POWER TO ACT TO PROTECT THE VALUABLE RIGHTS OF A 
MINOR INDIAN WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR ENROLLMENT IN A TRIBE? THIS 
MINOR, PERHAPS INFANT, INDIAN DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO 
INITIATE THE FORMAL, MECHANICAL PROCEDURE NECESSARY TO BECOME 
ENROLLED IN HIS TRIBE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE VERY VALUABLE 
CULTURAL AND PROPERTY BENEFITS FLOWING THEREFROM. OBVIOUSLY, 
CONGRESS HAS POWER TO ACT FOR THEIR PROTECTION. WIE1OTNSTTTUTJ:ONAL 
AND PLENARY POWER OF- .CONGRESS, OVER- INDIANS AND INDIAN TRIBES AND 
AFFAIRS, CANNOT SE^MADE TO HINGE. UPON THE CRANKING INTO OPERATION 
OlCK MECHANICAL PROCESS TESTABLI SHED UNDER TRIBAL LAW,--PARTICULARLY 
WITJir RESPECT TO~1NDiAN*~CHILDREN -WHO.r>^ BECAUSE OF THEIR MINORITY, 
CANNOT -MAKE-r A. .REASONED - DECISION - ABOUT THEIR TRIBAL AND - INDIAN 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE VERSUS STATES' RIGHTS 
FROM THE FOREGOING, IT IS CLEAR THAT CONGRESS HAS FULL POWER 
TO ENACT LAWS TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE FUTURE AND INTEGRITY OF 
INDIAN TRIBES BY PROVIDING MINIMAL SAFEGUARDS WITH RESPECT TO STATE 
PROCEEDINGS FOR INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY. THE FINAL QUESTION IS, 
PARAPHRASING THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 'D$ftS*CONGR£SS HAVE POWER" 
Tft^CONTROL- THE ^INCIDENTS >OF CHILD- CUSTODY- LITIGATION INVOLVING 
NONRESERVATION INDIAN' CHILDREN AND P£R^ )NTS"*4PJIRSUlLNT:.TO^ THE INDIAN 
COMMERCE. CLAUSE SUFFICIENT TO OVERRIDE JTHE SIGNIFICANT STATE 
INTEREST* TN* REGULATING THE PROCEDURE TO'BE"FOLLOWED BY ITS'COURTS 
"IJT-'EXERCISING JURISDICTION "OVER WHAT IS -TRADITIONALLY A STATE 
MATTER?' FIRST, LET IT BE SAID THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILL DO 
NOT OUST THE STATE FROM THE EXERCISE OF ITS LEGITIMATE POLICY 
POWERS IN REGULATING DOMESTIC RELATIONS. THE DECISIONS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT WILL SET TO REST THE PRINCIPLE OBJECTION. IT IS 
APPROPRIATE TO BEGIN WITH THE LANDMARK CASE OF MCCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), [FN20] WHERE THE COURT STATED: LET 
THE END BE LEGITIMATE, LET IT BE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND ALL MEANS WHICH ARE APPROPRIATE, WHICH ARE 
PLAINLY ADAPTED TO THAT END, WHICH ARE NOT PROHIBITED, BUT 
CONSISTENT WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, ARE 
CONSTITUTIONAL. IN BROWN V. WESTERN RY. CO., 338 U.S. 294 (1949), 
[FN21] THE COURT SAID: THE ARGUMENT IS THAT WHILE STATE COURTS, 
ARE WITHOUT POWER TO DETRACT FROM 'SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS' GRANTED BY 
CONGRESS * * * THEY ARE FREE TO FOLLOW THEIR OWN RULES OF 
'PRACTICE' AND 'PROCEDURE' * * * . A LONG SERIES OF CASES 
PREVIOUSLY DECIDED, FROM WHICH WE SEE NO REASON TO DEPART, MAKES 
IT OUR DUTY TO CONSTRUE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THIS COMPLAINT OURSELVES 
IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER PETITIONER HAS BEEN DENIED A RIGHT 
OF TRIAL GRANTED HIM BY CONGRESS. THIS FEDERAL RIGHT CANNOT BE 
DEFEATED BY FORMS OF LOCAL PRACTICE. * * * STRICT LOCAL RULES OF 
PLEADING CANNOT BE USED TO IMPOSE UNNECESSARY BURDENS UPON RIGHTS 
OF RECOVERY AUTHORIZED BY FEDER LAWS. IN DICE V. AKRON, C.Y.Y. R.R. 
CO., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), [FN22] THE COURT HELD: CONGRESS * * * 
GRANTED PETITIONER A RIGHT * * * . STATE LAWS ARE NOT CONTROLLING 
IN DETERMINING WHAT THE INCIDENTS OF THIS FEDERAL RIGHT SHALL BE.' 
CHIEF JUSTICE HOLMES, IN DAVIS V. WECHSLER, 263 U.S. 22 (1923), 
[FN23] PUT IT SUCCINCTLY: WHATEVER SPRINGES THE STATE MAY SET FORT 
THOSE WHO ARE ENDEAVORING TO ASSERT RIGHTS THAT THE STATE CONFERS, 
THE ASSERTION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS, WHEN PLAINLY AND REASONABLY MADE, 
IS NOT TO BE DEFEATED UNDER THE NAME OF LOCAL PRACTICE. WE WILL 
QUOTE MERELY TWO OTHER CASES TO SUPPORT TO PROPOSITION THAT 
CONGRESS MAY, CONSTITUTIONALLY, IMfiOS«-CERTATjri?R0eEBeRAL BURDENS 
^^ON-f;TftTF^^m^TF~'Tr^^PrTP~,,ra-^»P"TE^T .THF.TffTTPgqy*^ *^ 1"^ ^^ ""'^  «*•' 
JNDIAN .CHILDREN, .INDIAN-PARENTS.,„AND^INDIAN^^rRIBE&-I^ -STATE-OOURT 
PROCEEDINGS '^OR—CHILD CUSTODY i—*HE~ COURT r~TN —AMERICAN RAILWAY 
EXPRESS CO. V. LEVEE. 263 U.S. 19 (1923), [FN24] HELD THAT: THE 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BE EVADED BY THE FORMS OF LOCAL 
PRACTICE * * * . SHE^iiOCALP^i^SfES^PPLIED-ASiTO-THE-BURDEN-t>F-PROOF 
NABROWED -THE-=PROTECTION- THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD SECURED (UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW), AND THEREFORE CONTRAVENED THE LAW. AND FINALLY, IN 
AN EXTENSIVE QUOTE FROM THE LANDMARK DECISION OF THE COURT, IN 
SECOND EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY CASES, 223 U.S. 1 (1912), WE EXAMINE 
THE DUTY OF STATE COURTS, OTHERWISE HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE 
SUBJECT MATTER, TO ENFORCE FEDERAL SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS: WE COME NEXT 
TO CONSIDER WHETHER RIGHTS ARISING FROM CONGRESSIONAL ACT MAY BE 
ENFORCED, AS OF RIGHT, IN THE COURTS OF THE STATES WHEN THEIR 
JURISDICTION, AS PRESCRIBED BY LOCAL LAW, IS ADEQUATE TO THE 
OCCASION * * * . (THE STATE COURT WAS OF THE OPINION THAT IT COULD 
DECLINE TO ENFORCE THE FEDERAL RIGHT) BECAUSE * * * IT WOULD BE 
INCONVENIENT AND CONFUSING FOR THE SAME COURT, IN DEALING WITH 
CASES OF THE SAME GENERAL CLASS, TO APPLY IN SOME THE STANDARD OF 
RIGHT ESTABLISHED BY CONGRESSIONAL ACT AND IN OTHERS THE DIFFERENT 
STANDARDS RECOGNIZED BY THE LAWS OF THE STATE. * * * IT NEVER HAS 
BEEN SUPPOSED THAT COURTS ARE AT LIBERTY TO DECLINE COGNIZANCE OF 
CASES MERELY BECAUSE THE RULES OF LAW TO BE APPLIED IN THEIR 
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CONCLUSION 
UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE, THIS COMMITTEE HAS BEEN CHARGED 
WITH THE INITIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN IMPLEMENTING THE PLENARY POWER 
OVER, AND RESPONSIBILITY TO, THE INDIAN AND INDIAN TRIBES. IN THE 
EXERCISE OF THAT RESPONSIBILITY, THE COMMITTEE HAS NOTED A GROWING 
CRISIS WITH RESPECT TO THE BREAKUP OF INDIAN FAMILIES AND THE 
PLACEMENT OF INDIAN CHILDREN, AT AN ALARMING RATE, WITH NON-INDIAN 
FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE HOMES. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN 
THE FAILURE OF STATE OFFICIALS, AGENCIES, AND PROCEDURES TO TAKE 
INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF INDIAN 
FAMILIES AND THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF THE INDIAN TRIBE IN 
PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE INDIAN FAMILY AS THE WELLSPRING OF 
ITS OWN FUTURE. WHILE THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT FEEL THAT IT IS 
NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE TO OUST THE STATES OF THEIR TRADITIONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILDREN FALLING WITHIN THEIR GEOGRAPHIC 
LIMITS, IT DOES FEEL THE NEED TO ESTABLISH MINIMUM FEDERAL 
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS. IN STATE, INDIAN- CHTLD CUSTODY 
PROPFFnTNGS DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AS AN 
INDIAN. THE INDIAN FAMILY AND THE INDIAN TRIBE. 
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 
AS AMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE, THE LEGISLATION COMPLETELY 
REWRITES S. 1214 AS PASSED BY THE SENATE. IN ADDITION, THE 
AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R. 12533, AS FURTHER 
AMENDED, DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM H.R. 12533 AS INTRODUCED. THE 
FOLLOWING IS A SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL AS REPORTED 
WITH APPROPRIATE EXPLANATIONS. 
SECTION 1 
SECTION 1 PROVIDES THAT THE BILL MAY BE CITED AS THE 'INDIAN 
CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978'. 
SECTION 2 
SECTION 2 CONTAINS CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS. AS AMENDED, IT 
LAYS THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE 
CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE IN THE FIELD OF INDIAN CHILD WELFARE. 
SECTION 3 
SECTION 3 CONTAINS A CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF POLICY. AS 
AMENDED, THE SECTION MAKES CLEAR THAT THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLE OF 
THE BILL IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE INDIAN CHILD. HOWEVER. THE 
COMMITTEE NOTES THAT THIS LEGAL PRINCIPLE IS VAGUE. AT BEST. IN 
A FOOTNOTE ON PAGE 835 IN THE DECISION OF SMITH V. OFFER, 431 U.S. 
820 (1977) , THE SUPREME COURT STATED: MOREOVER, JUDGES TOO MAY FIND 
IT DIFFICULT, IN UTILIZING VAGUE STANDARDS LIKE 'THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD', TO AVOID DECISIONS RESTING ON SUBJECTIVE VALUES.' 
SECTION 4 
SECTION 4 DEFINES VARIOUS TERMS USED IN THE BILL. PARAGRAPH 
(1) DEFINES THE TERM 'CHILD CUSTODY PLACEMENT' BY DEFINING FOUR 
DISCRETE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS INCLUDING WITHIN THE TERM. S. 1214 AND 
H.R. 12533, AS INTRODUCED, USED THE TERM 'PLACEMENT' WHICH PROVED 
TO BE AMBIGUOUS WITH RESPECT TO THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE BILL. 
THE TERMS MAY NOT BE CURRENT IN THE LEGAL LEXICON OF DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS AND MIGHT HAVE SOME DIFFERENT OR OVERLAPPING MEANING IN 
NORMAL USAGE. THE TERMS ARE INTENDED TO HAVE THE MEANING GIVEN TO 
THEM IN THE PARAGRAPH. PARAGRAPH (2) DEFINES THE TERM 'EXTENDED 
FAMILY MEMBER'. THE CONCEPT OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY MAINTAINS ITS 
VITALITY AND STRENGTH IN THE INDIAN COMMUNITY. BY CUSTOM AND 
TRADITION, IF NOT NECESSITY, MEMBERS OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY HAVE 
DEFINITE RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES IN ASSISTING IN CHILD-
REARING. YET, MANY NON-INDIAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AGENCIES HAVE 
TENDED TO VIEW CUSTODY OF AN INDIAN CHILD BY A MEMBER OF THE 
EXTENDED FAMILY AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF PARENTAL NEGLECT. IT 
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE CONCEPT WAS NOT UNKNOWN IN THE NON-INDIAN 
WORLD. JUSTICE BRENNAN, IN HIS CONCURRING OPINION IN MOORE V. EAST 
CLEVELAND, 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1977); NOTED: IN TODAY'S AMERICAN, 
THE 'NUCLEAR FAMILY' IS THE PATTERN SO OFTEN FOUND IN MUCH OF WHITE 
SUBURBIA * * * . THE CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE INTERPRETED, HOWEVER, 
TO TOLERATE THE IMPOSITION BY GOVERNMENT UPON THE REST OF US WHITE 
SUBURBIA'S PREFERENCE IN PATTERNS OF FAMILY LIVING. THE 'EXTENDED 
FAMILY' * * * REMAINS NOT MERELY STILL A PERVASIVE LIVING PATTERN, 
BUT UNDER GOAD OF BRUTAL ECONOMIC NECESSITY, A PROMINENT PATTERN— 
VIRTUALLY A MEANS OF SURVIVAL— FOR LARGE NUMBERS OF THE POOR AND 
DEPRIVED MINORITIES OF OUR SOCIETY. PARAGRAPH (3) DEFINES 'INDIAN' 
AS ANY PERSON WHO IS A MEMBER OF AN INDIAN TRIBE. PARAGRAPH (4) 
DEFINES 'INDIAN CHILD.' THE COMMITTEE REJECTS THE USE OF THE TERM 
'MERELY' BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO QUALIFY THE ELIGIBILITY 
OF AN INDIAN TO BE A MEMBER OF AN INDIAN TRIBE, PARTICULARLY WITH 
RESPECT TO A MINOR. BLOOD RELATIONSHIP IS THE VERY TOUCHSTONE OF 
A PERSON'S RIGHT TO SHARE IN THE CULTURAL AND PROPERTY BENEFITS OF 
AN INDIAN TRIBE. WE DO NOTE THAT, FOR AN ADULT INDIAN, THERE IS 
AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF EXPATRIATION FROM ONE'S TRIBE. U.S. EX REL. 
STANDING BEAR V. CROOK, 25 FED.CAS.NO. 14891 (1879). HOWEVER, THIS 
RIGHT HAS NO RELEVANCE TO AN INDIAN CHILD WHO, BECAUSE OF HIS 
MINORITY, DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO MAKE A REASONED DECISION 
ABOUT EXERCISING HIS RIGHT TO ENROLL IN HIS TRIBE. PARAGRAPH (5) 
DEFINES 'INDIAN CHILD'S TRIBE.' IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE APPROPRIATE 
OFFICIAL CAN MAKE A REASONABLE JUDGMENT ABOUT WHICH INDIAN TRIBE 
THE INDIAN CHILD HAS THE MORE SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS IN CASES WHERE 
THE CHILD IS ELIGIBLE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN MORE THAN ONE TRIBE. 
PARAGRAPH (6) DEFINES 'INDIAN CUSTODIAN.' WHERE THE CUSTODY OF AN 
INDIAN CHILD IS LODGED WITH SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE PARENTS UNDER 
FORMAL CUSTOM OR LAW OF THE TRIBE OR UNDER STATE LAW, NO PROBLEM 
ARISES. BUT, BECAUSE OF THE EXTENDED FAMILY CONCEPT IN THE INDIAN 
COMMUNITY, PARENTS OFTEN TRANSFER PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE INDIAN 
CHILD TO SUCH EXTENDED FAMILY MEMBER ON AN INFORMAL BASIS, OFTEN 
FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME AND AT GREAT DISTANCES FROM THE 
PARENTS. WHILE SUCH A CUSTODIAN MAY NOT HAVE RIGHTS UNDER STATE 
LAW, THEY DO HAVE RIGHTS UNDER INDIAN CUSTOM WHICH THIS BILL SEEKS 
TO PROTECT, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO PROTECT THE PARENTAL INTERESTS 
OF THE PARENTS. PARAGRAPH (7) DEFINES 'INDIAN ORGANIZATION'. 
PARAGRAPH (8) DEFINES 'INDIAN TRIBE'. PARAGRAPH (9) DEFINES 
'PARENT'. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE LAST SENTENCE IS NOT MEANT 
TO CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN STANLEY V. 
ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). [FN25] PARAGRAPH (10) DEFINES THE 
TERM 'RESERVATION'. FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF JURISDICTION OVER 
INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS, THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE 
PARAGRAPH ADDRESSES AND VARIES THE HOLDING IN CASES SUCH AS 
DECOTEAU V. DISTRICT COURT, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), [FN26] AND 
ROSEBUD V. KNEIP, 97 S.CT. 1361 (1977). PARAGRAPH (11) DEFINES 
'SECRETARY' AS THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. PARAGRAPH (12) 
DEFINES 'TRIBAL COURT'. 
SECTION 101 
SUBSECTION (A) PROVIDES THAT AN INDIAN TRIBE SHALL HAVE 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS WHERE THE 
INDIAN CHILD IS RESIDING OR DOMICILED ON THE RESERVATION, UNLESS 
FEDERAL LAW HAS VESTED THAT JURISDICTION IN THE STATE. IT FURTHER 
PROVIDES THAT THE DOMICILE OF AN INDIAN CHILD WHO IS THE WARD OF 
A TRIBAL COURT IS DEEMED TO BE THAT OF THE COURT, WHICH IS 
GENERALLY IN ACCORD WITH EXISTING LAW. THE PROVISIONS ON EXCLUSIVE 
TRIBAL JURISDICTION CONFIRMS THE DEVELOPING FEDERAL AND STATE CASE 
LAW HOLDING THAT THE TRIBE HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION WHEN THE 
CHILD IS RESIDING OR DOMICILED ON THE RESERVATION. WISCONSIN 
POTAWATOMIES V. HOUSTON, 393 F.SUPP. 719 (1973); WAKEFIELD V. 
LITTLE LIGHT, 276 MD. 333 (1975) ; IN RE MATTER OF GREYBULL, 543 
P.2D 1079 (1975); DUCKHEAD V. ANDERSON ET AL. , WASH. SUP. CT. , 
NOVEMBER 4, 1976. SUBSECTION (B) DIRECTS A STATE COURT, HAVING 
JURISDICTION OVER AN INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDING TO TRANSFER 
SUCH PROCEEDINGS, ABSENT GOOD CAUSE TO THE CONTRARY, TO THE 
APPROPRIATE TRIBAL COURT UPON THE PETITION OF THE PARENTS OR THE 
INDIAN TRIBE. EITHER PARENT IS GIVEN THE RIGHT TO VETO SUCH 
TRANSFER. THE SUBSECTION IS INTENDED TO PERMIT A STATE COURT TO 
.APPLY A MODIFIED DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS, IN APPROPRIATE 
'gASF.Sf TO INSURE THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AS AN INDIAN, THE 
INDIAN PARENTS OR CUSTODIAN. AND THE TRIBE ARE FULLY PROTECTED. 
SUBSECTION (C) , F«EaaRURBOSE&^ 0^ -«STATE - PROCEEDINGS ~FOR~'FOSTER~XaERE 
PLACEMENT OR^-SERMINAXION^OEftJailfiNSA^^ 
TW^ ERVENTXPN--TTPQM T^HR-,T'M"TM1 •gTTfiTOnf A*W~"AND * THE" INDIAN ' CHILTT^ S* 
T^ RSBE* THE COMMITTEE IS ADVISED THAT THE PARENTS WOULD HAVE THIS 
RIGHT IN ANY EVENT. SUBSECTION (D) PROVIDES THAT THE PUBLIC ACTS, 
RECORDS, AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF AN INDIAN TRIBE WITH RESPECT 
TO CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE GIVEN FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
BY OTHER JURISDICTIONS TO THE SAME EXTENT THAT SUCH JURISDICTIONS 
EXTEND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. 
SECTION 102 
SUBSECTION (A) REQUIRES THAT, IN AN INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDING IN 
STATE COURTS WITH RESPECT TO AN INDIAN CHILD, THE MOVING PARTY MUST 
PROVIDE CERTAIN NOTICES TO THE PARENT OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN AND THE 
TRIBE. IN LIEU NOTICE TO THE OF THE INTERIOR IS PROVIDED IN CASES 
WHERE THE LOCATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR TRIBE CANNOT REASONABLY BE 
DETERMINED. THE COMMITTEE EXPECTS THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD MAKE 
DILIGENT EFFORTS TO RELAY SUCH NOTICE TO THE PARENT, CUSTODIAN, 
AND/OR TRIBE. THE SUBSECTION WAS AMENDED TO PROVIDE THAT THE COURT 
WOULD REQUIRE SUCH NOTICE WHERE IT HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE INDIAN AFFILIATION OF THE CHILD. SUBSECTION (B) 
PROVIDES THAT AN INDIGENT PARENT OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN SHALL HAVE A 
RIGHT TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN ANY INVOLUNTARY STATE 
PROCEEDING FOR FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS. WHERE STATE LAWS MAKES NO PROVISION FOR SUCH APPOINTMENT, 
THE SECRETARY IS AUTHORIZED, SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, 
TO PAY REASONABLE EXPENSES AND FEES OF SUCH COUNSEL. IN ADOPTING 
THIS AMENDMENT, THE COMMITTEE NOTES WITH APPROVAL THE DECISION OF 
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA IN 
DAVIS V. PAGE, 442 F.SUPP. 258 (1977), WHEREIN THE COURT HELD: 
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF COUNSEL, HILARY DAVIS WAS LITTLE MORE THAN A 
SPECTATOR IN THE ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDING. SHE WAS IGNORANT OF THE 
LAW OF EVIDENCE, AND OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW GOVERNING DEPENDENCY 
PROCEEDINGS. SHE SAT SILENTLY THROUGH MOST OF THE HEARING, AND 
FEARFUL OF ANTAGONIZING THE SOCIAL WORKERS, RELUCTANTLY CONSENTED 
TO WHAT SHE BELIEVED WOULD BE THE PLACEMENT OF HER CHILD WITH THE 
STATE FOR A FEW WEEKS. (P. 260.) THE RIGHT TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE 
FAMILY IS AMONG THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT. (P. 261.) THE PARENT'S INTEREST IN THE CUSTODY AND 
COMPANIONSHIP OF HIS CHILD AND THE GRIEVOUS NATURE OF THE LOSS 
WHICH ACCOMPANIES INTERFERENCE WITH THAT INTEREST SUFFICE TO 
MANDATE THE PROVISION OF COUNSEL UNDER A BALANCE OF INTEREST TEST 
WITHOUT FURTHER INQUIRY * * * . (THE RIGHT OF COUNSEL INEVITABLY 
EMERGES AS AN ELEMENT OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. (P. 263.) 
SUBSECTION (C) PROVIDES THAT EACH PARTY TO A STATE COURT PROCEEDING 
FOR FOSTER CARE OF TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS SHALL HAVE A 
RIGHT TO EXAMINE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE COURT UPON WHICH 
IT MAY BASE ITS DECISION. THE COMMITTEE WAS ADVISED THAT, IN MANY 
CASES, INDIAN PARENTS OR CUSTODIANS HAVE BEEN, PRACTICALLY, DENIED 
THE RIGHT. SUBSECTION (D) PROVIDES THAT A PARTY SEEKING FOSTER CARE 
PLACEMENT OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS INVOLVING AN INDIAN 
CHILD MUST SATISFY THE COURT THAT ACTIVE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO 
PROVIDE ASSISTANCE DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE BREAKUP OF INDIAN 
FAMILIES. THE COMMITTEE IS ADVISED THAT MOST STATE LAWS REQUIRE 
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE AGENCIES INVOLVED IN CHILD PLACEMENTS TO RESORT 
TO REMEDIAL MEASURES PRIOR TO INITIATING PLACEMENT OR TERMINATION 
PROCEEDINGS, BUT THAT THESE SERVICES ARE RARELY PROVIDED. THIS 
SUBSECTION IMPOSES A FEDERAL REQUIREMENT IN THAT REGARD WITH 
RESPECT TO INDIAN CHILDREN AND FAMILIES. SUBSECTIONS (E) AND (F) 
ESTABLISH EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS FOR FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT OR 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS. AS INTRODUCED, H.R. 12533 REQUIRED 
A 'BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT' STANDARD FOR BOTH ACTIONS. WHILE THE 
COMMITTEE FEELS THAT THE REMOVAL OF A CHILD FROM THE PARENTS IS A 
PENALTY AS GREAT, IF NOT GREATER, THAN A CRIMINAL PENALTY, IT 
AMENDED THE BILL TO REDUCE THE STANDARD TO 'CLEAR AND CONVINCING' 
IN THE CASE OF FOSTER CARE WHERE PARENTAL RIGHTS ARE NOT 
TERMINATED. THE PHRASE 'QUALIFIED EXPERT WITNESSES' IS MEANT TO 
APPLY TO EXPERTISE BEYOND THE NORMAL SOCIAL WORKER QUALIFICATIONS. 
SECTION 103 
SUBSECTION (A) PROVIDES THAT CONSENT TO FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT 
OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS MUST BE EXECUTED IN WRITING 
BEFORE A JUDGE OF A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION AND THAT THE 
JUDGE MUST BE SATISFIED THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH CONSENT WAS FULLY 
UNDERSTOOD BY THE PARENT OR CUSTODIAN. WHERE THE JUDGE DETERMINES 
THE PARENT OR CUSTODIAN DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT COMMAND OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, IT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED INTO A LANGUAGE SUCH 
PERSON DOES UNDERSTAND. THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT INTEND THAT THE 
EXECUTION OF THE CONSENT NEED BE IN OPEN COURT WHERE 
CONFIDENTIALITY IS REQUESTED OR INDICATED. SUBSECTION (B) PERMITS 
A PARENT OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN TO WITHDRAW CONSENT TO A FOSTER CARE 
PLACEMENT AT ANY TIME. SUBSECTION (C) AUTHORIZES A PARENT OR INDIAN 
CUSTODIAN TO WITHDRAW CONSENT TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OR 
ADOPTIVE PLACEMENT OF AN -INDIAN CHILD AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO THE 
ENTRY OF A FINAL DECREE. SUBSECTION (D) AUTHORIZES THE SETTING 
ASIDE OF A FINAL DECREE OF ADOPTION OF AN INDIAN CHILD UPON 
PETITION OF THE PARENT UPON GROUNDS THAT CONSENT THERETO WAS 
OBTAINED THROUGH FRAUD OR DURESS. THIS RIGHT IS LIMITED TO 2 YEARS 
AFTER ENTRY OF THE DECREE, UNLESS A LONGER PERIOD IS PROVIDED UNDER 
STATE LAW. WITH RESPECT TO SUBSECTIONS (B) , (C) , AND (D) , THE 
COMMITTEE NOTES THAT NOTHING IN THOSE SUBSECTIONS PREVENTS AN 
APPROPRIATE PARTY OR AGENCY FROM INSTITUTING AN INVOLUNTARY 
PROCEEDING, SUBJECT TO SECTION 102, TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF THE 
CHILD, BUT DOES NOT WISH TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS ROUTINELY INVITING 
SUCH ACTIONS. 
SECTION 104 
SECTION 104 AUTHORIZES THE CHILD, PARENT, OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN, 
OR THE TRIBE TO MOVE TO SET ASIDE ANY FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT OR 
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE RIGHTS 
SECURED UNDER SECTIONS 101, 102, AND 103 WERE VIOLATED. 
SECTION 105 
SECTION 105, AS A WHOLE, CONTEMPLATES THOSE INSTANCES WHERE 
THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE INDIAN PARENT HAS ALREADY BEEN 
ILRKINATED. THE SECTION SEEKS TO PR01LU1 THE RIGHTS OF THE INDI.V. 
CHILD AS AN INDIAN AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIAN COMMUNITY AND TRIBE 
IN RETAINING ITS CHILDREN IN ITS SOCIETY. SUBSECTION (A) PROVIDES 
THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF GOOD CAUSE TO THE CONTRARY, A PREFERENCE 
SHALL BE GIVEN TO ADOPTIVE PLACEMENT OF AN INDIAN CHILD WITH THE 
EXTENDED FAMILY; A MEMBER OF THE CHILD'S TRIBE; OR ANOTHER INDIAN 
FAMILY. THIS SUBSECTION AND SUBSECTION (B) ESTABLISH A FEDERAL 
POLICY THAT, WHERE POSSIBLE, AN INDIAN CHILD SHOULD REMAIN IN THE 
.INDIAN COMMUNITY, BUT IS NOT TO BE READ AS PRECLUDING THE 
PLACEMENT OF AN INDIAN CHILD WITH A NON-INDIAN FAMILY. SUBSECTION 
(B) ESTABLISHES A SIMILAR PREFERENCE FOR FOSTER CARE OR PREADOPTIVE 
PLACEMENTS OF AN INDIAN CHILD. THE LANGUAGE WAS AMENDED TO CONFORM 
TO LANGUAGE IN H.R. 7200 OF THIS CONGRESS RELATIVE TO FOSTER CARE 
AND ADOPTIVE PLACEMENTS IN THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE SETTINGS. 
SUBSECTION (C) PROVIDES THAT THE TRIBE MAY ESTABLISH A DIFFERENT 
ORDER OF PREFERENCE WHICH WILL BE FOLLOWED IN LIEU OF THE FEDERAL 
STANDARDS AS LONG AS SUCH ORDER IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LEAST 
RESTRICTIVE SETTING STANDARD IN SUBSECTION (B) . WHERE APPROPRIATE, 
THE PREFERENCE OF THE CHILD OR PARENT SHALL BE CONSIDERED AND A 
REQUEST FOR ANONYMITY OF A CONSENTING PARENT SHALL BE GIVEN WEIGHT 
IN APPLYING THE PREFERENCES. WHILE THE REQUEST FOR ANONYMITY 
SHOULD BE GIVEN WEIGHT IN DETERMINING IF A PREFERENCE SHOULD BE 
APPLIED, IT IS NOT MEANT TO OUTWEIGH THE BASIC RIGHT OF THE CHILD 
AS AN INDIAN. SUBSECTION (D) PROVIDES THAT THE STANDARDS TO BE USED 
IN MEETING THE PREFERENCE SHALL BE THOSE PREVAILING IN THE RELEVANT 
INDIAN COMMUNITY. ALL TOO OFTEN, STATE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
AGENCIES, IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT AN INDIAN FAMILY IS FIT FOR 
FOSTER CARE OR ADOPTIVE PLACEMENT OF AN INDIAN CHILD, APPLY A 
WHITE, MIDDLE-CLASS STANDARD WHICH, IN MANY CASES, FORECLOSES 
PLACEMENT WITH THE INDIAN FAMILY. SUBSECTION (E) REQUIRES THE STATE 
TO MAINTAIN RECORDS SHOWING WHAT EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO COMPLY 
WITH THE PREFERENCE STANDARDS OF THIS SECTION AND TO MAKE SUCH 
RECORDS AVAILABLE TO THE TRIBE AND SECRETARY. 
SECTION 106 
SUBSECTION (A) AUTHORIZES A BIOLOGICAL PARENT OF AN INDIAN 
CHILD TO PETITION FOR THE RETURN OF THE CHILD WHEN A PREVIOUS 
ADOPTION OF SUCH CHILD FAILS. THE CHILD SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE 
PARENT UPON SUCH PETITION, UNLESS THERE IS A SHOWING, IN A 
PROCEEDING SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 102, THAT SUCH 
RETURN WOULD NOT BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. SUBSECTION 
(B) PROVIDES THAT WHEN AN INDIAN CHILD IS BEING REMOVED FROM A 
FOSTER CARE HOME FOR PURPOSES OF FURTHER FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT, 
PREADOPTIVE PLACEMENT, OR ADOPTIVE PLACEMENT, SUCH FURTHER 
PLACEMENT SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT, UNLESS 
THE CHILD IS BEING RETURNED TO THE PARENT OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN. 
SECTION 107 
SECTION 107 CONFERS A RIGHT UPON AN ADULT INDIAN, WHO WAS THE 
SUBJECT OF ADOPTION, TO SECURE NECESSARY INFORMATION FROM THE COURT 
WHICH ENTERED THE DECREE TO ENABLE TO THE PERSON TO PROTECT AND 
SECURE ANY RIGHTS HE MAY HAVE FROM HIS TRIBAL AFFILIATION. THERE 
APPEARS TO BE A GROWING TREND IN STATE LAW, SUPPORTED BY DEVELOPING 
PSYCHOLOGY, THAT AN ADOPTED INDIVIDUAL HAS AN INHERENT RIGHT TO 
KNOW HIS GENEALOGICAL BACKGROUND. HOWEVER, THIS SECTION AND 
SECTION 301 ARE NOT AIMED AT THAT RIGHT. THESE PROVISIONS ARE 
AIMED AT DIFFERENT, BUT NO LESS VALUABLE RIGHTS. ONE, THESE 
PROVISIONS WILL HELP PROTECT THE VALUABLE RIGHTS AN INDIVIDUAL HAS 
AS A MEMBER OR POTENTIAL MEMBER OF AN INDIAN TRIBE AND ANY 
COLLATERAL BENEFITS WHICH MAY FLOW FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
BECAUSE OF SUCH MEMBERSHIP. TWO, THESE PROVISIONS WILL HELP 
PROTECT THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF AN INDIAN TRIBE IN HAVING ITS 
CHILDREN REMAIN WITH OR BECOME A PART OF THE TRIBE. 
SECTION 108 
SUBSECTION (A) AUTHORIZES AN INDIAN TRIBE, WHICH BECAME 
SUBJECT TO STATE JURISDICTION UNDER PUBLIC LAW 83-280 OR ANY OTHER 
FEDERAL LAW, TO REASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CHILD CUSTODY 
PROCEEDINGS UPON PETITION TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
INCLUDING A SUITABLE PLAN. SUBSECTION (B) AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY, 
IN CONSIDERING A PETITION FOR REASSUMPTION, TO TAKE INTO 
CONSIDERATION VARIOUS FACTORS AFFECTING THE EXERCISE OF SUCH 
JURISDICTION, INCLUDING MEMBERSHIP ROLLS, SIZE OF RESERVATION OF 
FORMER RESERVATION, AND POPULATION BASE. DEPENDING ON SUCH 
CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SECRETARY IS GIVEN THE FLEXIBILITY TO AUTHORIZE 
PARTIAL RETROCESSION BASED UPON THE REFERRAL AUTHORITY UNDER 
SECTION 101(B) OR TO LIMIT THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE FULL 
EXERCISE OF 101(A) JURISDICTION. THE SUBSECTION WAS ADOPTED AS AN 
AMENDMENT IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS THOSE OCCURRING IN ALASKA AND OKLAHOMA. 
SUBSECTION (C) PROVIDES FOR PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF REASSUMPTION 
BY THE SECRETARY IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER AND FOR THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF SUCH REASSUMPTION. SUBSECTION (D) PROVIDES THAT REASSUMPTION 
SHALL NOT AFFECT ONGOING PROCEEDINGS AT THE TIME OF REASSUMPTION 
UNLESS PROVIDED FOR IN AN AGREEMENT UNDER SECTION 109. 
SECTION It) 9 
SECTION 109 AUTHORIZES INDIAN TRIBES AND STATES TO ENTER INTO 
MUTUAL AGREEMENTS OR COMPACTS WITH RESPECT TO JURISDICTION OVER 
INDIAN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS AND RELATED MATTERS. IT ALSO 
PROVIDES FOR REVOCATION OF SUCH AGREEMENTS BY THE PARTIES. 
SECTION 110 
SECTION 110 ESTABLISHES A 'CLEAN HANDS' DOCTRINE WITH RESPECT 
TO PETITIONS IN STATE COURT FOR THE CUSTODY OF AN INDIAN CHILD BY 
A PERSON WHO IMPROPERLY HAS SUCH CHILD IN PHYSICAL CUSTODY. IT IS 
AIMED AT THESE PERSONS WHO IMPROPERLY SECURE OR IMPROPERLY RETAIN 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE PARENT OR INDIAN 
CUSTODIAN AND WITHOUT THE SANCTION OF LAW. IT IS INTENDED TO BAR 
SUCH PERSON FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THEIR WRONGFUL CONDUCT IN A 
SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR CUSTODY. THE CHILD IS TO BE RETURNED TO 
THE PARENT OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN BY THE COURT UNLESS SUCH RETURN 
WOULD RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL AND IMMEDIATE PHYSICAL DANGER OR THREAT 
OF PHYSICAL DANGER TO THE CHILD. IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT ANY SUCH 
SHOWING BE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL PETITIONER. 
SECTION 111 
SECTION 111 PROVIDES THAT, WHERE STATE LAW AFFORDS A HIGHER 
DEGREE OF PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARENT OR INDIAN 
CUSTODIAN, SUCH STANDARD WILL BE APPLIED BY THE STATE COURT IN LIEU 
OF THE RELATED PROVISION OF THIS TITLE. THE SECTION WAS AMENDED BY 
THE COMMITTEE TO INCLUDE ANY RELEVANT PROTECTION OR STANDARD 
ESTABLISHED UNDER FEDERAL LAW. 
SECTION 112 
SECTION 112 WOULD PERMIT, UNDER APPLICABLE STATE LAW, THE 
EMERGENCY REMOVAL OF AN INDIAN CHILD FROM HIS PARENT OR INDIAN 
CUSTODIAN OR EMERGENCY PLACEMENT OF SUCH CHILD IN ORDER TO PREVENT 
IMMINENT PHYSICAL HARM TO THE CHILD NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS 
OF THIS TITLE. SUCH EMERGENCY REMOVAL AND/OR PLACEMENT IS TO 
CONTINUE ONLY FOR A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME AND THE COMMITTEE 
EXPECTS THAT THE APPROPRIATE STATE OFFICIAL OR AUTHORITY WOULD TAKE 
EXPEDITIOUS ACTION TO RETURN THE CHILD TO THE PARENT OR CUSTODIAN ;-
TRANSFER JURISDICTION TO THE APPROPRIATE TRIBE; OR INSTITUTE A 
PROCEEDING SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THIS TITLE. 
SECTION 113 
SECTION 113 PROVIDES FOR THE ORDERLY PHASING IN OF THE EFFECT 
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS TITLE. AS AMENDED, IT PROVIDES THAT NONE 
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS TITLE, EXCEPT SECTION 101(A), WOULD APPLY 
TO ANY STATE ACTION FOR FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT; FOR TERMINATION OF 
PARENTAL RIGHTS; FOR PREADOPTIVE PLACEMENT; OR FOR ADOPTIVE 
PLACEMENT WHICH WAS INITIATED OR COMPLETED PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF 
THIS ACT. HOWEVER, IT IS INTENDED THAT THE PROVISIONS WOULD APPLY 
TO ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCRETE PHASE OF THE SAME MATTER OR WITH RESPECT 
TO THE SAME CHILD INITIATED AFTER ENACTMENT. FOR INSTANCE, IF THE 
FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT OF AN INDIAN CHILD WAS INITIATED OR COMPLETED 
PRIOR TO ENACTMENT AND THEN, SUBSEQUENT TO ENACTMENT, THE CHILD WAS 
REPLACED FOR FOSTER CARE, OR AN ACTION FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS WAS INITIATED, OR THE CHILD WAS PLACED IN A PREADOPTIVE 
SITUATION, OR HE WAS PLACED FOR ADOPTION, THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 
WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO THOSE SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS. 
SECTION 201 
SUBSECTION (A) AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY TO MAKE GRANTS TO 
INDIAN TRIBES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO FUND INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY 
SERVICE PROGRAMS ON OR NEAR THE RESERVATION AND LISTS 
NONEXCLUSIONARY SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED IN SUCH PROGRAMS. 
SUBSECTION (B) PERMITS TRIBES AND ORGANIZATIONS TO USE SUCH GRANT 
MONEY FOR NON-FEDERAL MATCHING SHARE WITH RESPECT TO TITLES IV-B 
AND XX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OR OTHER SIMILAR FEDERAL 
PROGRAMS. IT WOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE THE LICENSING OR APPROVAL OF 
FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE HOMES OR INSTITUTIONS BY INDIAN TRIBES AS 
EQUIVALENT TO STATE LICENSING OR APPROVAL. 
SECTION 202 
SECTION 202 AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY TO MAKE SIMILAR GRANTS 
TO INDIAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR OFF-RESERVATION PROGRAMS. 
SECTION 203 
SECTION 203 AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND THE 
SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE TO ENTER INTO JOINT 
FUNDING AGREEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICE 
PROGRAMS, TO THE EXTENT THAT FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLE BY 
APPROPRIATION ACTS FOR SUCH PURPOSES. THE AUTHORITY OF THE SNYDER 
ACT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1921 (42 STAT. 208) IS MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE 
APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS FOR GRANTS TO TRIBES AND ORGANIZATIONS. 
SECTION 204 
SECTION 204 PROVIDES THAT, SOLELY WITH RESPECT TO SECTIONS 202 
AND 203 OF THIS ACT, 'INDIAN' SHALL HAVE THE MEANING ASSIGNED TO 
IT IN SECTION 4(C) OF THE INDIAN HEALTH CARE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 
1976 (90 STAT. 1400, 1401). 
SECTION 301 
SUBSECTION (A) PROVIDES THAT ANY STATE COURT ENTERING A FINAL 
DECREE OF ADOPTION OF AN INDIAN CHILD AFTER THE DATE OF ENACTMENT 
OF THIS ACT SHALL PROVIDE A COPY OF SUCH DECREE TOGETHER WITH 
CERTAIN OTHER BASIC INFORMATION TO THE SECRETARY, INCLUDING ANY 
AFFIDAVIT OF A PARENT REQUESTING ANONYMITY. THE SECRETARY IS 
REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SUCH INFORMATION AND RECORDS AND TO INSURE 
THAT SUCH INFORMATION IS KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. THE SUBSECTION 
PROVIDES THAT SUCH INFORMATION SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION ACT. SUBSECTION (B) PROVIDES THAT, UPON REQUEST OF 
AN ADOPTED INDIAN CHILD OVER 18; AN "ADOPTIVE OR FOSTER PARENT OF 
AN INDIAN CHILD; OR AN INDIAN CHILD'S TRIBE, THE SECRETARY SHALL 
RELEASE SUCH INFORMATION AS MAY BE NECESSARY FOR ENROLLMENT OF THE 
CHILD OR FOR OTHERWISE PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AS AN 
INDIAN. WHERE THE BIOLOGICAL PARENT HAS REQUESTED ANONYMITY, THE 
SECRETARY IS AUTHORIZED TO CERTIFY TO AN INDIAN TRIBE THE 
ELIGIBILITY OF AN INDIAN CHILD UNDER THE TRIBE'S MEMBERSHIP 
CRITERIA WITHOUT DISCLOSING THE IDENTITY OF THE PARENTS, IF SUCH 
CERTIFICATION IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE TRIBE. 
SECTION 302 
SECTION 302 ESTABLISHES TIMETABLES AND CONSULTING REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE SECRETARIAL PROMULGATION OF REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THIS 
ACT. 
SECTION 401 
SLZZIOi: 4 01 DIRECTS THE SECRETARY TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS ON THE FEASIBILITY OF PROVIDING INDIAN CHILDREN WITH 
SCHOOLS LOCATED NEAR THEIR HOMES. THE COMMITTEE WAS INFORMED OF 
THE DEVASTATING IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL BOARDING SCHOOL SYSTEM ON 
INDIAN FAMILY LIFE AND ON INDIAN CHILDREN, PARTICULARLY THOSE 
CHILDREN IN THE ELEMENTARY GRADES AND CONSIDERS THAT IT IS IN THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF INDIAN CHILDREN THAT THEY BE AFFORDED THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO LIVE AT HOME WHILE ATTENDING SCHOOL. IT IS NOTED 
THAT MORE THAN 10,000 NAVAJO CHILDREN IN GRADES 1 TO 8 ARE BOARDED. 
SECTION 402 
SECTION 402 REQUIRES THE SECRETARY, WITHIN 60 DAYS AFTER 
ENACTMENT, TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE NOTICE AND INFORMATION ABOUT THIS 
ACT AND ITS PROVISIONS TO APPROPRIATE STATE OFFICIALS. 
SECTION 403 
SECTION 403 PROVIDES THAT IF ANY PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT IS 
HELD INVALID, THE REMAINING PROVISIONS SHALL NOT BE AFFECTED 
THEREBY. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION IS THE OUTGROWTH OF 
HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED IN THE 93D, 94TH, AND 95TH 
CONGRESS. IN 1974, THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS OF THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, AT THE URGING OF 
INDIAN TRIBES AND ORGANIZATIONS, CONDUCTED OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON 
THE REMOVAL OF INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND THE 
PLACEMENT OF SUCH CHILDREN IN FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE HOMES. TESTIMONY 
WAS TAKEN FROM A WIDE SPECTRUM OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WITNESSES 
WHICH TENDED TO CONFIRM REPORTS OF ABUSES OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIAN 
TRIBES. PARENTS, AND CHILDREN IN THE PROCESS. DURING THE 94TH 
CONGRESS, TASK FORCE IV OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW 
COMMISSION, ESTABLISHED BY THE ACT OF JANUARY 2, 1975 (88 STAT. 
1910), ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENTS. AFTER A 
SERIES OF HEARINGS, THE TASK FORCE REPORT AND FINDINGS SUPPORTED 
THE FINDINGS OF THE SENATE OVERSIGHT HEARINGS. IN THE LATTER PART 
OF 1976 AND EARLY 1977, THE COMMISSION CONSIDERED THE FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MATTERS. 
IN ITS FINAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, THE COMMISSION MADE A NUMBER 
OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ISSUE, MANY OF WHICH HAVE BEEN INCLUDED 
IN H.R. 12533. ON APRIL 1, 1977, SENATOR ABOUREZK INTRODUCED S. 
1214 WHICH WAS REFERRED TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN 
AFFAIRS. ON AUGUST 4, 1977, THE SENATE COMMITTEE HELD HEARINGS ON 
THE BILL, AGAIN, TAKING TESTIMONY FROM THE BROAD SPECTRUM OF 
CONCERNED PARTIES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, INDIAN AND NON- INDIAN. THE 
COMMITTEE ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE AND 
REPORTED THE AMENDED BILL TO THE SENATE ON NOVEMBER 3, 1977 (S. 
REPT. NO. 95- 597). THE BILL PASSED THE SENATE ON NOVEMBER 4, 
77. IN THE HOUSE, S. 1214 WAS REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE ON 
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS. ON FEBRUARY 9 AND MARCH 9, 1978, THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC LANDS HELD HEARINGS ON 
THE BILL, HEARING 8 HOURS OF TESTIMONY FROM 34 WITNESSES. THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE RECEIVED COMMENTS ON S. 1214, EITHER BY ORAL TESTIMONY 
OR WRITTEN COMMUNICATION, FROM 3 EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS; 20 STATES; 
22 NON-INDIAN PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS; 35 INDIAN ORGANIZATIONS; AND 
38 INDIAN TRIBES. ON APRIL 18, 1978, THE SUBCOMMITTEE MARKED UP S. 
1214 AND ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE. THIS 
SUBSTITUTE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INTRODUCED BY MR. UDALL ET AL. AS A 
CLEAN BILL, H.R. 12533. ON JUNE 21, 1978, THE FULL COMMITTEE TOOK 
UP CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGISLATION AND PROCEEDED TO THE MARKUP OF 
H.R. 12533 IN LIEU OF S. 1214. THE COMMITTEE ADOPTED AN AMENDMENT 
IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 12533 WHICH WAS FURTHER 
AMENDED. H.R. 12533, AS AMENDED, WAS REPORTED FROM THE COMMITTEE 
FAVORABLY, BY VOICE VOTE. 
COST AND BUDGET COMPLIANCE 
TITLE II OF THE BILL DIRECTS THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO 
INSTITUTE PROGRAMS FOR CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICE ASSISTANCE. THESE 
PROGRAMS INCLUDE AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT CENTERS ON AND OFF 
RESERVATIONS AND TO PROVIDE A VARIETY OF ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
DIRECTED TOWARD THE STABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE INDIAN FAMILY. 
CBO HAS PROJECTED A COST OF APPROXIMATELY $125 MILLION OVER THE 
NEXT 5 FISCAL YEARS. THE COMMITTEE FEELS THAT THIS ESTIMATE IS 
HIGH AND IS BASED UPON ASSUMPTIONS WHICH ARE PROBABLY NOT VALID, 
BUT IT AGREES THAT THE COSTS WILL NOT EXCEED A TOTAL OF $125 
MILLION. FOR INSTANCE, IT ASSUMES CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILY SERVICE 
CENTERS IN EVERY CASE IN WHICH AN INDIAN RESERVATION OR URBAN AREA 
MIGHT BE ELIGIBLE FOR SUCH CENTER. IN FACT, EXISTING FACILITIES, 
BOTH ON THE RESERVATION AND IN THE URBAN AREAS, WOULD PROBABLY BE 
USED TO HOUSE THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS CONTEMPLATED IN THE BILL. THE 
ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12533 BY THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE FOLLOWS: 
U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 
11, 1978. HON. MORRIS K. UDALL, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND 
INSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: PURSUANT TO SECTION 403 OF THE CONGRESSIONAL 
BUDGET ACT OF 1974, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE HAS PREPARED 
THE ATTACHED COST ESTIMATE FOR H.R. 12533, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE 
ACT OF 1978. SHOULD THE COMMITTEE SO DESIRE, WE WOULD BE PLEASED 
TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS ON THE ATTACHED COST ESTIMATE. 
SINCERELY, ALICE M. RIVLIN, DIRECTOR. 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE 
1. BILL NO.: H.R. 12533. 2. BILL TITLE: INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT OF 1978. 3. BILL STATUS: AS ORDERED REPORTED FROM THE 
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, JUNE 21, 1978. 4. 
BILL PURPOSE: THE PURPOSE OF THIS BILL IS TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS 
FOR PLACEMENT OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE HOMES AND 
TO ESTABLISH GRANTS TO INDIAN TRIBES AND INDIAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR 
THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF INDIAN FAMILY DEVELOPMENT 
CENTERS. H.R. 12533 DOES NOT REQUEST ANY ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS BILL. RATHER, THE ACT STATES THAT THE NEW 
PROGRAMS WILL BE AUTHORIZED UNDER THE ACT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1921 (THE 
SNYDER ACT). THE SNYDER ACT PROVIDES PERMANENT AND OPEN ENDED 
AUTHORIZATION FOR INDIAN PROGRAMS. THIS BILL IS SUBJECT TO 
SUBSEQUENT APPROPRIATION ACTION. 5. COST ESTIMATE: FISCAL YEAR 
1979: MILLIONS ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION . . 
. . .— ESTIMATED COSTS — FISCAL YEAR 1980: ESTIMATED 
ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION 27.6 ESTIMATED COSTS 
6.8 FISCAL YEAR 1981: ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION . . . . 
. 32.3 ESTIMATED COSTS 30.4 FISCAL YEAR 1982: ESTIMATED 
ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION 42.2 ESTIMATED COSTS 
38.2 FISCAL YEAR 1983: ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION . . . . 
. 52.4 ESTIMATED COSTS 45.0 JULY 11, 1978 THE COSTS OF 
THIS BILL FALLS WITHIN BUDGET FUNCTION 500. 6. BASIS FOR ESTIMATE: 
THE PROJECTED COST OF H.R. 12533 IS BASED ON PROGRAMMATIC 
INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS SUPPLIED BY THE BUREAU OF INDIAN 
AFFAIRS (BIA). BELOW ARE THE SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR THIS 
ESTIMATE. (1) THERE ARE 150 POTENTIAL LOCATIONS BOTH ON AND OFF THE 
RESERVATIONS THAT WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO BUILD AND OPERATE A CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT CENTER AS DESCRIBED IN THE BILL. IT WAS ASSUMED BY BIA 
THAT A MAXIMUM OF 30 CENTERS WOULD BE CONSTRUCTED ANNUALLY AT A 
COST IN FISCAL YEAR 1980 OF $658,000 PER CENTER. (2) ONCE BUILT, 
EACH CENTER WOULD BE OPERATED BY A PROFESSIONAL AND SUPPORT STAFF 
OF 15. THE FIRST FULL YEAR COSTS (FISCAL YEAR 1981) COVERING 
OPERATING EXPENSES FOR 30 CENTERS IS ESTIMATED TO BE $7.9 MILLION. 
(3) THE BUILDING COSTS WERE INFLATED BY THE CBO PROJECTION FOR COST 
INCREASES IN THE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING INDUSTRY. THE OTHER EXPENSES 
WERE INFLATED BY THE CBO PROJECTION FOR INCREASES IN THE CPI. (4) 
THE SPENDOUT ON CONSTRUCTION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT CENTER IS SPREAD 
OVER 3 YEARS, WHILE THE SPENDOUT FOR OPERATING EXPENSES IS SPREAD 
OVER A 2-YEAR PERIOD. THE FISCAL YEAR 1980 SPENDOUT IS RELATIVELY 
LOW REFLECTING A LAGTIME FOR PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CENTERS. (5) THIS COST ESTIMATE ASSUMES AN ENACTMENT FOR THIS BILL 
OF OCTOBER 1978 WITH APPROPRIATION ACTION COMPLETED AND REGULATIONS 
ISSUED BY OCTOBER 1979. 7. ESTIMATE COMPARISON: NONE. 8. 
PREVIOUS CBO ESTIMATE: ON NOVEMBER 2, 1977, CBO PREPARED AN 
ESTIMATE ON S. 1214, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1977. THE 
SENATE BILL IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS H.R. 12533. HOWEVER, S. 
1214 DID NOT ASSUME THE USE OF SNYDER ACT AUTHORIZATION AND 
INCLUDED ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION LANGUAGE TO COVER THE PROVISION 
OF THE BILL SETTING AN AUTHORIZATION LEVEL OF $26 MILLION FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 1979. 9. ESTIMATE PREPARED BY DEBORAH KALCEVIC. 10. 
ESTIMATE APPROVED BY JAMES L. BLUM, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR BUDGET 
ANALYSIS. 
INFLATIONARY IMPACT STATEMENT 
AT THE LEVEL OF FUNDING ESTIMATED BY THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, ENACTMENT OF THIS LEGISLATION WOULD HAVE SOME MINIMAL 
INFLATIONARY IMPACT. THIS IMPACT IS LESSENED SINCE THE COST WILL 
BE SPREAD OUT OVER 5 FISCAL YEARS. 
OVERSIGHT STATEMENT 
OTHER THAN NORMAL OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES EXERCISED IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH THESE LEGISLATIVE OPERATIONS, THE COMMITTEE 
CONDUCTED NO SPECIFIC OVERSIGHT HEARINGS AND NO RECOMMENDATIONS 
WERE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO RULE X, CLAUSE 2(B)2. 
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION 
THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, BY A VOICE 
VOTE, RECOMMENDS THAT THE BILL, AS AMENDED, BE ENACTED. 
DEPARTMENTAL REPORTS 
THE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DATED JUNE 6, 
1978, AND THE REPORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATED FEBRUARY 
9, 1978, AND MAY 23, 1978, ARE AS FOLLOWS: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 6, 1978. 
HON. MORRIS K. UDALL, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C. DEAR MR. 
CHAIRMAN: THIS DEPARTMENT WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ITS VIEWS KNOWN ON 
H.R. 12533, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978, AND URGES THE 
COMMITTEE TO MAKE THE RECOMMENDED CHANGES DURING MARKUP OF THE 
BILL. WE UNDERSTAND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS COMMUNICATED ITS 
CONCERN WITH THE BILL TO THE COMMITTEE, AND WE URGE THE COMMITTEE 
TO AMEND THE BILL TO ADDRESS THOSE CONCERNS. IF H.R. 12533 IS 
AMENDED AS DETAILED HEREIN AND AS RECOMMENDED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE'S LETTER OF MAY 23, 1978, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE BILL 
BE ENACTED. TITLE I OF H.R. 12533 WOULD ESTABLISH NATIONWIDE 
PROCEDURES FOR THE HANDLING OF INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENTS. THE BILL 
WOULD VEST IN TRIBAL COURTS THEIR ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED RIGHT TO 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENTS WITHIN THEIR 
RESERVATIONS. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR TRANSFER OF SUCH A 
PROCEEDING FROM A STATE COURT TO A TRIBAL COURT IF THE PARENT OR 
INDIAN CUSTODIAN SO PETITIONS OR IF THE INDIAN TRIBE SO PETITIONS, 
AND IF NEITHER OF THE PARENTS NOR THE CUSTODIAN OBJECTS. 
REQUIREMENTS DEALING WITH NOTICE TO TRIBES AND PARENTS AND CONSENT 
TO CHILD PLACEMENTS ARE ALSO A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE BILL. TESTIMONY 
ON THE PROBLEMS WITH PRESENT INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT THE LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT ON THE PART OF 
MANY INDIAN PARENTS WHO HAVE LOS THEIR CHILDREN. TITLE I WOULD ALSO 
IMPOSE ON STATE COURTS EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO 
BE MET BEFORE AN INDIAN CHILD COULD BE ORDERED REMOVED FROM THE 
CUSTODY OF HIS PARENTS OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN. COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL 
WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE PARENT OR CUSTODIAN UPON A FINDING OF 
INDIGENCY BY THE COURT. THE COURT. STATE COURTS WOULD ALSO BE 
REQUIRED, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 12533, TO APPLY PREFERENCE 
STANDARDS SET FORTH IN SECTION 105 IN THE PLACING OF AN INDIAN 
CHILD. THESE PREFERENCES WOULD STRENGTHEN THE CHANCES OF THE 
INDIAN CHILD STAYING WITHIN THE INDIAN COMMUNITY AND GROWING UP 
WITH A CONSISTENT SET OF CULTURAL VALUES. TITLE II OF H.R. 12533, 
ENTITLED 'INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY PROGRAMS,' WOULD AUTHORIZE THE 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO MAKE GRANTS TO INDIAN TRIBES AND 
ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIAN FAMILY SERVICE 
PROGRAMS BOTH ON AND OFF THE RESERVATION. SECTION 204 WOULD 
AUTHORIZE $26 MILLION FOR THAT PURPOSE. TITLE III OF H.R. 12533, 
ENTITLED 'RECORDKEEPING, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY, AND TIMETABLES, ' 
WOULD DIRECT THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO MAINTAIN RECORDS, IN 
A SINGLE CENTRAL LOCATION, OF ALL INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENTS AFFECTED 
BY THE ACT. THOSE RECORDS WOULD NOT BE OPEN, BUT INFORMATION FROM 
THEM COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO AN INDIAN CHILD OVER AGE 18, TO HIS 
ADOPTIVE OR FOSTER PARENT, OR TO AN INDIAN TRIBE, FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF ASSISTING IN THE ENROLLMENT OF THAT CHILD IN AN INDIAN TRIBE. 
TITLE IV OF H.R. 12533, ENTITLED 'PLACEMENT PREVENTION STUDY,' 
WOULD DIRECT THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT 
TO CONGRESS A PLAN, INCLUDING A COST ANALYSIS STATEMENT, FOR THE 
PROVISION TO INDIAN CHILDREN OF SCHOOLS LOCATED NEAR THEIR HOMES. 
ALTHOUGH WE SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF PROMOTING THE WELFARE OF INDIAN 
CHILDREN, WE URGE THAT THE BILL BE AMENDED IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS. 
SECTION 4(9) DEFINES THE TERM 'PLACEMENT.' THIS DEFINITION IS 
CRUCIAL TO THE CARRYING OUT OF THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE I. WE 
BELIEVE THAT CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS HELD PURSUANT TO A DIVORCE DECREE 
AND DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS WHERE THE ACT COMMITTED WOULD BE A 
CRIME IF COMMITTED BY AN ADULT SHOULD BE EXCEPTED FROM THE 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM 'PLACEMENT'. WE BELIEVE THAT THE 
PROTECTIONS PROVIDED BY THIS ACT ARE NOT NEEDED IN PROCEEDINGS 
BETWEEN PARENTS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE STANDARDS AND 
PREFERENCES HAVE NO RELEVANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF A DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDING. SECTION 101(A) WOULD GRANT TO INDIAN TRIBES EXCLUSIVE 
JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENT PROCEEDINGS. WE BELIEVE 
THAT SECTION 101(A) SHOULD BE AMENDED TO MAKE EXPLICIT THAT AN 
INDIAN TRIBE HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION ONLY IF THE INDIAN CHILD 
IS RESIDING ON THE RESERVATION WITH A PARENT OR CUSTODIAN WHO HAS 
LEGAL CUSTODY. THE BILL DOES NOT ADDRESS THE SITUATION WHFRT: TWO 
PARENTAL VIEWS ARE INVOLVED. THEREFORE, THE DEFINITION OF DOMICILE 
_ISINADEQUATE AND THE USE OF THE WORD" 'PARENT' AS DEFINED DOES NOT 
ARTICULATE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COURTS TO BOTH PARENTS. WE 
BELIEVE THAT RESERVATIONS LOCATED IN STATES SUBJECT" TO PUBLIC LAW 
83-280 SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED FROM SECTION 101(A), SINCE 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 108, REGARDING RETROCESSION OF 
JURISDICTION, DEAL WITH THE REASSUMPTION OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION IN 
THOSE STATES. SECTION 101(B) SHOULD BE AMENDED TO PROHIBIT CLEARLY 
THE TRANSFER OF A CHILD PLACEMENT PROCEEDING TO A TRIBAL COURT WHEN 
ANY PARENT OR CHILD OVER THE AGE OF 12 OBJECTS TO THE TRANSFER. 
SECTION 101(E), REGARDING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO TRIBAL ORDERS, 
SHOULD BE AMENDED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
INTENDED IS THAT WHICH STATES PRESENTLY GIVE TO OTHER STATES. 
SECTION 102(A) WOULD PROVIDE THAT NO PLACEMENT HEARING BE HELD 
UNTIL AT LEAST 30 DAYS AFTER THE PARENT AND THE TRIBE RECEIVE 
NOTICE. WE BELIEVE THAT IN MANY CASES 30 DAYS IS TOO LONG TO DELAY 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH A PROCEEDING. WE SUGGEST THAT THE SECTION 
BE AMENDED TO ALLOW THE PROCEEDING TO BEGIN 10 DAYS AFTER SUCH 
NOTICE WITH A PROVISION ALLOWING THE TRIBE OR PARENT TO REQUEST UP 
TO 20 ADDITIONAL DAYS TO PREPARE A CASE. THIS WOULD ALLOW CASES 
WHERE THE PARENTS OR TRIBE DO NOT WISH A FULL 30 DAYS' NOTICE TO 
BE ADJUDICATED QUICKLY, WHILE STILL AFFORDING TIME TO THE PARENT 
OR TRIBE WHO NEEDS THAT TIME TO PREPARE A CASE. WE ALSO SUGGEST 
THAT THE SECTION BE AMENDED TO REQUIRE THE SECRETARY TO MAKE A GOOD 
FAITH EFFORT TO LOCATE THE PARENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND TO 
PROVIDE FOR SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE PARENT OR INDIAN CUSTODIAN 
CANNOT BE LOCATED. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR 
SPECIFIC EMERGENCY REMOVAL PROVISIONS IN H.R. 12533. A SECTION 
SHOULD BE ADDED ALLOWING THE REMOVAL OF A CHILD FROM THE HOME 
WITHOUT A COURT ORDER WHEN THE PHYSICAL OR EMOTIONAL WELL- BEING 
OF THE CHILD IS SERIOUSLY AND IMMEDIATELY THREATENED. THAT REMOVAL 
SHOULD NOT EXCEED 72 HOURS WITHOUT AN ORDER FROM A COURT OF 
COMPETENT JURISDICTION. SECTION 102(B) WOULD PROVIDE THE PARENT OR 
INDIAN CUSTODIAN OF AN INDIAN CHILD THE RIGHT TO COURT-APPOINTED 
COUNSEL IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT HE OR SHE IS INDIGENT. WE ARE 
OPPOSED TO THE ENACTMENT OF THIS SECTION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT 
THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT DEMONSTRATION OF NEED FOR SUCH A 
PROVISION TO JUSTIFY THE FINANCIAL BURDEN SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD 
BE TO BOTH THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. SECTION 102(C) 
WOULD ALLOW ALL PARTIES TO A PLACEMENT TO EXAMINE ALL DOCUMENTS AND 
FILES UPON WHICH ANY DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THAT PLACEMENT MAY 
BE BASED. THIS PROVISION CONFLICTS WITH THE FEDERAL CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT TREATMENT ACT, PUBLIC LAW 93-247, WHICH PROVIDES 
CONFIDENTIALITY FOR CERTAIN RECORDS IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
CASES. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A BROAD OPENING OF RECORDS WOULD LEAD 
TO LESS REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT. HOWEVER, WE DO 
RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE PARENT TO CONFRONT AND BE GIVEN AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE ANY EVIDENCE WHICH THE COURT MAY USE IN 
DECIDING THE OUTCOME OF A CHILD PLACEMENT PROCEEDING. WE RECOMMEND 
THAT THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT CONFORM WITH THE PROVISIONS OF 
PUBLIC LAW 93-247. SECTION 102(E) OF H.R. 12533 WOULD REQUIRE THE 
STATE COURT TO FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, BEFORE ORDERING THE 
REMOVAL OF THE CHILD FROM THE HOME, THAT CONTINUED CUSTODY ON THE 
PART OF THE PARENT OR CUSTODIAN WILL RESULT IN SERIOUS EMOTIONAL 
OR PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE CHILD. WE BELIEVE THAT THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF IS TOO HIGH. WE WOULD SUPPORT THE LANGUAGE FOUND IN SECTION 
101(B) OF THE SENATE-PASSED S. 1214, WHICH WOULD IMPOSE A BURDEN 
OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WOULD SET DOWN CERTAIN SOCIAL 
CONDITIONS WHICH COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT AS PRIME 
FACIE EVIDENCE OF NEGLECT OR ABUSE. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE 
LANGUAGE 'WILL RESULT' IN SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE CHILD SHOULD BE 
AMENDED TO READ 'IS LIKELY TO RESULT' IN SUCH DAMAGE. IT IS ALMOST 
IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE AT SUCH A HIGH BURDEN OF PROOF THAT AN ACT WILL 
DEFINITELY HAPPEN. SECTION 105 OF H.R. 12533 WOULD IMPOSE ON STATE 
COURTS CERTAIN PREFERENCES IN PLACING AN INDIAN CHILD. SUBSECTION 
(C) WOULD SUBSTITUTE THE PREFERENCE LIST OF THE INDIAN CHILD'S 
TRIBE WHERE THE TRIBE HAS ESTABLISHED A DIFFERENT ORDER OF 
PREFERENCE BY RESOLUTION. LANGUAGE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THAT 
SUBSECTION WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THAT RESOLUTION TO BE PUBLISHED IN 
THE FEDERAL REGISTER AND LATER INCLUDED IN THE CODE OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS. THIS WOULD ALLOW THE STATE COURT EASY ACCESS TO THE 
PREFERENCES OF THE VARIOUS TRIBES. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR WHAT THE LAST 
SENTENCE IN SUBSECTION (C) MEANS IN ALLOWING THE PREFERENCE OF THE 
INDIAN CHILD OR PARENT TO BE CONSIDERED 'WHERE APPROPRIATE'. WE 
BELIEVE THAT THE PREFERENCE OF THE CHILD AND THE PARENT SHOULD BE 
GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THAT 
COURT IS FOLLOWING THE PREFERENCES SET FORTH IN SECTION 105(A) OR 
105(B), OR WHETHER IT IS FOLLOWING A PREFERENCE LIST ESTABLISHED 
BY AN INDIAN TRIBE. THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND THAT A SEPARATE 
SUBSECTION BE ADDED TO SECTION 105 STATING THAT THE PREFERENCES OF 
THE INDIAN CHILD AND OF THE PARENT BE GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION BY 
THE COURT WHENEVER AN INDIAN CHILD IS BEING PLACED. SECTION 106 
DEALS WITH FAILED PLACEMENTS AND REQUIRES THAT, WHENEVER AN INDIAN 
CHILD IS REMOVED FROM A FOSTER HOME OR INSTITUTION IN WHICH THE 
CHILD WAS PLACED FOR THE PURPOSE OF FURTHER PLACEMENT, SUCH REMOVAL 
SHALL BE CONSIDERED A PLACEMENT FOR PURPOSES OF THE ACT. WE SEE 
NO REASON FOR REQUIRING A FULL PROCEEDING EVERY TIME A CHILD IS 
MOVED FROM ONE FORM OF FOSTER CARE TO ANOTHER. WE DO, HOWEVER, 
RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR NOTIFICATION OF THE PARENTS AND THE TRIBE 
OF SUCH MOVE AND FOR APPLYING THE PREFERENCES SET FORTH IN SECTION 
105. THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND THAT SUBSECTION (B) OF SECTION 106 
BE AMENDED TO REQUIRE THE NOTICE AND PREFERENCE PROVISIONS TO APPLY 
WHEN A CHILD IS MOVED FROM ONE FORM OF FOSTER CARE TO ANOTHER AND 
TO REQUIRE THE REMOVAL TO BE CONSIDERED AS A NEW PLACEMENT ONLY IN 
THE CASE WHERE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IS AT ISSUE. SECTION 
107 DEALS WITH THE RIGHT OF AN INDIAN WHO HAS REACHED AGE 18 AND 
WHO HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A PLACEMENT TO LEARN OF HIS OR HER 
TRIBAL AFFILIATION. WE BELIEVE THAT RATHER THAN APPLY TO THE COURT 
FOR SUCH INFORMATION, THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED SHOULD APPLY TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE III, THE 
SECRETARY WOULD MAINTAIN A CENTRAL FILE WITH THE NAME AND TRIBAL 
AFFILIATION OF EACH CHILD SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. 
THEREFORE, THE SECRETARY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY THAN THE STATE COURT 
TO HAVE THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO PROTECT ANY RIGHTS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED WHICH MAY FLOW FOR HIS OR HER TRIBAL 
AFFILIATION. FINALLY, WITH RESPECT TO TITLE I, WE BELIEVE THAT A 
SECTION SHOULD BE ADDED WHICH WOULD STATE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE ACT SHOULD APPLY ONLY WITH RESPECT TO PLACEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
WHICH BEGIN 6 MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE ACT. 
THIS WOULD ALLOW STATES SOME TIME TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT AND WOULD THUS AVOID THE CHANCE OF HAVING 
LARGE NUMBERS OF PLACEMENTS INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO 
FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES OF THE ACT. SUCH A SECTION SHOULD ALSO STATE 
THAT THE INTENT OF THE ACT IS NOT THE PRE- EMPTION BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE WHOLE AREA OF INDIAN CHILD WELFARE AND PLACEMENT. 
IN ANY CASE WHERE A STATE HAS LAWS WHICH ARE MORE PROTECTIVE THAN 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS ACT, E.G., WITH REGARD TO NOTICE AND 
ENFORCEMENT, THOSE LAWS SHOULD APPLY. WE BELIEVE THAT MANY OF THE 
AUTHORITIES GRANTED BY TITLE II OF THE BILL ARE UNNECESSARY BECAUSE 
THEY DUPLICATE AUTHORITIES IN PRESENT LAW, AND THEREFORE, WE 
RECOMMEND THE DELETION OF TITLE II. WE FIND ESPECIALLY 
OBJECTIONABLE IN TITLE II THE FOLLOWING: THE AUTHORIZATION FOR AN 
UNLIMITED SUBSIDY PROGRAM FOR INDIAN ADOPTIVE CHILDREN. WE BELIEVE 
THAT ANY SUCH PROGRAM SHOULD BE LIMITED TO HARD-TO-PLACE CHILDREN 
OR CHILDREN WHO ARE OR WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR FOSTER CARE SUPPORT 
FROM THE BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE AMOUNT 
OF ANY SUCH SUPPORT WOULD HAVE TO BE LIMITED TO THE PREVALENT STATE 
FOSTER CARE RATE FOR MAINTENANCE AND MEDICAL NEEDS. THE 
AUTHORIZATION FOR GRANTS TO ESTABLISH AND OPERATE OFF-RESERVATION 
INDIAN CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICE PROGRAMS. THE NEW SEPARATE 
AUTHORIZATION OF $26 MILLION IN SECTION 203(B) OF TITLE II. THE 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201(C) WHICH WOULD AUTHORIZE EVERY INDIAN 
TRIBE TO CONSTRUCT, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN FAMILY SERVICE FACILITIES 
REGARDLESS OF THE SIZE OF THE TRIBE OR THE AVAILABILITY OF EXISTING 
SERVICES AND FACILITIES. THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF FEDERAL 
FUNDS APPROPRIATED UNDER TITLE II TO BE USED AS THE NON-FEDERAL 
MATCHING SHARE IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER FEDERAL FUNDS. HOWEVER, WE 
BELIEVE THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF SECTION 201(B), PROVIDING THAT 
LICENSING OR APPROVAL BY AN INDIAN TRIBE SHOULD BE DEEMED 
EQUIVALENT TO THAT DONE BY A STATE, SHOULD REMAIN IN THE BILL UNDER 
TITLE I AS A SEPARATE SECTION. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO SECTION 301 
OF TITLE III OF H.R. 12533. WE BELIEVE THAT REQUIRING THE SECRETARY 
TO MAINTAIN A CENTRAL FILE ON INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENTS WILL BETTER 
ENABLE THE SECRETARY TO CARRY OUT HIS TRUST RESPONSIBILITY, 
ESPECIA-LY WHEN JUDGMENT FUNDS ARE TO BE DISTRIBUTED. HOWEVER, WE 
OBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 302(C), WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE 
SECRETARY TO PRESENT ANY PROPOSED REVISION OR AMENDMENT OF RULES 
AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED UNDER THAT SECTION TO BOTH HOUSES OF 
CONGRESS. ANY SUCH PROPOSED REVISION OR AMENDMENT WOULD BE 
PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER AND WE BELIEVE THAT PLACING THIS 
ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ON THE SECRETARY IS BOTH BURDENSOME AND 
UNNECESSARY. WE BELIEVE THAT SECTION 401 OF TITLE IV SHOULD BE 
AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS: SEC. 401. (A) IT IS THE SENSE OF 
CONGRESS THAT THE ABSENCE OF LOCALLY CONVENIENT DAY SCHOOLS MAY 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE BREAKUP OF INDIAN FAMILIES. (B) THE SECRETARY IS 
AUTHORIZED AND DIRECTED TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT TO THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND THE 
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN 1 YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THIS ACT, A REPORT 
ON THE FEASIBILITY OF PROVIDING INDIAN CHILDREN WITH SCHOOLS 
LOCATED NEAR THEIR HOMES. IN DEVELOPING THIS REPORT THE SECRETARY 
SHALL GIVE PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION TO THE PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL 
FACILITIES FOR CHILDREN IN THE ELEMENTARY GRADES. THE OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET HAS ADVISED THAT THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE 
PRESENTATION OF THIS REPORT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM, AND THAT ENACTMENT OF THE HOUSE 
SUBCOMMITTEE'S PRESENT VERSION OF H.R. 12533 WOULD NOT BE 
CONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S OBJECTIVES. SINCERELY, FORREST 
J. GERARD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, 
D.C., FEBRUARY 9, 1978. HON. MORRIS K. UDALL, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE 
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
WASHINGTON, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: THIS IS TO BRING TO YOUR 
ATTENTION SEVERAL AREAS WHERE THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PERCEIVES 
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH S. 1214, A BILL TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS FOR 
THE PLACEMENT OF INDIAN CHILDREN IN A FOSTER OR ADOPTIVE HOMES, TO 
PREVENT THE BREAKUP OF INDIAN FAMILIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 
IN OUR VIEW, CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE BILL RAISES SERIOUS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE FOR DIFFERING 
TREATMENT OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF PERSONS BASED SOLELY ON RACE. S. 
1214 WAS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON NOVEMBER 4, 1977 AND IS NOW 
PENDING IN THE INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDIAN 
AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC LANDS. THIS DEPARTMENT HS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN 
THE HEARINGS RELATING TO THE BILL. OUR COMMENTS THEREFORE ARE 
BASED ON A READING OF THE TEXT OF THE BILL RATHER THAN ON A REVIEW 
OF THE TESTIMONY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY WHICH NECESSARILY WOULD 
BE CONSIDERED BY A COURT WHICH HAD TO INTERPRET ITS PROVISIONS AND 
DETERMINE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY. AS YOU MAY BE AWARE, THE 
COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY RECOGNIZED THAT TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE 
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS OF TRIBAL 
MEMBERS LOCATED ON RESERVATIONS, UNLESS A STATE HAS ASSUMED 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LEGISLATION SUCH AS 
PUBLIC LAW 83-280. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS LEGAL 
PRINCIPLE IS OFTEN IGNORED BY LOCAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS AND 
FOSTER HOMES IN CASES WHERE THEY BELIEVE INDIAN CHILDREN HAVE BEEN 
NEGLECTED, AND THAT S. 1214 IS DESIGNED TO REMEDY THIS, AND TO 
DEFINE THE INDIAN RIGHTS IN SUCH CASES. THE BILL WOULD APPEAR TO 
SUBJECT FAMILY RELATIONS MATTERS OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF PERSONS TO 
THE JURISDICTION OF TRIBAL COURTS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY ADJUDICATED 
IN STATE COURTS. THE BILL WOULD ACCOMPLISH THIS RESULT WITH REGARD 
TO THREE DISTINCT CATEGORIES OF PERSONS, ALL POSSESSING THE COMMON 
TRAIT OF HAVING ENOUGH INDIAN BLOOD TO QUALIFY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN 
A TRIBE. ONE CLASS WOULD BE MEMBERS OF A TRIBE. ANOTHER CLASS 
WOULD BE NONTRIBAL MEMBERS LIVING ON RESERVATIONS, AND A THIRD 
WOULD BE NONMEMBERS LIVING OFF RESERVATIONS. THESE THREE CLASSES 
WOULD BE_DENIED_ACCESS _TO_STATE_COURTS_FOR_ THE-ADJJIDXCATTON OF 
(7FPTATN FAMTT.V PFT.ATTOMS MATTFRS TINT .ESS 'GOOD CAUSF' TS SHOWN TTWnFP 
SECTION 102(C) OF THE BILL. THE GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
RAISED BY S. 1214 IS WHETHER THE DENIAL OF ACCESS TO STATE COURTS 
CONSTITUTES INVIDIOUS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION VIOLATIVE OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT. SEE BOWLING V. SHARP, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). THIS 
QUESTION IS MOST PROPERLY ADDRESSED BY FOCUSING ON EACH OF THE 
THREE CLASSES DESCRIBED ABOVE AND CONTRASTING EACH CLASS WITH A 
SIMILARLY SITUATED CLASS OF PERSONS WHOSE ACCESS TO STATE COURTS 
IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE BILL. THE CLASS OF PERSONS WHOSE RIGHTS 
UNDER THE BILL MAY, IN OUR OPINION, CONSTITUTIONALLY BE 
CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THIS LEGISLATION ARE MEMBERS OF A TRIBE, WHETHER 
LIVING ON OR NEAR A RESERVATION. IN FISHER V. DISTRICT COURT, 424 
U.S. 382 (1976), THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSED AN ARGUMENT MADE BY 
MEMBERS OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE THAT DENIAL TO THEM OF 
ACCESS TO THE MONTANA STATE COURTS TO PURSUE AN ADOPTION DID NOT 
INVOLVE IMPERMISSIBLE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. IN THAT CASE, BOTH 
THE PERSONS SEEKING TO PURSUE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD IN QUESTION AND 
THE NATURAL MOTHER OF THE CHILD WHO CONTESTED THE RIGHT OF THE 
MONTANA COURTS TO ENTERTAIN THE ADOPTION PROCEEDING WERE RESIDENTS 
OF THE RESERVATION AND MEMBERS OF THE TRIBE. THE COURT STATED 
THAT: THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBAL COURT DOES NOT 
DERIVE FROM THE RACE OF THE PLAINTIFF BUT RATHER FROM THE 
QUASI-SOVEREIGN STATUS OF THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE UNDER FEDERAL 
LAW. MOREOVER, EVEN IF A JURISDICTIONAL HOLDING OCCASIONALLY 
RESULTS IN DENYING AN INDIAN PLAINTIFF A FORUM TO WHICH A NON-
INDIAN HAS ACCESS, SUCH DISPARATE TREATMENT OF THE INDIAN IS 
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE IT IS INTENDED TO BENEFIT THE CLASS OF WHICH HE 
IS A MEMBER BY FURTHERING THE CONGRESSIONAL POLICY OF INDIAN 
SELF-GOVERNMENT. MORTON V. MANCARI, 417 U.S. 535, 551-555 (1974). 
[FN28] 424 U.S., AT 390-01. IN FISHER, THE CLASS TO WHICH THE 
COURT WAS APPARENTLY REFERRING CONSISTED OF MEMBERS OF THE NORTHERN 
CHEYENNE TRIBE. THIS IS SO BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S CITATION TO 
MORTON V. MANCARI, IN WHICH THE COURT HAD UPHELD PREFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT SITUATIONS BY REASONING 
THAT THE 'PREFERENCE, AS APPLIED, IS GRANTED TO INDIANS NOT AS A 
DISCRETE RACIAL GROUP, BUT RATHER, AS MEMBERS OF QUASI-SOVEREIGN 
TRIBAL ENTITIES * * * . ' 417 U.S., AT 554. MORE RECENTLY, THE 
COURT HAS REENTERED THIS THICKET IN UNITED SIAT£t> v. ANTZhUVE, 45 
U.S.L.W. 4361 (U.S. APRIL 19, 1977). IN THAT CASE, ENROLLED COEUR 
D'ALESE INDIANS CONTENDED THAT THEIR FEDERAL CONVICTIONS FOR MURDER 
OF A NON- INDIAN ON THE COEUR D'ALESE RESERVATIONS WERE PRODUCTS 
OF INVIDIOUS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE A NON-INDIAN 
PARTICIPATING IN THE SAME CRIME WOULD HAVE BEEN TRIED IN STATE 
COURT AND WOULD HAVE HAD CERTAIN SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGES REGARDING 
THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO BE PROVED FOR CONVICTION. [FN27] THE 
COURT, IN REJECTING THIS CLAIM, HELD THAT THE COEUR D'ALESE INDIANS 
'WERE NOT SUBJECTED TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (UNDER 18 
U.S.C. SEC. 1153) BECAUSE THEY ARE OF THE INDIAN RACE BUT BECAUSE 
THEY WERE ENROLLED EMBERS OF THE COEUR D'ALESE TRIBE.' ID., AT 
4363. WE BELIEVE THAT MANCARI, FISHER, AND ANTELOPE DIRECTLY 
SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THIS BILL AS IT AFFECTS THE ACCESS 
OF TRIBAL MEMBERS TO STATE COURTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THESE CASES 
DO NOT RESOLVE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF S. 1214 AS IT WOULD AFFECT 
THE RIGHTS OF NONTRIBAL MEMBERS LIVING EITHER ON OR OFF 
RESERVATIONS. INDEED, THEY CAN BE READ TO SUGGEST THAT, ABSENT 
TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP, CONGRESS' FREEDOM TO TREAT DIFFERENTLY PERSONS 
HAVING INDIAN BLOOD IS DIMINISHED. WITH REGARD TO NONMEMBERS LIVING 
ON A RESERVATION, A FOOTNOTE IN THE ANTELOPE CASE WOULD APPEAR 
INDIRECTLY TO ADDRESS, BUT NOT RESOLVE, THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY 
THIS BILL: 'IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ENROLLMENT IN AN 
OFFICIAL TRIBE HAS NOT BEEN HELD TO BE AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT FOR 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION, AT LEAST WHERE THE INDIAN DEFENDANT LIVED ON 
THE RESERVATION AND 'MAINTAINED TRIBAL RELATIONS WITH THE INDIANS 
THEREON.' EX PARTE PERO, 99 F.2D 28, 30 (CA 7 1938). SEE ALSO 
UNITED STATES V. IVES, 504 F.2D 935, 953 (CA 9 1974) (DICTA). 
SINCE RESPONDENTS ARE ENROLLED TRIBAL MEMBERS, WE ARE NOT CALLED 
ON TO DECIDE WHETHER NONENROLLED INDIANS ARE SUBJECT TO (FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION) AND WE THEREFORE INTIMATE NO VIEWS ON THE 
MATTER.' [FN29] IN EX PARTE PERO, SUPRA, THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TO A NONENROLLED 
INDIAN, WHO HAD BEEN CONVICTED OF MURDER IN A STATE COURT, HOLDING 
THAT THE INDIAN COULD ONLY BE TRIED IN FEDERAL COURT BY VIRTUE OF 
WHAT WAS THEN 18 U.S.C. 548, THE PREDECESSOR OF 18 U.S.C. 1153. 
THE COURT APPEARED TO BASE ITS HOLDING ON THE FACT THAT THE INDIAN 
WAS THE 'CHILD OF ONE INDIAN MOTHER AND HALFBLOOD FATHER, WHERE 
BOTH PARENTS ARE RECOGNIZED AS INDIANS AND MAINTAIN TRIBAL 
RELATIONS, WHO HIMSELF LIVES ON THE RESERVATION AND, MAINTAINS 
TRIBAL RELATIONS AND IS RECOGNIZED AS AN INDIAN * * * .' ID., AT 
31. WITH REGARD TO NONMEMBERS WHO ARE OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE FOR TRIBAL 
MEMBERSHIP WHO LIVE ON RESERVATIONS, PERO AT LEAST STANDS FOR THE 
PROPOSITION THAT THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN THE 'GUARDIAN-WARD 
RELATIONSHIP' IS SUFFICIENT TO SECURE A NONENROLLED INDIAN THE 
PROTECTION OF A FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDING AS OPPOSED TO TRIAL BY 
A STATE COURT. PERO IS, HOWEVER, PREDICATED ON A FEDERAL INTEREST 
WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO US TO DIFFER IN KIND FROM THE FEDERAL 
INTEREST IDENTIFIED IN MANCARI, FISHER, AND ANTELOPE. IN THOSE 
LATTER CASES, THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN PROMOTING INDIAN 
SELF-GOVERNMENT WAS SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AS A TOUCHSTONE OF THE 
COURT'S OPINIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THIS WEIGHTY INTEREST IS PRESENT 
IN S. 1214 IN A MORE ATTENUATED FORM WITH REGARD TO NONTRIBAL 
MEMBERS, EVEN THOSE LIVING ON RESERVATIONS. AN ELIGIBLE INDIAN WHO 
HAS CHOSEN, FOR WHATEVER REASONS, NOT TO ENROLL IN A TRIBE WOULD 
BE IN A POSITION TO ARGUE THAT DEPRIVING HIM OF ACCESS TO THE STATE 
COURTS ON MATTERS RELATED TO FAMILY LIFE WOULD BE INVIDIOUS. SUCH 
AN INDIAN PRESUMABLY HAS, UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE SAME RIGHT 
OF ASSOCIATION AS DO ALL CITIZENS, AND INDEED WOULD APPEAR TO BE 
IN NO DIFFERENT SITUATION FROM A NON-INDIAN LIVING ON A RESERVATION 
WHO, UNDER S. 1214, WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO STATE COURTS. THE ONLY 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM WOULD, IN FACT, BE THE RACIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORMER. WE ALSO THINK THAT EVEN PERO ONLY 
MARGINALLY SUPPORTS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THIS BILL AS APPLIED 
TO NONMEMBERS LIVING ON RESERVATIONS. IN PERO, THE FOCUS OF THE 
COURT'S INQUIRY WAS ON THE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE CONVICTED INDIAN 
AND THE INDIAN TRIBE AND RESERVATION. IN S. 1214, THE INQUIRY 
WOULD APPEAR TO BE SOLEY DIRECTED TO CONTACTS BETWEEN THE INDIAN 
CHILD AND THE INDIAN TRIBE, WHEREAS THE PERSONS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE 
MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE BILL ARE THE PARENTS OR GUARDIANS OF 
THE CHILD. [FN30J THUS, THERE IS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "THIS BILL AS APPLIED TO NONTRIBAL MEMBERS 
LIVING ON RESERVATIONS AND THE RATIONALE APPLIED BY_THE_COURT_IN 
MANCARI, FISHER. AND ANTELOPE WOULD NOT SAVE THE BILL. THE SIMPLE 
FACT IS THAT THE PARENTS OF AN INDIAN CHILD MAY FIND THEIR 
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS ALTERED BY VIRTUE OF THEIR INDIAN BLOOD AND THE 
SIMPLE FACT OF RESIDENCE ON A RESERVATION. THE COURT HAS NEVER 
SANCTIONED SUCH A RACIAL CLASSIFICATION WHICH DENIED SUBSTANTIVE 
RIGHTS, AND WE ARE UNABLE TO FIND ANY PERSUASIVE REASON TO SUGGEST 
THAT IT WOULD TO SO. OUR CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO NONMEMBERS 
LIVING ON RESERVATIONS IS EVEN MORE CERTAIN IN THE CONTEST OF 
NONMEMBERS LIVING OFF RESERVATIONS. IN SUCH A SITUATION, WE ARE 
FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE INDIAN OR POSSIBLE NON-INDIAN PARENT MAY 
B5TTBE "IWVlDIOUB'LY'DTSCRIMrNATED AGAINST UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
AND THAT THE_gRQVI5XQN~S_ QF_THIS .BILL_WOULD__BQ_ SO. ASSUMING A 
COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST WOULD OTHERWISE JUSTIFY THIS 
DISCRIMINATION, WE ARE UNABLE TO SUGGEST WHAT SUCH AN INTEREST 
MIGHT BE. FOR REASONS STATED ABOVE, WE CONSIDER THAT PART OF S. 
1214 RESTRICTING ACCESS TO STATE COURTS TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO TRIBAL MEMBERS. HOWEVER, WE THINK THAT S. 1214 IS OF 
DOUBTFUL CONSTITUTIONALITY AS APPLIED TO NONTRIBAL MEMBERS LIVING 
ON RESERVATIONS AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE HELD TO BE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO NONMEMBERS LIVING OFF RESERVATIONS. 
[FN31] THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET HAS ADVISED THAT THERE 
IS NO OBJECTION TO THE SUBMISSION OF THIS REPORT FROM THE 
STANDPOINT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM. SINCERELY, PATRICIA M. 
WALD, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 23, 1978. HON. MORRIS K. UDALL, CHAIRMAN, 
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: WE WOULD LIKE 
TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INDIAN AFFAIRS VERSION OF S. 1214, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 
1978. AS YOU KNOW, THE DEPARTMENT PRESENTED AT SOME LENGTH ITS 
VIEWS ON ONE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISED BY S. 1214 AS IT PASSED 
THE SENATE IN A LETTER TO YOU DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1978. [FN32] 
BRIEFLY, THAT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE CONCERNED THE FACT THAT S. 1214 
WOULD HAVE DEPRIVED PARENT OF INDIAN CHILDREN AS DEFINED BY THAT 
BILL OF ACCESS TO STATE COURTS FOR THE ADJUDICATION OF CHILD 
CUSTODY AND RELATED MATTERS BASED -OTTOM, ON THE RACIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIAN CHILD. S IN THAT LETTER OUR 
BELIEF THAT SUCH RACIAL CLASSIFICATION WAS SUSPECT UNDER THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT AND THAT WE SAW NO COMPELLING REASON WHICH MIGHT JUSTIFY 
ITS USE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN, FOR THE 
MOST PART, ELIMINATED IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE DRAFT, WHICH DEFINES 
'INDIAN CHILD' AS 'ANY UNMARRIED PERSON WHO IS UNDER AGE 18 AND IS 
EITHER (A) A MEMBER OF AN INDIAN TRIBE OR (B) ELIGIBLE FOR 
MEMBERSHIP IN AN INDIAN TRIBE AND IS THE BIOLOGICAL CHILD OF A 
MEMBER OF AN INDIAN TRIBE.' WE ARE STILL CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT 
EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL JURISDICTION BASED ON THE '(B)' PORTION OF THE 
DEFINITION OF 'INDIAN CHILD' MAY CONSTITUTE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION. 
SO LONG AS A PARENT WHO IS A TRIBAL MEMBER HAS LEGAL CUSTODY OF A 
CHILD WHO IS MERELY ELIGIBLE FOR MEMBERSHIP AT THE TIME OF A 
PROCEEDING, NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM ARISES. WHERE, HOWEVER, 
LEGAL CUSTODY._OF._A. -CHILD. WHO TS MERELY ETiTGIBLE-JOR-MEMBERSHIP—IS 
LODGED EXCLUSIVELY WITH NONTRIBAL MEMBERS, EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL 
JURISDICTION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BECAUSE NO ONE DIRECTLY AFFECTED 
BY_THE ADJUDICATION IS AN' ACTUAL_J!RIBAL_MEMBER. WE DO NOT THINK 
THAT THE BLOOD CONNECTION BETWEEN THE CHILD AND A BIOLOGICAL BUT 
NONCUSTODIAL PARENT IS A SUFFICIENT BASIS UPON WHICH TO DENY THE 
PRESENT PARENTS AND THE CHILD ACCESS TO STATE COURTS. THIS PROBLEM 
COULD BE RESOLVED EITHER BY LIMITING THE DEFINITION OF INDIAN CHILD 
TO CHILDREN WHO ARE ACTUALLY TRIBAL MEMBERS OR BY MODIFYING THE 
'(B)' PORTION TO READ, 'ELIGIBLE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN AN INDIAN TRIBE 
AND IS IN THE CUSTODY OF A PARENT WHO IS A MEMBER OF AN INDIAN 
TRIBE.' A SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MAY BE RAISED BY SEC. 
101(E) OF THE HOUSE DRAFT. THAT SECTION COULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE 
READ TO REQUIRE FEDERAL, STATE, AND OTHER COURTS TO GIVE 'FULL 
FAITH AND CREDIT' TO THE 'PUBLIC ACTS, RECORDS AND JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS OF ANY INDIAN TRIBE APPLICABLE TO INDIAN CHILD 
PLACEMENTS ' EVEN THOUGH SUCH PROCEEDINGS MIGHT NOT BE 'FINAL' 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS BILL ITSELF. SO READ, THE PROVISION MIGHT 
WELL RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS UNDER SEVERAL SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS. E.G., HALVEY V. HALVEY, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). [FN33] 
WE THINK THAT PROBLEM CAN BE RESOLVED BY AMENDING THAT PROVISION 
TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO BE GIVEN TO TRIBAL 
COURT ORDERS IS NO GREATER THAN THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ONE STATE 
IS REQUIRED TO GIVE TO THE COURT CORDERS OF A SISTER STATE. A THIRD 
AND MORE SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS, WE THINK, RAISED BY 
SECTION 102 OF THE HOUSE DRAFT. THAT SECTION, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH 
SECTIONS 103 AND 104, DEALS GENERALLY WITH THE HANDLING OF CUSTODY 
PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING INDIAN CHILDREN BY STATE COURTS. SECTION 102 
ESTABLISHES A FAIRLY DETAILED SET OF PROCEDURES AND SUBSTANTIVE 
STANDARDS WHICH STATE COURTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO FOLLOW AN 
ADJUDICATING THE PLACEMENT OF AN INDIAN CHILD AS DEFINED BY SECTION 
4(4) OF THE HOUSE DRAFT. AS WE UNDERSTAND SECTION 102, IT WOULD, 
FOR EXAMPLE, IMPOSE THESE DETAILED PROCEDURES ON A NEW YORK STATE 
COURT SITTING IN MANHATTAN WHERE THAT COURT WAS ADJUDICATING THE 
CUSTODY OF AN INDIAN CHILD AND EVEN THOUGH THE PROCEDURES OTHERWISE 
APPLICABLE IN THIS STATE-COURT PROCEEDING WERE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
SUFFICIENT. WHILE WE THINK THAT CONGRESS MIGHT IMPOSE SUCH 
REQUIREMENTS ON STATE COURTS EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER 
RESERVATION INDIANS PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 83-280, WE ARE NOT 
CONVINCED THAT CONGRESS' POWER TO CONTROL THE INCIDENTS OF SUCH 
LITIGATION INVOLVING NONRESERVATION INDIAN CHILDREN AND PARENTS 
PURSUANT TO THE INDIAN COMMERCE CLAUSE IS SUFFICIENT TO OVERRIDE 
THE SIGNIFICANT STATE INTEREST IN REGULATING THE PROCEDURES TO BE 
FOLLOWED BY ITS COURTS IN EXERCISING STATE JURISDICTION OVER WHAT 
IS A TRADITIONALLY STATE MATTER. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE FEDERAL 
INTEREST IN THE OFF-RESERVATION CONTEXT IS SO ATTENUATED THAT THE 
10TH AMENDMENT AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM PRECLUDED THE 
WHOLESALE INVASION OF STATE POWER CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 102. SEE 
HART, 'THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW,' 54 
COLUM.L.REV. 489, 508 (1954). [FN34] FINALLY, WE THINK THAT 
SECTION 101(B) OF THE HOUSE DRAFT SHOULD BE REVISED TO PERMIT ANY 
PARENT OR CUSTODIAN OF AN INDIAN CHILD OR THE CHILD HIMSELF, IF 
FOUND COMPETENT BY THE STATE COURT. TO OBJECT TO TRANSFER OF A 
PLACEMENT PROCEEDING TO A TRIBAL COURT. ALTHOUGH THE BALANCING OF 
INTERESTS BETWEEN PARENTS, CUSTODIAN, INDIAN CHILDREN, AND TRIBES 
IS NOT AN EASY ONE, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 
OF CONGRESS TO FORCE ANY OF THE PERSONS DESCRIBED ABOVE WHO ARE NOT 
IN FACT TRIBAL MEMBERS TO HAVE SUCH MATTERS HEARD BEFORE TRIBAL 
COURTS IS QUESTIONABLE UNDER OUR ANALYSIS OF SECTION 102 ABOVE AND 
THE VIEWS DISCUSSED ABOVE IN REGARD TO SECTION 4(4). 
II. NONCONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
THERE ARE, IN ADDITION, A NUMBER OF DRAFTING DEFICIENCIES IN 
THE HOUSE DRAFT. FIRST, WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SOME LANGUAGE USED 
IN SECTIONS 2 AND 3 REGARDING 'THE FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
CARE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE' AND THE 'SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO AMERICAN INDIAN PEOPLE. ' THE USE OF SUCH 
LANGUAGE HAS BEEN RELIED ON BY AT LEAST ONE COURT TO HOLD THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF INDIANS 
EVEN THOUGHT CONGRESS HAS NOT APPROPRIATED ANY MONEY FOR SUCH 
PURPOSES. WHITE V. CALIFANO, 437 F.SUPP. 543 (D.S.D. 1977). WE 
FEAR THE LANGUAGE IN THIS BILL COULD BE USED BY A COURT TO HOLD THE 
UNITED STATES LIABLE FOR THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF INDIAN FAMILIES 
FAR IN EXCESS OF THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE II OF THE BILL AND THE 
APPARENT INTENT OF THE DRAFTERS. SECOND, SECTION 101(A) OF THE 
HOUSE DRAFT, IF READ LITERALLY, WOULD APPEAR TO DISPLACE ANY 
EXISTING STATE COURT JURISDICTION OVER THESE MATTERS BASED ON 
PUBLIC LAW 83-280. WE DOUBT THAT "IS THE INTENT OF THE DRAFT 
BECAUSE, INTER ALIA, THERE MAY NOT BE IN EXISTENCE TRIBAL COURTS 
TO ASSUME SUCH STATE- COURT JURISDICTION AS WOULD APPARENTLY BE 
OBLITERATED BY THIS PROVISION. THIRD, THE APPARENT INTENT OF 
SECTION 4(10) IS, IN EFFECT, TO REESTABLISH THE DIMINISHED OR 
DISESTABLISHED BOUNDARIES OF INDIAN RESERVATIONS FOR THE LIMITED 
PURPOSE OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENTS. WE 
THINK THAT SUCH REESTABLISHMENT, IN ORDER TO AVOID POTENTIAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, SHOULD BE DONE IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER 
AFTER THE RESERVATIONS POTENTIALLY AFFECTED ARE IDENTIFIED AND 
CONGRESS HAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE IMPACT ON THE RESIDENTS 
OF THE AREA TO BE AFFECTED AND ANY OTHER FACTORS CONGRESS MAY DEEM 
APPROPRIATE. THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET HAS ADVISED THAT 
THERE IS NO OBJECTION TO THE PRESENTATION OF THIS LETTER AND THAT 
ENACTMENT OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS VERSION OF 
S. 1214 WOULD NOT WV CONSISTLHT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S 
OBJECTIVES. SINCERELY, JCIA M. WALD, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 
GENERAL. 
SENTING VIEWS 
H.R. 12533 SHOULD BE SENT BACK TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDIAN 
AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC LANDS FOR ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION BECAUSE OF 
MAJOR DEFECTS IN THE BILL AND BECAUSE OF INADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY FOR 
AFFECTED STATES AND AGENCIES TO TESTIFY ON THE BILL. I FEEL A 
SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO SUBMIT 
THIS DISSENTING OPINION BECAUSE I WAS THE ONLY MEMBER EXPRESSING 
GRAVE CONCERNS ABOUT MANY OF THE BILL'S PROVISIONS. LARGELY BECAUSE 
OF MY CONCERNS ABOUT LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIAN CHILD, THE 
NATURAL PARENTS, AND THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS, MANY CHANGES WERE MADE 
AT A STAFF LEVEL TO IMPROVE THE BILL. THESE CHANGES WERE MANY AND 
SUBSTANTIVE AND MUCH IMPROVEMENT WAS MADE IN THIS REGARD. 
AMENDMENTS ALSO HELPED IMPROVE THE BILL BUT MAJOR DEFECTS REMAIN. 
AMONG THESE NUMEROUS ISSUES ARE THE COST TO THE STATES TO ENFORCE 
THE PROVISIONS, NEW LAYERS OF PROGRAMS FOR INDIAN TRIBES, AND BASIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES LIKE STATE-INDIAN JURISDICTION. THESE WERE 
NOT CAREFULLY ENOUGH CONSIDERED DURING MARKUP. I CALL THESE 
PROBLEMS TO THE ATTENTION OF MY COLLEAGUES AND URGE THAT THE BILL 
BE REJECTED UNTIL THOSE ISSUES CAN MORE CAREFULLY BE DISCUSSED BY 
BOTH THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC. BELOW I DETAIL THE PROBLEMS. 
HISTORY OF H.R. MI'JJ 
H.R. 12533 IS THE OUTGROWTH OF S. 1214 WHICH WAS PASSED BY THE 
SENATE AND ASSIGNED TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS AND 
PUBLIC LANDS. THIS BILL WAS THE MARKUP VEHICLE IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE 
AND WAS REPORTED WITH VERY LITTLE DISCUSSION OR PARTICIPATION BY 
MEMBERS. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE MARKUP, THE SUBCOMMITTEE 
STAFF, APPARENTLY NOTING THE MAJOR DEFECTS OF S. 1214, DRAFTED AN 
ENTIRELY NEW BILL, H.R. 12533, AND CIRCULATED IT AS THE MARKUP 
VEHICLE FOR THE FULL INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. MARKUP 
WAS SCHEDULED FOR 2 OR 3 WEEKS DURING WHICH TIME I RAISED OBJECTION 
AND NUMEROUS QUESTIONS WHICH RESULTED IN MANY OF THE CHANGES BEING 
MADE TO IMPROVE THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS NOW CONTAINED IN THE BILL. 
TO MY KNOWLEDGE THE NEW BILL, H.R. 12533 AND THE SUBSEQUENT DRAFTS 
WERE NEVER GENERALLY CIRCULATED TO THE STATES, JUVENILE JUDGES, 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE WELFARE AGENCIES, OR EVEN TO THE INDIAN TRIBES. 
THE BILL SHOULD HAVE BEEN CIRCULATED FOR COMMENT IN LIGHT OF THE 
MAJOR REVISIONS MADE AND BEING CONSIDERED. 
MANY KFOPPS SOUGHT ADPITIONAI, TI.MK 
IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT MANY GROUPS, INCLUDING THE 
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND JUSTICE, EXPRESSED THE NEED FOR EITHER 
MAJOR CHANGES OR ADDITIONAL TIME TO STUDY THE BILL AND COMMENT. FOR 
EXAMPLE THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IN A LETTER DATED MAY 23, 1978, FOR 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL PATRICIA WALD TO THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 
EXPRESSED NUMEROUS PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH THE 
LANGUAGE IN " WHILE SOME OF THOSE PROBLEMS MAY HAVE BEEN 
ALLEVIATED IN H.R. 12533, I AM UNAWARE OF ANY FURTHER REVIEW BY THE 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. IN THAT LETTER, DISCUSSING THE HOUSE VERSION, 
MS. WALD RAISED SOME SERIOUS QUESTIONS: (1) WHETHER THE BILL UNDER 
WHITE V. CALIFANO MIGHT HOLD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF INDIANS EVEN THOUGH NO MONEY HAD BEEN 
APPROPRIATED, (2) WHETHER THE BILL MIGHT DISPLACE ANY EXISTING 
STATE COURT JURISDICTION ON INDIAN CHILD WELFARE MATTERS IN PUBLIC 
LAW 280 STATES EVEN WHERE TRIBAL COURTS DID NOT EXIST, AND (3) 
WHETHER THE BILL MIGHT HAVE THE EFFECT OF REESTABLISHING DIMINISHED 
OR DISESTABLISHED BOUNDARIES OF INDIAN RESERVATIONS FOR THE LIMITED 
PURPOSE OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILD PLACEMENTS. IN 
REGARD TO (3) SHE WROTE: WE THINK THAT SUCH REESTABLISHMENT, IN 
ORDER TO AVOID POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, SHOULD BE DONE 
IN A STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER AFTER THE RESERVATIONS POTENTIALLY 
AFFECTED ARE IDENTIFIED AND CONGRESS HAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BOTH 
THE IMPACT ON THE RESIDENTS OF THE AREA TO BE AFFECTED AND ANY 
OTHER FACTORS CONGRESS MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE. TO MY KNOWLEDGE THIS 
ISSUE WAS NEVER DISCUSSED. THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, IN A 
SEVEN-PAGE LETTER DATED JUNE 6, 1978 FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
FORREST J. GERARD, RAISED NUMEROUS QUESTIONS ABOUT H.R. 12533. 
AMONG OTHER CONSIDERATIONS MR. GERARD SAID: WE BELIEVE THAT MANY 
OF THE AUTHORITIES GRANTED BY TITLE II OF THE BILL ARE UNNECESSARY 
BECAUSE THE DUPLICATE AUTHORITIES IN PRESENT LAW, AND THEREFORE, 
WE RECOMMEND THE DELETION OF TITLE II. I WOULD POINT OUT THAT TITLE 
II REMAINS IN THE BILL LARGELY AS DRAFTED AND THAT IT EVEN PROVIDES. 
PAYMENT TO ADOPTIVE PARENTS OF INDIAN CHILDREN. IN ADDITION, IT 
PROVIDES FOR CONSTRUCTION OF INDIAN FAMILY SERVICE FACILITIES OFF 
OF RESERVATIONS REGARDLESS OF THE SIZE OF THE TRIBE OR THE 
AVAILABILITY OF EXISTING SERVICES AND FACILITIES. IT SHOULD BE 
NOTED THAT MANY OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY MR. GERARD, WHO IS A 
STRONG ADVOCATE OF INDIAN, WERE NOT, IN MY OPINION, PROPERLY 
ADDRESSED. IN A MEMORANDUM DATED JUNE 19, 1978, FROM THE 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ADDITIONAL POINTS WERE RAISED WHICH 
I BELIEVE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED MORE THOROUGHLY. ASIDE FROM 
THE ABOVE FEDERAL CONCERNS, I AM EVEN MORE DISTRESSED BY OBJECTIONS 
RAISED BY OFFICIALS IN MY STATE OF MONTANA AFTER I FORWARDED A COPY 
OF THE BILL FOR REVIEW. ONE JUNE 20, 1978, THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM 
WAS RECEIVED BY THE COMMITTEE FROM GOV. THOMAS L. JUDGE, OF 
MONTANA. IT HAS COME TO MY ATTENTION THAT YOU HAVE SCHEDULED THE 
MARKUP ON H.R. 12533, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT. THIS 
LEGISLATION IDENTIFIES SOME REAL PROBLEMS AND WE ARE IN AGREEMENT 
WITH THE INTENT OF THE BILL. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE SOME ILL 
EFFECT. I URGE YOU TO HOLD HEARINGS ON THE BILL TO ALLOW US TIME 
TO PRESENT OUR CONCERN. I AM SURE YOU WANT TO INSURE THAT PROBLEMS 
ARE SOLVED WITHOUT CREATING NEW ONES AT THE SAME TIME. THANK YOU 
VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION OF THIS REQUEST. THAT MESSAGE WAS 
RECEIVED JUST 1 DAY BEFORE REPORTING THE BILL AND THE REQUEST WAS 
NOT GRANTED. I SUSPECT THE CONCERNS OF GOVERNOR JUDGE WOULD HAVE 
BEEN REFLECTED BY OTHER STATES, ESPECIALLY PUBLIC LAW 280 STATES, 
HAD THEY BEEN MORE AWARE OF THE PROVISIONS. BELOW IS A LETTER FROM 
THE STATE OF MONTANA ATTORNEY FOR SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION 
SERVICES. THE LETTER IS UNSIGNED BECAUSE IT WAS FIRST TRANSMITTED 
TO ME BY TELECOPIER ON THE DAY BEFORE THE MARKUP AND SUBSEQUENTLY 
SENT IN THE FORM BELOW AND NOT RECEIVED IN MY OFFICE UNTIL 5 DAYS 
AFTER THE MARKUP. - SUGGEST ALL MEMBERS WILL WANT TO KCIMJ xtixb 
LETTER BEFORE VOTING ON THE BILL. STATE OF MONTANA, SOCIAL AND 
REHABILITATION SERVICES, HELENA, MONT., JUNE 20, 1978. HON. RON 
MARLENEE, CONGRESSMAN FROM MONTANA, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
WASHINGTON, D.C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN MARLENE: IN RESPONSE TO A 
REQUEST FROM BOB ZIEMER OF YOUR STAFF, THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS 
OF THE MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES HAS 
REVIEWED H.R. 12533— THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT. OUR STUDY OF 
THE BILL HAS BEEN HURRIED, BUT WE CAN FORESEE NUMEROUS PROBLEMS IN 
THE DELIVERY OF SOCIAL SERVICES TO MONTANA INDIAN CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES IF THE ACT IS PASSED IN ITS PRESENT FORM. FOR THIS REASON 
WE URGE YOU TO ASK THE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS 
TO DEFER FURTHER MARKUP ON THE BILL UNTIL AFFECTED STATES, AND 
ESPECIALLY MONTANA, CAN MORE FULLY COMMENT ON ITS CONSEQUENCES. 
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ASIDE, SEVERAL PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
ARE READILY APPARENT FROM READING THE BILL. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH 
THE BILL REQUIRES STATE COURTS TO GIVE PREFERENCE TO CERTAIN HOMES 
IN PLACING INDIAN CHILDREN BASED ON EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD, THE 
BILL DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY MECHANISM REQUIRING THE FAMILY OR THE 
TRIBE TO PRESENT SUCH EVIDENCE. NOR DOES IT CREATE A MEANS BY 
WHICH ALREADY OVERBURDENED STATE COURTS CAN DISCOVER SUCH EVIDENCE 
ON THEIR OWN. BUT EVEN MORE DISTURBING TO THE MONTANA DEVELOPMENT 
OF SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION SERVICES IS THE BILL'S LACK OF CLARITY 
ON THE ISSUE OF PAYMENT FOR SOCIAL SERVICES FOR INDIAN CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES. SECTION 201(B) OF TITLE II OF THE BILL STATES: THE 
PROVISION OR POSSIBILITY OF ASSISTANCE UNDER THIS ACT SHALL NOT BE 
A BASIS FOR THE DENIAL OR REDUCTION OF ANY ASSISTANCE OTHERWISE 
AUTHORIZED UNDER TITLES IV-B AND XX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OR 
ANY OTHER OTHER FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAM. THIS LANGUAGE SUGGESTS 
A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT A STATE WHOSE COURTS HAD NOT EXERCISED 
JURISDICTION OVER AN INDIAN CHILD OR FAMILY WOULD BE CALLED UPON 
TO FUND AT LEAST PART OF THE SOCIAL SERVICES DELIVERED TO THAT 
INDIAN CHILD OR FAMILY. THIS OFFICE BELIEVES THAT IN ALL CASES IN 
WHICH AN INDIAN TRIBAL COURT EXERCISES JURISDICTION OVER THE 
FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR PROVIDING SOCIAL SERVICES SHOULD FALL 
EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE TRIBE AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, 
IT APPEARS THAT TRIBAL COURTS MAY PICK AND CHOOSE THOSE INDIAN 
CHILDREN OVER WHICH THEY WTT.T, KXFRCTSF .TTTPTSnTPTTnKf Hf>WFVFT?f ST&TK 
COURTS ARE ALLOWED NO CHOICE. ONE POTENTIAL RESULT, OF COURSE, IS 
THAT TRIBAL COURTS WILL WAIVE JURISDICTION IN ALL DIFFICULT OR 
EXPENSIVE CASES WHILE STATE COURTS AND, HENCE, THE STATE AGENCIES 
ADMINISTERING TITLE IV AND TITLE XX WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO 
ACCEPT THOSE CASES. SUCH A SITUATION IS CLEARLY INEQUITABLE. AS 
CAN BE SEEN FROM THESE COMMENTS THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT LEAVES 
MANY ISSUES UNRESOLVED. ALTHOUGH QUICK ACTION ON THE BILL MAY BE 
POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT, THE MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND 
REHABILITATION SERVICES STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT FULL AND 
DELIBERATE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ALL ASPECTS OF THE BILL. IF 
WE CAN PROVIDE FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO YOU, PLEASE FEE FREE TO 
CONTACT US. SINCERELY YOURS, RICHARD A. WEBER, STAFF ATTORNEY, 
OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND 
REHABILITATION SERVICES. WITH REGARD TO THE ABOVE LETTER, MEMBERS 
WILL NOTE THE CONCERN EXPRESSED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE FINANCIAL 
BURDEN. I NEED NOT REMIND MY COLLEAGUES THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR 
COSTS OF LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS ARE THE COURTS. AND IN LIGHT 
OF THE PROPOSITION 13 ATTITUDE ACROSS THIS COUNTRY I QUESTION THE 
WISDOM OF PASSING LEGISLATION WHICH MAY HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON 
STATE AND COUNTY BUDGETS WITHOUT ONE IOTA OF EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
AS TO WHAT THAT COST MIGHT BE. ON THIS ISSUE ALONG THE BILL OUGHT 
TO BE REJECTED AND RETURNED TO COMMITTEE FOR ADDITIONAL HEARINGS. 
IT SHOULD BE NOTED, IN FAIRNESS, THAT MANY CHURCH GROUPS URGED 
PASSAGE OF THE BILL. HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC 
CHARITIES RAISED MANY SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. WHILE MANY OF THOSE 
WERE RESOLVED IN THE REDRAFTING OF THE BILL AND THE AMENDMENT 
PROCESS, OTHER REMAIN OUTSTANDING. BUT PERHAPS ONE OF THE STRONGEST 
ARGUMENTS FOR DEFEATING THE BILL CAME IN A LETTER OF JUNE 12, 1978, 
FROM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATORS. 
THE CONCLUDING PARAGRAPH OF THAT LETTER SAID: THE NATIONAL COUNCIL 
OF STATE PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATORS BELIEVES THAT H.R. 12533 
SHOULD NOT BE ENACTED PRIOR TO A MUCH BROADER CONSULTATION THAN HAS 
THUS FAR BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE RESPONSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. 
ENCLOSED IS A RESOLUTION APPROVED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF 38 STATES 
AND TWO JURISDICTIONS PRESENT AT THE COUNCIL MEETING ON JUNE 7-8, 
1978 IN SUPPORT OF THIS RECOMMENDATION. BELOW IS A COPY OF THE 
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY OVER TWO-THIRDS OF THE STATES PUBLIC WELFARE 
ADMINISTRATORS. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE PUBLIC WELFARE 
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION, 
WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 7, 1978. 
SOCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS [FN35] 
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE— ACT— H.R. 12533 (S. 1214) 
1. SUPPORT OBJECTIVES OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO ESTABLISH 
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST SEPARATION OF INDIAN CHILDREN FROM THEIR PARENTS 
AND INAPPROPRIATE FOSTER CARE OR ADOPTIVE PLACEMENTS OUTSIDE THE 
CULTURAL SETTING OF THE INDIAN CHILD. 2. RECOMMEND THE COUNCIL 
NOTE THAT, WHILE MANY CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGES OVER THE SENATE-PASSED 
BILL (S. 1214) HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE HOUSE VERSION, THERE 
REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PROVISIONS WHOSE IMPACT ON INDIAN 
FAMILIES, TRIBAL COURTS, STATE COURTS, AND STATE AND LOCAL CHILD 
WELFARE SERVICES PROGRAMS NEED TO BE EXPLORED MORE EXTENSIVELY THAN 
HAS BEEN DONE. 3. EXPRESS CONCERN THAT THE BILL AS WRITTEN MAY 
WORK AGAINST ITS OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING STABILITY AND PERMANENCY 
FOR THE INDIAN CHILD WHOSE HOME SITUATION IS SUCH THAT TEMPORARY 
OR PERMANENT PLACEMENT BECOMES A NECESSITY, AND THAT THE RESULT MAY 
BE MANY SUCH CHILDREN WILL BE WELL SERVED NEITHER BY THE 
STATE/LOCAL PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM OR BY THE INDIAN COMMUNITY. 
4. RECOMMEND THAT H.R. 12533 IN ITS JUNE 7 VERSION BE WIDELY 
DISSEMINATED FOR DISCUSSION AMONG AFFECTED GROUPS, INCLUDING THE 
MORE THAN 270 FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED GOVERNING BODIES OF INDIAN 
TRIBES, BANDS, AND GROUPS, AS WELL AS TO REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE 
COURTS, JUVENILE JUDGES, AND PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CHILD WELFARE 
SERVICES AGENCIES, BEFORE BEING DEBATED BY THE FULL HOUSE. IN 
ADDITION, IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT A TELEGRAM WAS RECEIVED BY 
THE FULL COMMITTEE JUST PRIOR TO MARKUP FROM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL 
OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, OR A SIMILAR ORGANIZATION, 
ASKING FOR ADDITIONAL TIME FOR REVIEW. I DID NOT SEE A COPY OF 
THAT COMMUNICATION BUT I WAS ADVISED IT EXISTS. I APOLOGIZE FOR 
THIS LENGTH DISSENT BECAUSE BASICALLY I AGREE THAT SOME LEGISLATION 
IS NEEDED TO GIVE INDIAN TRIBES GREATER VOICE IN THE PLACEMENT OF 
INDIAN CHILDREN. HOWEVER, THIS BILL GOES WAY BEYOND WHAT IS NEEDED 
BY AUTHORIZING A WHOLE NEW LAYER OF INDIAN PROGRAMS BOTH ON AND OFF 
THE RESERVATIONS, PAYMENTS TO ADOPTIVE PARENTS OF ADOPTED CHILDREN, 
A CERTAIN IMPACT ON STATE COURTS, AND THE POSSIBLE UPSETTING OF 
BOUNDARIES FOR JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS. FOR THESE AND THE OTHER 
REASONS OUTLINED ABOVE I URGE MY COLLEAGUES TO DEFEAT THIS BILL. 
RON MARLENEE. 
FN1 H.R. 12533 WAS INTRODUCED BY REPRESENTATIVES UDALL, 
RONCALIO, BAUCUS, BINGHAM, BLOUIN, BURKE OF CALIFORNIA, PHILIP 
BURTON, CARR, DELLUMS, FRASER, MILLER OF CALIFORNIA, RISENHOOVER, 
SEIBERLING STARK, TSONGAS, VENTO, AND WEAVER. A SIMILAR BILL, S. 
1214, HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE SENATE. 
FN2 TESTIMONY OF VALANCIA THACKER BEFORE TASK FORCE 4 OF THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION. 
FN3 6 L.ED. 23. 
FN4 65 S.CT. 1373, 89 L.ED. 1782. 
FN5 88 S.CT. 362, 19 L.ED.2D 438. 
FN6 88 S.CT. 2096, 20 L.ED.2D 1166. 
FN7 91 S.CT. 1704, 29 L.ED.2D 233. 
FN8 23 L.ED. 833. 
FN9 67 S.CT. 810, 91 L.ED. 967. 
FN10 8 L.ED. 483. 
FN11 6 S.CT. 1109, 30 L.ED. 228. 
FN12 36 S.CT. 696, 60 L.ED. 1192. 
FN13 18 L.ED. 182. 
FN14 28 S.CT. 399, 52 L.ED. 520. 
FN15 79 S.CT. 269, 3 L.ED.2D 251. 
FN16 34 S.CT. 387, 58 L.ED. 691. 
FN17 94 S.CT. 2474, 41 L.ED.2D 290. 
FN18 19 S.CT. 722, 43 L.ED. 1041. 
FN19 35 S.CT. 135, 59 L.ED. 308. 
FN20 4 L.ED. 579. 
FN21 70 S.CT. 105, 94 L.ED. 100. 
FN22 72 S.CT. 312, 96 L.ED. 3°P. 
FN23 44 S.CT. 13, 68 L.ED. 143. 
FN24 44 S.CT. 11, 68 L.ED. 140. 
FN25 92 S.CT. 1208, 31 L.ED.2D 551. 
FN26 95 S.CT. 1082, 43 L.ED.2D 300, REHEARING DENIED 95 
S.CT. 1667, 421 U.S. 939, 44 L.ED.2D 95. 
FN27 SPECIFICALLY, THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN WHICH THE CRIME 
OCCURRED, DID NOT HAVE A FELONY MURDER RULE SO THAT, IN ORDER TO 
BE CONVICTED OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER, THE STATE WOULD HAVE HAD TO 
PROVE CERTAIN ELEMENTS THAT WERE NOT REQUIRED TO BE PROVEN IN THE 
FEDERAL TRIAL BECAUSE A FELONY-MURDER RULE WAS IN EFFECT IN THE 
LATER COURT. 
FN28 94 S.CT. 2474, 41 L.ED.2D 290. 
FN29 45 U.S.L.W., AT 4363 N. 7. 
FN30 AS WE UNDERSTAND THE BILL, THIS DENIAL OF ACCESS OF 
STATE COURTS WOULD BE PREDICATED ON THE EXISTENCE OF 'SIGNIFICANT 
CONTACTS' BETWEEN THE INDIAN CHILD AND AN INDIAN TRIBE AND THAT 
THIS ISSUE WOULD BE 'AN ISSUE OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT 
ON THE BASIS OF SUCH CONSIDERATIONS AS: MEMBERSHIP IN A TRIBE, 
FAMILY TIES WITHIN THE TRIBE, PRIOR RESIDENCY ON THE RESERVATIONS 
FOR APPRECIABLE PERIODS OF TIME, RESERVATION DOMICILE, THE 
STATEMENTS OF THE CHILD DEMONSTRATING A STRONG SENSE OF 
SELF-IDENTITY AS AN INDIAN, OR ANY OTHER ELEMENTS WHICH REFLECT A 
CONTINUING TRIBAL RELATIONSHIP.' THE BILL IS UNCLEAR AS TO WHETHER 
THIS DETERMINATION WOULD BE MADE BY A TRIBAL COURT OR STATE COURT. 
FN31 WE ALSO NOTE OUR CONCERN WITH THE LANGUAGE USED IN 
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF THE BILL REGARDING 'THE FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR THE CARE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE' AND THE 'SPECIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO AMERICAN INDIAN PEOPLE.' 
THE USE OF SUCH LANGUAGE HAS BEEN USED BY AT LEAST ONE COURT TO 
HOLD THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
OF INDIANS EVEN THOUGH CONGRESS HAD NOT APPROPRIATED ANY MONEY FOR 
SUCH PURPOSES. WHITE V. CALIFANO, ET AL. , CIV. NO. 76-5031, USDC, 
S. DAK. (SEPTEMBER 12, 1977). WE FEAR THE LANGUAGE IN THIS BILL 
COULD BE USED BY A COURT TO HOLD THE UNITED STATES LIABLE FOR THE 
FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF INDIAN FAMILIES FAR IN EXCESS OF THE 
PROVISIONS OF TITLE II OF THE BILL AND THE INTENT OF CONGRESS. 
FN32 THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THAT LETTER WERE SUBSEQUENTLY 
PRESENTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC LANDS 
OF YOUR HOUSE COMMITTEE IN TESTIMONY BY THIS DEPARTMENT ON MAR. 9, 
1978. 
FN33 67 S.CT. 903, 91 L.ED. 1133. 
FN34 WE NOTE THAT WE ARE AWARE OF NO CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS 
WHICH WOULD INDICATE THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING STATE-COURT 
PROCEDURES UTILIZED IN THESE CUSTODY CASES, EVEN ASSUMING THAT SUCH 
FINDINGS WOULD STRENGTHEN CONGRESS' HAND IN THIS PARTICULAR MATTER. 
AS A POLICY MATTER, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT THE VIEWS OF THE STATES 
SHOULD BE SOLICITED BEFORE CONGRESS ATTEMPTED TO OVERRIDE STATE 
POWER IN THIS FASHION, A POSITION THIS DEPARTMENT TOOK IN TESTIMONY 
BEFORE THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS ON SENATE 
JOINT RESOLUTION 102 ON FEB. 27, 1978. 
FN35 APPROVED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE PUBLIC 
WELFARE ADMINISTRATORS ON JUNE 7, 1978. (Note: 1. PORTIONS OF THE 
SENATE, HOUSE AND CONFERENCE REPORTS, WHICH ARE DUPLICATIVE OR ARE 
DEEMED TO BE UNNECESSARY TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS, ARE 
OMITTED. OMITTED MATERIAL IS INDICATED BY FIVE ASTERISKS: *****. 
2. TO RETRIEVE REPORTS ON A PUBLIC LAW, RUN A TOPIC FIELD SEARCH 
USING THE PUBLIC LAW NUMBER, e.g., TO(99-495)) H.R. REP. 95-1386, 
H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1978, 1978 USCC&AN 7530, 
1978 WL 8515 (Leg.Hist.) 
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date on which the child was placed or the plan was commenced, 
whichever occurs later, that failure to comply is evidence of failure 
of parental adjustment. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-3a-409. Specific considerations where child is not in physical 
custody of parent. 
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or 
parents, the court, in determining whether parental rights should be 
terminated shall consider, but is not limited to, the following: 
(a) the services provided or offered to the parent or parents to 
facilitate a reunion with the child; 
(b) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and needs of the 
child and his desires regarding the termination, if the court 
determines he is of sufficient capacity to express his desires; and 
(c) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust their 
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child's best 
interest to return him to his home after a reasonable length of time, 
including but not limited to: 
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and 
maintenance, if financially able; 
(ii) maintenance of regular visitation or other contact with the child 
that was designed and carried out in a plan to reunite the child with 
the parent or parents; and 
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the 
custodian of the child. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard 
incidental conduct, contributions, contacts, and communications. 
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or have 
neglected a child the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the 
following conditions: 
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the 
parent that renders him unable to care for the immediate and 
continuing physical or emotional needs of the child for extended 
periods of time; 
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, or sexually 
cruel or abusive nature; 
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, controlled 
substances, or dangerous drugs that render the parent unable to care 
for the child; 
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child with adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, education, or other care necessary for his 
physical, mental, and emotional health and development by a parent or 
parents who are capable of providing that care. However, a parent who, 
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, does not provide 
specified medical treatment for a child is not for that reason alone a 
negligent or unfit parent; 
(e) conviction of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of such a 
nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to provide adequate 
care to the extent necessary for the child's physical, mental, or 
emotional health and development; 
(f) with regard to a child who is in the custody of the division, if 
the parent is incarcerated as a result of conviction of a felony, and 
the sentence is of such length that the child will be deprived of a 
normal home for more than one year; 
(g) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a sibling of the child due to 
known or substantiated abuse or neglect by the parent or parents; 
(h) a history of violent behavior; or 
(i) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely disabling injury 
to or disfigurement of the child. 
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division and the 
parent or parents fail to comply substantially with the terms and 
conditions of a plan to reunite the family within six months after the 
wilfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the 
circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement, 
and there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be 
capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the near 
future; 
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this chapter; 
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the parent or parents: 
(a) to support or communicate with the child; 
(b) to prevent neglect of the child; 
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional 
abuse of the child; or 
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent; 
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished their parental 
rights to the child, and the court finds that termination is in the 
child's best interest; or 
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during which the 
child was returned to live in his own home, substantially and 
continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child proper 
parental care and protection. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination. 
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have abandoned a 
child, it is prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or 
parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have surrendered 
physical custody of the child, and for a period of six months 
following the surrender have not manifested to the child or to the 
person having the physical custody of the child a firm intention to 
resume physical custody or to make arrangements for the care of the 
child; or 
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail, telephone, or 
otherwise for six months or failed to have shown the normal interest 
of a natural parent, without just cause. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-3a-402. Judicial process for termination - Parent unfit or 
incompetent - Best interest of child. 
(1) This part provides a judicial process for voluntary and 
involuntary severance of the parent-child relationship, designed to 
safeguard the rights and interests of all parties concerned and 
promote their welfare and that of the state. 
(2) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened and 
preserved, but if a parent is found, by reason of his conduct or 
condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon any of the grounds 
for termination described in this part, the court shall then consider 
the welfare and best interest of the child of paramount importance in 
determining whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-3a-404. Petition - Who may file. 
(1) (a) Any interested party may file a petition for termination of 
the parent-child relationship with regard to a child. 
(b) A child's foster parent may file a petition for termination of 
parental rights so long as that foster parent intends to pursue 
adoption and has had physical custody of the child for one year or 
longer. A foster parent does not lose standing to file a petition 
under this section solely because the division removes the child from 
that home. 
(2) The attorney general shall file a petition for termination of 
parental rights under this part on behalf of the division. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental rights. 
The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to one or 
both parents if it finds any one of the following: 
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child; 
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused the child; 
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent; 
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement 
under the supervision of the court or the division, that the division 
or other responsible agency has made a diligent effort to provide 
appropriate services and the parent has substantially neglected, 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 89-CV-69-U 
The above entitled matter having come on for hearing before 
the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, District Judge, on the 15th day of 
August, 1989, Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney, 
Ray E. Nash, the Defendant was in default and did not appear. The 
Plaintiff was sworn and examined and the matter was submitted to 
the Court, the Court having heretofore made and entered in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from the Defendant 
and the same is so ordered, to become final when the Findings and 
Decree are filed with the registry of actions in the District Court 
of Uintah County. 
2. That the care, custody and control of the minor children 
David Alan Coando born December 2, I979f Paul Dean Coando born 
December 2, 1979, and Sky Deona Coando born April 15, 1987, is 
awarded to the Plaintiff subject to reasonable rights of visitation 
in the Defendant at reasonable times, reasonable pl-aces, and under 
reasonable circumstances. 
3. The Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $75.00 per 
month per child as child support until each child reaches the age 
of eighteen. 
4. It is ordered that Plaintiff shall be entitled to all of 
the benefits provided for in the Utah statutes paragraph 78-45d(l) 
et seq. in the event of the Defendant's failure to pay and continue 
the support money provided for herein. 
5. It is ordered that the Plaintiff is awarded their personal 
paraphernalia and a few items of furniture, fixtures, and household 
effects who needs them for the care and support of the minor 
children. 
6. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to refrain from 
any activity or influence, verbal or otherwise, in connection with 
the minor children that might tend to alienate from or influence 
the minor child against the other party hereto. 
7. Thac the Plaintiff is awarded the home which is in her own 
name and which she is makinq all of the payments on it and the 
Defendant has no ownership right in connection therewith. 
8. It is further ordered that the Court shall retain 
jurisdiction of this matter to make such future orders as may be 
necessary in connection herewith, 
DATED this f^7^ day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
/y Jw*^ J£^^*ga 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
